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Director: Dr. Gary Schafran 
 The author assessed the risk to a wastewater pump station and a planned 
replacement located nearby due to coastal flooding and rising sea levels. The locations 
for the pump stations are in the Larchmont neighborhood by the Lafayette River tidal 
estuaries in Norfolk, Virginia. The Lafayette River is a tributary to the Elizabeth River, 
which flows to the Chesapeake Bay. The low-lying areas along the river are subject to 
coastal surges caused by tropical and extra-tropical storms that flood the bay. 
 
 The region is considered one of the urban areas most exposed to the accelerating 
rate of rising sea levels. Six of the highest storm surges on record have occurred since 
2003 and even more moderate events have inundated the existing pump station. The 
flooding impacts the service and reduces the life cycle performance of the pump system. 
 
 The study compares the vulnerability of the existing pump station to an alternative 
to replace the station in a new location. It uses systems engineering to define the 
challenge caused by coastal flooding and future sea levels, and risk-informed decision 





pump station reduces relative risk due to coastal flooding nearly fivefold; but over the 50-
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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH PROBLEM CONTENT 
 
1.1 Problem Background 
 
  In May 2014, Kristen Lentz, PE, Director of Utilities for the City of Norfolk, 
asked if Old Dominion University (ODU) could revisit applications for grant funds to 
increase the resiliency of four submersible wastewater pump stations. (See Appendix A, 
May 23, 2014 entry.) The city submitted Pre-Application Form DR-4092-VA, Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) to the Commonwealth of Virginia to seek Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funds to reduce the exposure of Pump Stations 
(PS) 109, 112, 113, and 114 (City of Norfolk, 2013b). All four are located in low-lying 
areas along the Lafayette River, a tidal estuary in the Lockhaven and 
Larchmont/Edgewater neighborhoods. 
 
 The city sought the funds to improve the resiliency of the pump stations when 
exposed to coastal flooding. The application noted such actions as (1) elevating control 
panels, (2) installing new submersible pumps, (3) raising the wet well elevations, and (4) 
installing watertight hatches. In the case of PS 113, the city is preparing to replace the 
existing station with a new station located on higher ground one block in-land (west) 






 Ms. Lentz noted that the Commonwealth rejected the four pre-applications stating 
the risk to the stations was too low to justify the funding. She asked if the College of 
Engineering and Technology could study the risk to these stations.  
 
 Further discussions led to a refinement of the problem statement. The author 
proposed assessing the impact on PS 113 and its alternative to compare how 
improvements increased resiliency. Figure 1 provides a vicinity map and Appendix A 
















1.2 Project Problem Statement 
 
 The problem statement is to determine the risk to existing Pump Station 113 and 
its planned replacement to an increase in coastal flooding caused by rising sea levels. The 
location for the existing pump station is in the Larchmont/Edgewater neighborhood at the 
corner of Walnut Hill Street and Sylvan Street. The new location is one block west at the 
corner of Walnut Hill Street and Rolfe Avenue. Figure 2 shows the sewerage shed area 
and pictures of the site are in Appendix A. 
 
 The Lafayette River tidal estuary drains into the Elizabeth River that leads to the 
Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. The low-lying areas along the river are subject 
to tidal flooding, and coastal surges caused by tropical and extra-tropical storms that 
flood the bay. There is an open storm drain at the east end of Walnut Hill Street where 
these hazards often flow up into the street, backup runoff from rain events and extend the 














 Also, the tidal areas of Southeastern Virginia are experiencing an increased 
frequency of flooding due to rising sea levels (Boon, Wang, & Shen, 2008). 
Combinations of changes in the climate, regional subsidence, and ocean currents have 
caused regional sea levels to rise. In addition, the scientific community expects the rate of 
change to increase over the 21st century. As a consequence, future storm events will 
occur on ever increasing tide levels resulting in more frequent and extensive flooding of 










1.3 Project Study Objective 
 
 This study objective is to define present and future flood hazards, and analyze the 
impact of these hazards on the operational performance of the existing and new pump 
stations. The analysis translates the impact into a risk-informed decision framework that 
assesses the pumps’ resiliency to coastal flooding. 
 
 The risk is a function of exposure to flood stages, pump station failure modes, and 
consequences due to failure. The results show how this combination changes as flood 
stages change over time and compares the difference in performance between the existing 
and new pump station locations. In addition, the framework provides the Department of 
Utilities a means to communicate the risks and the need for any adaptive actions to City 







LITERATURE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION 
 
2.1 Outline for the Literature Review 
 
 The project question is: what is the risk to the existing Pump Station 113 and its 
planned new location to an increase in coastal flooding caused by rising sea levels? In 
order to address the question, it is necessary to determine how to assess the risk to a 
submersible wastewater pump station exposed to present day and future levels of coastal 
flooding. The literature review uses a list of subset questions listed below to outline an 
approach to develop an appropriate methodology to assess the risk. The review is 
structured to first understand an approach applicable to any form of infrastructure and 
then outline methods specific to submersible wastewater pumps.  
 
a. What is the problem scenario? 
b. What is an appropriate way to assess the problem scenario? 
c. What is the appropriate risk-informed decision methodology to evaluate 
impacts? 
d. How do rising sea levels impact the performance of the pump stations? 
e. What is an appropriate means to demonstrate the impact on the performance 













2.2 Review by Subset Questions 
 
2.2.1 Subset Question a: What is the problem scenario? 
 
 The City of Norfolk and the greater Hampton Roads region are experiencing an 
increase in the rate of coastal flooding caused by rising sea levels. The Virginian-Pilot 
has published numerous newspaper articles on how vulnerable the Tidewater region of 
southeastern Virginia is to rising sea levels (Tompkins & DeConcini, 2014). These media 
accounts have referenced sources identifying the Norfolk area as having the highest 
relative sea level rise rate on the east coast. They also have identified Norfolk as the most 
exposed urban environment in the United States, second only to New Orleans 
 
 An example that reinforces this perception is a study by the Virginia Institute of 
Marine Sciences (VIMS) that explains how sea level rise is increasing the region’s 
vulnerability to the impacts of storm surge (Boon, 2005). The study compares the impact 
of Hurricane Isabel in 2003 with an unnamed hurricane in 1933 using data recorded on 
Tide Gauge 8838610, Sewells Point, Virginia located at Naval Station, Norfolk. Even 
though the 2003 event produced a lesser surge of approximately 1.45 meters (m), the 
storm tide high water marks equaled those of the 1933 hurricane that produced a surge of 
about 1.78 m. Boon (2005) in the above reference attributes the comparable impact of the 
lesser storm to the fact that sea levels in the region had risen some 0.30 m over the 70-






 More recently, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
website provided data on extreme water levels for the Sewells Point, Virginia (VA) tide 
gauge (NOAA, 2015). Figure 3 shows the historic upward trend in water levels and 
includes the 1 - percent (%), 10%, 50%, and 99% annual exceedence probability levels in 












 As evidence of this trend, NOAA includes a link at the same webpage to tables of 
the Top Ten Highest Water Levels for Long Term Stations in both feet and meters above 
Mean Higher-High Water (MHHW) (as of June 2014). Table 1 lists the top ten events for 
the Sewells Point Tidal Gauge. The trend shows four events occurred over 73 continuous 
years in the 20
th
 Century or about one every 18 years; however, six have occurred since 





Table 1. NOAA Top Ten Highest Water Levels for Tide Gauge 8838610 Sewells 













8.23.1933 5.26 6.41 8.02 
9.18.2003 5.13 6.28 7.89 
11.12.2009 4.97 6.12 7.73 
8.28.2011 4.80 5.95 7.56 
3.7.1962 4.46 5.61 7.22 
10.29.2012 4.04 5.19 6.80 
9.18.1936 3.96 5.11 6.72 
11.22.2006 3.87 5.02 6.63 
2.5.1998 3.82 4.97 6.58 




 From a historic perspective, changes in sea levels have been relatively stable and 
our community has enjoyed imperceptible changes since its founding 500 years ago 
(Figure 4). However, for the first time in 7000 years, people are experiencing changes in 
sea levels that are perceptible and disruptive to our way of life. We now face the potential 














 From a scientific perspective, it is the uncertainty associated with projecting a rate 
of rise and quantifying impacts that creates the complexity. In 1987, the National 
Research Council (NRC) warned that historic sea level rise trends have the potential to 
start accelerating (NRC, 1987). It further advised that the rate of future sea level rise is 
too uncertain to estimate expected probabilities. Therefore, the NRC recommends 
developing sea level rise scenarios to identify trends for planning adaptive measures.  
 
 Locally, the Virginia Institute of Marine Resources (VIMS) prepared a report for 
the Virginia General Assembly and included four sea level rise scenarios (VIMS, 2013).  
In addition, the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC) prepared a 





rising sea levels that incorporates VIMS’ four scenarios (McFarlane, 2013). Figure 5 and 
Table 2 provide current projections for Hampton Roads, Virginia based on the observed 











Table 2. Sea Level Rise Projections for Norfolk, Virginia (McFarlane, 2013) 
 
Scenario Sea Level Rise, 1992 - 2100 
High 7.5 feet (2.30 meters) 
Intermediate to High 4.9 feet (1.50 meters) 
Low to Intermediate 2.6 feet (0.80 meters) 




  So there is growing physical evidence and understanding of emerging long-term 





will to embrace long-term policies to adapt to these pending changes in the face of other 
competing needs. There is even an element of the state’s political power that has 
challenged the science behind the causes (Luzzatto, 2014). 
 
2.2.2 Subset Question b: What is an appropriate way to assess the problem 
scenario? 
 
2.2.2.1 A Basis for Taking an Integrated Systems Approach 
 
 In the aftermath of forensic investigations of the devastating impact of Hurricane 
Katrina, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is leading a national dialogue 
on critical infrastructure, which recommends the following guiding principles to protect 
the public’s health, safety and welfare (ASCE, 2009), (ASCE, 2014.a) and (ASCE, 
2014.b): 
 
 Quantify, communicate, and manage risk 
 Employ an integrated systems approach 
 Exercise sound leadership, management, and stewardship in decision-making 
processes, and 
 Adapt critical infrastructure in response to dynamic conditions and practice 
 
 It is the author’s position that these four guiding principles should form the basis 
for understanding the impacts of rising sea levels and for applying adaptive measures to 
cope with this dynamic condition. Although PS 113 is a small system in scope and scale, 





requires an integrated systems approach in the form of a hierarchy. Therefore, it is 
necessary to frame the problem in such a way that the pump station aligns within a 
regional system adapting to the changing sea levels.  
 
 The word system has many meanings. For this study there are two aspects to 
applying the word system as a way to address the problem scenario. The first is to think 
of the word “system” as a noun; as a body that is composed of integrated parts that make 
it function. The second is to think of the word “systems” as an adjective as in a systems 
approach, a process to understand and describe how those integrated parts make that body 
function. 
 
 For our particular problem scenario, the project is within a coastal system. The 
physical extent of this system starts at the Atlantic Coast along the mouth of the 
Chesapeake Bay. It continues into the bay, its estuaries, and to the extent of tidal waters 
into the numerous tributaries that feed the bay. It includes all the aspects that have made 
Tidewater, Virginia a place for over a million people to call home.  
 
 Therefore, the coastal system is more than a physical entity. People are part of the 
system and have introduced many devices to manage the system and make it an 
environment that supports a coastal community. In answering this subset question, it is 
necessary to describe what constitutes a coastal system and devise a systems approach to 





2.2.2.2 The Coastal Environment as a System 
 
 The challenge is how do we describe our coastal system? The traditional approach 
defines a coastal system by its physical attributes and response to environmental changes. 
However, choosing to live on the coast is what makes rising sea levels a hazard for 
communities coping with its impact. Therefore, we need to describe a coastal system as a 
community living within a coastal environment, and this community is a group of people 
living in the same locality within one governing body exposed to a common hazard 
(Morris, 1976).  
 
 What the community needs to understand is the linkage between the natural 
system and the multiple forms of manmade subsystems that support living within a 
dynamic coastal environment. The National Academy of Engineering (NAE) promotes a 
systems approach to address the need to balance the various benefits and costs of a water 
resources project, and the need to integrate the project within a system framework to 
minimize impacts to other components (NRC, 2004).  
 
 For projects in river basins, the NAE notes watershed systems are easily 
delineated based on topographic divides; but for projects in a coastal environment, the 
complex and dynamic nature of the shoreline makes delineating a system more 
problematic. It further notes that a coastal system is highly vulnerable to the effects of 
human development activities. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) proposes 





it involves multiple jurisdictions (USACE, 2015a). One possible perspective is to 
describe our community on the coast in terms of an enterprise system.  
 
 George Rebovich, Jr. describes a concept termed “enterprise systems 
engineering”. He explains the need for a new way of thinking “a systems thinking that 
captures the fundamental relationships of information to complexity so that designers of 
every kind of enterprise can secure the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of enormous 
change.” This new systems thinking is rooted in “evolutionary biology” (Rebovich, 
2005). Though his approach is more aligned with communication, information, and 
manufacturing type systems, it offers a means to assess the performance of infrastructure 
within a coastal system experiencing an evolutionary change in the form of sea level rise.  
 
 Pinto and Garvey present a structure for risk analysis in engineering enterprise 
systems based on Rebovich’s work (Pinto & Garvey, 2013).  The concept is applicable to 
“…an enterprise of people, processes, technologies, and organizations.” A key feature is 
how it captures the way users interface with technologies and with one another. Also, 
Pinto and Garvey quote Rebovich to explain an enterprise as “an entity comprised of 
interdependent resources that interact with one another and their environment to achieve 
goals.” 
 
 This approach reflects how systems engineering has evolved to address social-
technical challenges in engineering, asking how does a system affect society and how 





community. It will take adaptation to cope with the dynamic equilibrium, i.e., an 
equilibrium that is experiencing an accelerating rate of change. Engineers will need to 
develop solutions that people will want to embrace. How do engineers do this given the 
emerging hazards?  
 
 One way is how Pinto and Garvey link Rebovich’s work with that of J. 
Gharajedaghi about how modern system thinkers are viewing enterprises holistically 
(Pinto & Garvey, 2013). Gharajedaghi offers four characteristics of a holistic view 
(Gharajedaghi, 1999): 
 
 A multi-minded sociological entity comprised of a voluntary association of 
members who can choose their goals and means 
 An entity whose members share values embedded in a (largely common) culture 
 An entity having the attributes of a purposeful entity 
 An entity whose performance improves through alignment of purposes across its 
multiple levels 
 
 Rebovich’s and Gharajedaghi’s perspective offers a means to view a coastal 
community from a systems engineering perspective. It provides a basis for understanding 
the linkage between the region’s natural system and the multiple forms of manmade 
subsystems that support living within the region’s coastal environment. 
 
 Pinto and Garvey offer a framework to understand such linkages, which can be 
applied to assessing the impacts of rising sea levels on our infrastructure (Pinto & 





means for stakeholders to understand the hazards, the potential for consequences from 
those hazards, and an approach to judge appropriate solutions to adapt to these hazards. A 
key component to the framework is a value function quantifying the contributions of the 
various components that make up a system. 
 
 There are two challenges. How do we view the region as an enterprise system and 
how do we assess the value of infrastructure in order to measure risk? There is a wide 
range of disparate forms of infrastructure within any community. How do we assess their 
value in a consistent manner?   
 
 As noted above, the first of two subset questions is how do we view the region as 
an enterprise system? Simon Haslett applies a systems engineering perspective and 
explains the coast in a process-response system model (Haslett, 2000). He explains that 
coastal dynamics are a function of energy that drives processes, which cause changes in 
the shoreline. Primary sources are endogenetic energy, exogenetic energy, and the 
gravitational attraction of the sun and moon. Endogenetic energy is heat from within the 
earth’s core lost at the surface by tectonic and volcanic activity and is not an energy 
source for this region. However, exogenetic energy and the solar gravitational attraction 
are dominant energy sources in southeastern Virginia. 
 
 Exogenetic energy is from solar energy, which drives kinetic (wind) energy and 
the hydrologic cycle. Solar energy heats the earth, which creates wind and waves that 





form of rain from natural sources such as lakes, bays and oceans. The runoff drains to 
rivers that feed estuaries such as the Chesapeake Bay.  
 
 The gravitational forces drive the local tides, which have a semi-diurnal cycle in 
this region. The tides extend up the local rivers as far as Richmond on the James River.  
 
 It is these two sources of energy that dominate the local region and define its 
system dynamics. The resulting winds, waves, tides, rainfall and river flows move and 
shape the local terrain and shoreline. These changes have a direct impact on the region’s 
vulnerability. 
 
 Haslett further explains it is best to observe a natural environment as an open 
system with inputs and outputs of energy and materials and how the components are 
inter-related (Haslett, 2000). The challenge is defining a coastal system’s boundaries, 
identifying subsystems and their components, and understanding the relationship of 
energy and the resulting movement of material (water and sediment) through the coastal 
system. 
 
 He offers four basic ways to model how components are linked by energy and 
sediment flow within a coastal system: as a cascading system, a morphological system, a 
process-response system, and as an ecosystem. (Haslett, 2000). Of the four, the process-
response system best describes how the dominant energy source induces sediment 





 The cascading system describes the dynamic relationships between components 
such as the flow or “cascade” of energy through the coastal environment. The 
morphological system describes the flow of sediment movement driven by the cascading 
energy between the components. However, the process-response system combines both 
the cascading and morphological concepts and best explains how changes in 
environmental forces such as rising sea levels will shape sediment migration and coastal 
formations (Haslett, 2000).  
 
 Continuing to follow Haslett’s model, an existing environmental condition 
reflects its current state of evolution as the coastal system adjusts to ever changing 
conditions. As our coast is exposed to changes in energy conditions, its morphology 
responds in an effort to seek a state of equilibrium. A state of steady equilibrium reflects 
minor changes over a long-term average such as adjustments to the rhythms of a tidal 
cycle. A state of meta-stable equilibrium is a dramatic adjustment to a short-term event 
such as a barrier island breach in response to a major storm like Hurricane Sandy. A state 
of dynamic equilibrium is an adjustment to a gradual long-term change such as shoreline 
retreat in response to a rising sea level. 
 
 For our region, the primary driver for change in terms of coastal conditions is a 
warming of the atmosphere and there are two outcomes that will impact our environment 
(VIMS, 2013). The first is an apparent acceleration in the rate of sea level rise and the 





experiencing a state of dynamic equilibrium with the potential for more frequent and 
larger intervening meta-stable adjustments in the equilibrium.  
 
 The challenge is how do we define the hazard and its potential impact within such 
a coastal system, how do we integrate adaptive measures, and how do we assess the risk 
to these measures? 
 
 As discussed above, this study examines the coastal system as an enterprise 
system. Per Pinto and Garvey, an enterprise system is a network of interdependent people 
whose processes and supporting technology are not fully under the control of any single 
entity. A characteristic of an enterprise system is an absence of firm and fixed 
specifications under the control of a centralized authority agreed upon by participants at 
different organizational levels. Solutions within this kind of structure require stakeholder 
involvement and agreement for any form of adaptation and are far more difficult than 
technology alone can solve.  
 
 This description is in line with our democratic society. We are a country 
composed of interdependent groups of federal, state and local governments. Diminished 
control is demonstrated by how responsibilities for certain laws, regulations, policies and 
codes are distributed at each of the government levels. Also, the lack of firm and fixed 
specifications are evident by the legal actions needed to resolve conflicting 






 Therefore, an enterprise system structure offers an opportunity to assess 
vulnerabilities within the dynamics of a democratic society in an environment that is 
subject to dynamic evolution. The structure provides a basis for analyzing risk with 
stakeholder input and presenting it in a format to assist decision makers to make informed 
choices as to appropriate adaptive actions. 
 
2.2.2.3 The Representation of a Coastal System 
 
  Whereas an enterprise system can serve as a social representation of a 
community, understanding impacts of a dynamic environment on infrastructure makes it 
a social-technical problem. It is the actions and decisions at the community level that will 
shape how the jurisdictions will adapt.  
 
 For example, if the community decides to build barricades along the oceanfront 
such as levees, seawalls and beach fills along the shoreline and a lock and dam at the 
mouth of the Chesapeake Bay and inlets, jurisdictions can expect minimal changes in sea 
levels and reduced impacts from storm surges. Such a condition promotes the status quo 
and a minimal need to make dramatic changes. If the decision is a partial retreat to 
barricade at the mouths of rivers and along the shoreline, then it will promote redirecting 
development more in-land. However, if the decision is a managed retreat to the west and 
to protect urban centers such as Richmond, Washington DC, and Baltimore, then 






From an enterprise system perspective, the need for the community to make 
decisions makes the social component more dominant than the technical component. It is 
important to represent this kind of system as a set of interrelated parts. It is the interaction 
between these parts as a whole system that generates emergent behavior, properties that 
are different from the capability of any of the parts acting alone. These properties are 
unknown in advance and patterns only emerge through the operation of the system. When 
this is the case, networking principles apply as a means to represent a social system for 
the purpose of explanation, prediction and control (Lawson, 2005).  
 
 A network approach describes the behavior of the system and the interactions 
between its parts. It is more appropriate for elements whose properties evolve as a result 
of these interactions and lead to emergent behavior that is not expected and unintended. 
This is the kind of behavior characteristic of a social system. Keys to success are 
stakeholder involvement, continuous learning in the face of change, and problem 
resolution (Decker, Ciliers, & Hofneyr, 2011). 
 
 From the infrastructure perspective, there is a need to emphasize the technical 
component of the problem. An appropriate methodology is to take a reductionist 
approach based on Descartes’ guidance to divide a system into parts to explain, predict 
and control its behavior (Lawson, 2005). This approach is better for technical systems 
where elements can be presented in a hierarchical structure. Keys to success with this 
approach are defined conditions, control of resources, and modeling. A drawback of this 





particularly as the social component of a social-technical problem is more dominant 
relative to the technical component. 
 
 An alternative to the network approach is to recognize that a hierarchical 
representation is a special case of a network. Figure 6, based on work by Errol Lawson, is 
a representation of a social system where the heavy lines can represent a technical 
hierarchy within the network. It offers a means to “transition from a learning, problem 
solving, and task-defining network to a hierarchical structure, which facilitates reduction 
of a complicated program to a set of simpler tasks, unambiguous control, prediction of 










 For this example, the graphic represents a group of six entities within a network 
where the six points on the lopsided hexagon represent each of the entities. The lines in 
between the entities represent communication links, and the heavy lines represent the six 





 It is important to note that within a social-technical system, it is critical to 
establish the network first to comprehend the links before transforming to a hierarchy. If 
the hierarchy is defined by itself, it lacks the connections to mobilize the full social 
aspects of the social-technical system. It will fail to detect and cope with non-routine 
problems such as emergent behavior (Lawson, 2005).  
 
 It is beyond the scope of this project to explain a community and all its aspects 
such as governance, finance, insurance, health care, education, etc., as a network. In the 
absence of that kind of explanation, the author proposes a hierarchy as shown in Figure 7 
to represent infrastructure that supports the broad community such as private utilities and 
public works within the community’s network. Pump Station 113 fits within Level 3, 
where jurisdictions are responsible for the collection of their own wastewater for transfer 















A hierarchical structure offers a simple way to reduce a portion of a complicated 
network to a simpler representation. The simplification helps facilitate aligning 
responsibilities, clarifying control, predicting of outcomes and controlling resources.  
 
 However, it must be understood such a hierarchical structure is a most limited 
representation within a dynamic environment. If a Level 2 subsystem ignores the full 
linkage of the community network, the subsystem gives the false impression it has 
control and the ability to predict outcomes. In reality, the subsystem will fail to cope with 
unforeseen problems and errors outside of its linkage.  
 
 With an understanding of these limitations, the top of the hierarchy in this 
example is the coastal community and as an enterprise system its primary function is 





environmental law and climate change, examined the role of government in reducing 
vulnerability to sea level rise. She notes “the fundamental governance challenge in 
adapting…lies in crafting institutions that can critically examine our coastal assets and 
employ the best combination of defense and retreat to protect…resources from the threat 
of rising sea levels.” (Peloso, 2012). She proposes a vulnerability approach to help 
government assess the risks posed by the changing environment and evaluate alternative 
adaptive measures. 
 
 Peloso presents a definition of vulnerability to climate change as “…a measure of 
society’s inability to cope with shifts in climate patterns and the resulting changes in 
environmental conditions and resource availability.” She explains that the definition 
“…recognizes that both natural and social factors contribute to vulnerability.” 
Furthermore, she states there are three key elements of vulnerability: (1) exposure to 
natural hazards, (2) resilience, i.e. a system’s ability to withstand disturbance and 
recover, and (3) adaptive capacity, i.e. society’s ability to choose among various adaptive 
options. In addition, she adds reduction of near-term vulnerability need to focus on 
improving resiliency and the adaptive capacity of communities, or reduce exposure 
through retreat. 
 
 As she explains it, an increase in adaptive capacity can equip communities with 
tools to understand the effects of change, options available, and the costs and benefits of 
these options. These tools will provide a better understanding of options and enable 





Therefore, enhancing adaptive capacity can create the governance structures needed to 
generate and communicate scientific information about environmental change; and to do 
it in a way it can be used to make policy decisions reflecting the social values of its 
denizens.  
 
 It is at Level 1 (Figure 7), that a community’s actions and decisions will shape 
how the jurisdictions adapt and reduce its vulnerability to rising sea levels. It is at this 
level that leaders in a community dialogue with the subsystems to define a desired quality 
of life in this new and dynamic environment.  
 
 In an effort to help Virginia’s communities develop this capacity, William & 
Mary Law School established the Virginia Coastal Policy Clinic in 2013. Its goal is to 
debate science-based environmental and land use issues affecting the states coastal 
resources. It is striving to integrate science with legal and policy analysis to examine the 
implications of climate change on the coastal community (W&M, 2014). 
 
 Level 2a represents the range of interconnection, interdependent and relevant 
subsystems within the enterprise system such as public health care, education, social 
services, etc. It is at this level that subsystems strive to deliver and enhance the desired 
quality of life. 
 
 Level 2b represents the various forms of infrastructure that are critical 





classifications of infrastructure as defined in Institute of Sustainable Infrastructure, 
ENVISION
TM
. This is a new a format for rating sustainable design for the forms of 
horizontally oriented infrastructure shown in Figure 7 (ISI, 2014) that complements 
existing guidance for vertical construction (USGBC, 2014). Also, the author links the 
infrastructure, because its various forms are interconnected and interdependent. For 
example, energy is critical to powering the water, waste, transport and information 
infrastructure across level 2b.  
 
 Level 2c represents subsets specific to the type of infrastructure. For this study, it 
is HRSD; a regional wastewater authority that serves a population of 1.6 million people 
living in seventeen jurisdictions in southeastern Virginia. It owns and operates nine major 
and four smaller treatment plants within a combined treatment capacity of 941,000 
m
3
/day (249 million gallons per day) (Morgan, Hubbard, Martz, Moore, & Wittenberg, 
2012). 
 
 Level 3 represents the various cities and counties within HRSD’s region. These 
jurisdictions collect and transport wastewater to HRSD pump stations where the 
wastewater is ultimately pumped to a HRSD treatment facility. It is at this level, Pump 
Station 113 collects wastewater that is moved to a HRSD pump station located on 
Powhatan Avenue within the Larchmont neighborhood for transfer to HRSD’s Virginia 






 In framing the research problem, this study uses the hierarchical structure to 
explain how applying systems engineering can help the community cope with the impacts 
of rising sea levels. At each level it requires an understanding of systems philosophy and 
how that shapes the appropriate integrated systems approach to describe how the 
system’s integrated parts work, This integrated approach forms the systems foundation 
needed to link the region’s challenge with rising sea levels to PS 113. 
 
2.2.2.4 A Systems Approach in the Form of Systems Engineering 
 
 As noted in section 2.2.1, Subset question a: “What is the problem scenario?” 
ASCE’s guiding principles to protect the public’s health, safety and welfare should form 
the basis for understanding the impacts of rising sea. A key aspect to these principles is 
developing a process to enable informed decisions as to the potential for loss in the face 
of uncertain conditions. Community leaders need such tools to judge and communicate 
appropriate risk reducing measures to mitigate losses. 
 
 Such decisions are hard and they have four primary sources of difficulty (Clemen 
& Reilly, 2001): 
 A decision can be hard simply because of its complexity. 
 A decision can be difficult because of inherent uncertainty in the problem 
situation. 
 A decision maker may be interested in working toward multiple objectives, but 
progress in one direction may impede progress in other directions. 





 According to Clemen & Reilly, a good decision “is one that is made on the basis 
of thorough understanding of the problem and careful thought regarding the important 
issues.” Decision analysis provides insight about the problem situation, uncertainty, 
objectives, and tradeoffs. Its outcome is to provide a tool to construct models of 
uncertainty and preferences to analyze a decision (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). 
 
 The critical step in a decision is getting an understanding of critical objectives. A 
strategy is to reduce a complicated problem into something smaller so that it can be more 
readily analyzed and understood. The goal is to develop a requisite decision model, 
which is one where the decision maker’s thoughts about the problem, beliefs regarding 
uncertainty, and preferences are fully developed (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).  
 
 Per the ASCE guidelines, employing an integrated systems approach is a means to 
structure a complex problem into something more manageable (ASCE, 2009). 
Incorporating risk as a means to assess uncertainty aids leaders to make informed 
decisions about potential trade-offs. Through risk, decision makers can communicate the 
potential for loss to the public. 
 
 Systems engineering is an outcome of military operations analysis, particularly 
during World War II. Its traditional approach is to quantify and seek optimal economic 
solutions.  However, often economic optimization does not fully capture all the aspects of 





represent mathematically such as environmental impacts and social disruptions. 
Consequently, the public often rejects such optimized solutions (Checkland, 2000). 
 
 As a result, systems engineering is evolving to develop methodologies that try to 
cope with a scenario that is difficult to define. It is expanding its understanding of those 
aspects of a project that mathematics cannot easily represent. It is recognizing the need 
for satisficing alternatives, i.e., those that are not necessarily optimal, but good enough to 
balance economic, environmental and social needs (Keating, Calida, Sousa-Poza, & 
Kovacic, 2010). 
 
 A systems analysis offers a more holistic approach to assessing a problem 
scenario. The process provides a disciplined way of structured thinking grounded in a 
philosophical worldview often referred to by a German word, Weltanschauung. Its 
approach is more suitable for ill-defined problems, complex situations, and scenarios 
with emergent (unanticipated) outcomes (Keating, 2014). 
 
 As a start, it is important to frame the nature of the problem in order to focus 
further efforts. A problem is an undesirable situation or unresolved matter. A problem 
situation is when people hold different views when attempting to define the problem. The 
problem domain is defined by various attributes that describe the nature of a situation. 
These attributes are based on whether they reflect a traditional, well defined and agreed 
upon problem situation or a problem situation that is unique which involves human 





Table 3. The Nature of a Problem Situation (Keating, Peterson, & Rabadi, 2003) 
 
Attribute Traditional Problem Unique Problem 
Quantifiable Yes Not Easily 
Structure Understood Emergent 
Approach Evident Not Evident 
Definition Clear Ambiguous 
Environment More Static More Dynamic and 
Turbulent 




 The challenge is judging where in the spectrum the attributes exist and whether 
the nature of the problem is causing shifts in the attributes. If circumstances vary 
temporally, then what worked in the past may not assure success in a more turbulent 
future. If they vary spatially, then what works in one place may be inappropriate in 
another region. Often, the problem evolves if the nature of the impacts change or the 
number and type of stakeholders change or if there is any new knowledge that better 
defines the problem. This challenge makes it difficult to develop optimal, resilient 
alternatives that would not change over a project’s complete life cycle . 
 
 Therefore, there is a need for a process to help think through the problem. Figure 
8 offers a graphic depiction of a systems engineering approach. The key all engineers can 














 Figure 9 represents a disciplined approach to build the pyramid from the bottom-
up. These elements help avoid a prescriptive viewpoint. This approach recognizes that 
systems thinking functions on multiple levels and provides a framework to seek input 














 However, it is the application of systems philosophy that most demands 
management skills. It is a starting point of the effort and where the engineer ensures he or 
she has the right stakeholders. It is this step where the engineer facilitates the 
philosophical discussions needed to define the stakeholders’ problem situation. 
 
 There are conventional project management tools that an engineer can employ to 
help with this step such as performing an analysis of stakeholders’ feedback, establishing 
a communications plan to support philosophical discussions, and building a knowledge 





responsibility matrixes, work-breakdown structures and resource loading are applicable 
(Landaetta, 2010). 
 
 As an aid to fleshing out a philosophy, the engineer needs to ask seven questions 
to determine the degree of complexity (Keating, 2014).  
 
1. What is the problem/need? 
2. What are the interests and values of the primary stakeholders? 
3. What is the relevant context (circumstances/factors/conditions that 
constrain/enable systems analysis and deployment such as social goals, values, 
and agendas) 
4. What constitutes success/failure? 
5. What is a compatible approach to proceed?  
6. How do we circumvent likely failure modes? 
7. What are the system problem boundaries? 
 
 Answering these questions lays out an analysis that will strive to assure that 
stakeholders’ expectations are efficiently and continuously achieved throughout the 
project’s life cycle. The engineer must continuously strive to ensure sufficient resources 
are available to support this critical aspect of systems thinking. 
 
 The goal of building a solid foundation is to avoid what is termed in systems 
analysis as Type III and Type IV errors (to differentiate from statistical errors Types I 
and II) (Keating, 2008a). A Type III error is solving the wrong problem precisely in the 
most efficient way possible. This is often caused by having the wrong stakeholders 





“muddled” thinking that is typically caused by a philosophical mismatch among 
stakeholders such that agreement is unlikely and movement to resolution is highly 
improbable. 
 
2.2.2.5 Systems Philosophy 
 
 As noted in Figure 9, philosophy is the foundation for effective systems thinking. 
“A philosophy…provides the basis for making sense of what we perceive in the world.” 
(Keating et al., 2010). It provides the basis for an underlying worldview that informs a 
perspective, which drives some form of a consistent framework for decisions, actions, 
and interpretations.  
 
 There is no right or wrong philosophy, but there is a potential for disagreement 
among stakeholders as to what is the worldview as it applies to the problem, problem 
situation, and problem domain. An incompatibility of worldviews can render the best 
intentions impotent. This kind of disagreement can lead to a Type IV error described in 
section 2.2.2.4, A Systems Approach in the Form of Systems Engineering (Keating et al., 
2010). 
 
 Figure 10 presents a range across two philosophical spectrums. Epistemology is 
the study of how we gain and communicate knowledge. It ranges from the objective to 
the subjective viewpoint. Ontology is the study of the nature of reality from which we 







Figure 10. Endpoints of a Philosophical Spectrum for Epistemology and Ontology 




 In examining the challenge of rising sea levels, it is important to understand the 
degree of complexity at each level of the hierarchy in Figure 7.  The extent of the 
complexity will help choose which end of the spectrum of philosophy is applicable. This 
understanding in turn helps classify the systems principles that are compatible with that 
particular end of the spectrum.  
 
 Complexity is highest at the top level of the hierarchy, because of the diverse 
nature of an enterprise system. The degree of complexity will decrease with each lower 
level as the number of stakeholders diminishes and the knowledge needed to address the 






 Complexity theory, in the form of Ralph Stacey’s concept for a Zone of 
Complexity, is a way to help community leaders categorize an appropriate systems 
approach (Stacey, 2011). Figure 11, based on Stacey’s Complexity Matrix, provides a 
graphic presentation to categorize appropriate management actions in a complex adaptive 
system. It is a function of a level of agreement on the issues in question as shown on the 










 Far from Agreement implies just that, discord among stakeholders surrounding 





sea levels emerge. Far from Certainty means the situation is unique and new to the 
decision makers, and extrapolation from the past is an insufficient method to project 
outcomes. Furthermore, the certainty of a particular outcome is too ambiguous to 
quantify and requires planning scenarios to understand the problem situation.  
 
 On the right side of Zone 5 is where disagreement and uncertainty can lead to 
disintegration of the community as rising sea levels inundate the region. In our case, 
massive avoidance is not an option and disintegration would result in a retreat without 
any management of the consequences.  The desired approach is to avoid Zone 4, keep the 
problem situation within Zone 5, and eventually shift into the lower zones. Even if the 
ultimate decision is retreat from the coast, it can be done in a way to manage the risks and 
minimize the consequences.   
 
 The degree of agreement is dependent on the level of political consensus at all 
levels of government to address the problem. Its degree of certainty is dependent on how 
well the community can define the problem scenario, i.e., how it understands emerging 
long-term natural threats. 
 
 Given the description of the problem situation in section 2.2.1, the political will 
among federal, state and local governments is disparate, and the level of future sea levels 
is too uncertain to define with any statistical degree of confidence. The author categorizes 
the problem situation as closer to the top of the Agreement axis and to the right of Zone 1 





Zone 5 as the Complexity Zone, Zone 4 as Chaos Zone and the line between the zones as 
the Edge of Chaos. 
 With this understanding of complexity, the goal is to lead stakeholders to an 
agreed upon future state in the face of yet to be determined paths toward success. It is the 
author’s opinion that traditional visions and mission statements will fail amid competing 
agendas focused on self-preservation. It will take politics, the building of coalitions, and 
negotiation and compromise on acceptable tradeoffs among the competing stakeholders. 
It will demand a diversity of approaches to deal with a range of contexts, methods to sort 
through alternatives, and risk informed decisions to weigh tradeoffs. 
 
 Systems’ thinking offers a way to flesh out a framework to place the problem 
situation within Zone 5 and as a means to shift it to the lower zones. It can buy time until 
agreeable alternatives become apparent and more traditional project management 
principles can manage those outcomes. 
 
 The engineer’s objective is “to help public and private decision and policy-makers 
to solve the problems and resolve the policy issues that they face. It does this by 
improving the basis for their judgment by generating information and marshaling 
evidence bearing on their problems and in particular, on possible actions that may be 
suggested to alleviate them. Thus, a systems analysis commonly focuses on a problem 
arising from the operations of a socio-technical system, considers various responses to 
this problem and supplies evidence about the costs, benefits, and other consequences of 





 A systems analysis provides a means to span the philosophical spectrum. For a 
technical problem situation, a systematic (step-by-step) inquiry or hard systems approach 
is appropriate. Such an approach applies Descartes’ reductionist reasoning that the sum of 
the behavior of the parts describes the system’s properties.  
 
 This approach reduces a system to its constituent components. Each component 
behaves as a simple system displaying only a few variables. These variables are 
understood through common analytical processes. The approach assumes interactions 
between the parts are few, weak and linear (Beckman, 2000). 
 
 Its problem domain is in line with the traditional problem in Table 3. It uses 
quantitative objectives to reduce the problem situation to a mathematical model. This 
situation is termed “tame” or simple, because it has minimal ambiguity (Khisty, 
Mohammadi, & Amekudzi, 2012). 
 
 The process is simple in that it uses the model to predict the response of the 
system to changes in the environment and can produce an “optimal” solution. For a high 
degree of certainty, deterministic models can produce precise outputs. For those problem 
situations where mathematics can represent uncertainty, stochastic models can produce a 
probability of outputs in response to changes in inputs (Kirk, 1995).   
 
 This approach is termed hard systems engineering. It is based on Newtonian 





This assumes a designer can predict the behavior of any component with certainty if he or 
she understands its state at any time. With sufficient knowledge a designer can predict the 
future evolution of the system with a high degree of confidence (Decker et al., 2011). 
  
 This approach is best for complicated technical systems, which is not the same as 
a complex system. Complicated systems can have many pieces, where each component is 
understood in isolation and the whole can be reassembled from its parts such as many 
mechanical systems. These pieces work as one system to accomplish its function, but one 
key defect can stop the function. Also, complicated technical systems lack the ability to 
adapt. Such systems require redundant or backup components to mitigate failure (Ottino, 
2004). 
 
 However, for situations where human participation or judgment is a key 
component, reductionist methods can misrepresent the problem domain. The human 
aspect introduces relationships between stakeholders as well as complexities not easily 
represented by hard systems methodologies. These kinds of problems require decision 
makers to account for both the technical factors and the needs of stakeholders to achieve 
sustainable results (Kirk, 1995).  
 
 As shown in Figure 12, the influence of technology diminishes as complexity in 
the form of the human factors in Figure 13 increases. As these softer perspectives 
contribute more to agreeing to a solution, the ability of mathematical models to represent 





from a hard systems approach suitable along the vertical side of the curve, to some hybrid 
approach at the bend, to a soft systems approach as the curve flattens out. This curve is 









































 For such social-technical problems, a systemic (holistic) inquiry or soft system 
approach is appropriate. It uses stakeholders to define qualitative objectives to develop a 
worldview (Weltanschauung) perspective of the problem situations. Its problem domain 
is more in line with the unique problem in Table 3. 
 
 These situations are termed “messy”, because the nature and circumstances of the 
problem change. Some characteristics of messy problems are a turbulent environment, 
the resolution is not apparent, and defining and bounding the problem is difficult 
(Keating et al., 2003). Often messy problems are termed “wicked” problems, which are 
“incomplete, contradictory, and changing; have intricate interdependencies; and have 





 The process is not simple because it is dependent on the collective wisdom of the 
worldview. It uses iconic models to represent subjective interpretations of messy problem 
situations. Outcomes are in the form of a satisficing solution; i.e. an acceptable solution; 
a decision making process whereby one chooses an option that is, while not optimal, 
good enough (Keating & Katina, 2012).  
 
 The basis for the soft systems approach is the whole is greater than the sum of the 
parts and that sum results in emergent properties. The approach shifts the process away 
from optimization to one of learning how interactions generate emergent behavior. 
Emergence is where a system exhibits changes in structural and behavioral patterns over 
time as the system operates (Keating et al., 2003).  
 
 There are other distinctions between the hard and soft systems approaches. Table 
4 summarizes these key differences. It is a simple guide to help understand “…the nature 
of the problem, the context within which the problem exists, and the appropriate forms of 



















Table 4. Distributions between Hard and Soft Perspectives (Keating et al., 2010) 
 
Attribute Hard System Thinking Soft System Thinking 
Understanding 
Paradigm 
Reductionism – focused on 
understanding through breaking 
apart (analysis). Performance of 
a whole can be understood 
through the parts. 
Holism – a system is only 
understood at the (irreducible) whole 
system level. The behavior cannot be 
at the level of the parts. 
Objective Optimization – there is one solution, 
which is best (optimal) for system 
performance. This is the solution or 
configuration, which is sought. 
Learning – the primary function of 
system exploration is to learn about 
the system and be capable of 
mounting appropriate response(s) 
based on that learning. 
Methodology Systematic – approach is defined by 
defined process that can be replicated 
independent of context – prescriptive. 
Systemic – approach is a high level 
framework that provides a general 
guide –non-prescriptive. 
Goal/Objectives Clearly defined and agreed upon, the 
moving forward is assumed to be 
aligned with a singular perspective and 
objective 
Ambiguous and multiple 
perspectives –clarity is not assured 
and multiple perspectives cast 
suspicion on the degree of alignment 
for goals– which may be ill defined. 
Perspectives Unitary – assumes that there is 
alignment of perspectives for the 
problem domain. 
Pluralist – there exist multiple, 
potentially divergent, perspectives on 
the problem domain. 
Context Low – assume contextual influences 
are ‘minimized’ by successive 
bounding of the problem. 
High – contextual influences are seen 
as integral to the problem and not 
easily separable for investigation. 
Environment Stable – disturbances in the 
environment are minimal and rate/depth 
of changes not considered overbearing 
on system solution 
Turbulent – disturbances are 
potentially extensive and influential 




Simple – low variables, interaction 
capable of being understood, somewhat 
static/deterministic. 
Complex – high number of variables, 
rich interactions, dynamic and 




Mathematical/quantitative – exact 
relationships and predictive 
(mathematically) behavior dominate. 
Non-mathematical/qualitative – 
forms of representation non 
quantitative in nature. Behavior not 
precisely predictable. 
Boundaries Clearly delineated – boundaries are 
definitive and understood. 
Unclear and shifting – boundaries 
are ambiguous and evolving. 
Worldview Aligned – divergence in worldviews 
not made explicit or considered central 
to understanding. 
Potentially divergent – divergence 
considered probable, with focus on 
clarity of divergence. 
Defining metaphor Mechanistic – clear understanding of 
predictable interrelationships. 
Contextual – lack of clarity in nature 
of interrelationships.  
Behavior Predictable – system behavior is 
deducible from understanding historical 
patterns or trends. 
Emergent – system behavior cannot 
be known in advance. Patters emerge 








 In Table 5, the author has inserted Stacey’s Zones of Complexity and the 
philosophical spectrum within work by Charles Keating (Keating, 2014). The table offers 
a guide to classifying a system based on where it plots in Figure 11, describes its 
characteristics, and recognizes the system’s appropriate place on the philosophical 
spectrum. This linking of complexity thinking with systems thinking will help the 










Apply Hard System 
Thinking 
Complex 
Apply Soft Systems 
Thinking 
Stacey’s Zones 1 and 3, a hard systems 
approach 
2, a hybrid approach to 
address politics 
5 and 4, a soft systems 
approach 




Predetermined Attributes Yes No 
Interaction organization Highly org Loosely org 
Laws governing behavior (1) Well defined  
(3) Probabilistic 
(2) Physical laws defined or 
probabilistic, with uncertain 
social environment  
Undefined. Need to move 
problem to lower zones to 
represent behavior 
System evolution over time Not evolve Evolves 
Subsystems pursue own 
goals 
No Yes (Purposeful) 
System affected by 
behavioral influences 
No Yes 
Predominantly closed or 
open to the environment 
Largely closed Largely open 
Epistemological Spectrum Positivism Anti-Positivism 








2.2.2.6 Systems Methodology 
 
 As depicted in Figures 8 and 9, methodology serves as a broad framework that 
links the conceptual foundation built on philosophy and related axiomatic laws with 
models, methods and tools. It offers a general guide to work through the range of systems 
approaches that best fits the problem situation.   
 
 Systems engineering offers a disciplined way of structured thinking grounded in a 
philosophical worldview (Weltanschauung) to avoid making Type III and IV errors. A 
systems environment provides a means to think of our coastal community within a 
dynamic coastal environment as an integrated social and technical problem. Systems 
representation presents our community as an enterprise system and as a network where 
aspects can be depicted as a hierarchy. Systems philosophy helps classify the problem 
situation and describe its domain characteristics at any level in the hierarchy based on its 
degree of complexity. What is needed is a systems methodology that provides the 
framework to apply systems analysis to resolve real problems.  
 
 There are multiple kinds of methodologies offered in the literature (Keating, 
2014) and (Khisty et al., 2012). There are many examples of applying hard systems 
thinking to complicated natural and physical systems; and of applying soft systems 
thinking to complex organizations and industrial processes. However, a key weakness of 
this study is there is limited information and experience on applying soft systems 





 The author examined two soft systems approaches applicable to public works 
infrastructure problem situations that plot in Zones 5 and 4 in Figure 11; Checkland’s 
Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 2000) and Ackoff’s Interactive Planning 
(Ackoff, 2001). Both methodologies are appropriate for what Ackoff calls “messy” 
social-technical problems (Keating et al., 2003). Checkland’s methodology uses 
CATWOE (Customers, Actors, Transformation process, Weltanschauung, Owners, and 
Environmental Constraints) elements (Wikipedia, 2014) to flesh out root causes, a 
methodology Khisty uses for transportation applications (Khisty et al., 2012). However, it 
is the author’s opinion that Ackoff’s methodology is more applicable to large-scale 
challenges such as the impact of rising sea levels over a wide region.  
 
 Ackoff’s Interactive Planning is a generalized approach that is broad enough to 
help think through a unique social-technical problem at any point on the curve in Figure 
12. The approach has three underlying principles: 
 
 Participation – All stakeholders should participate in the planning process. The act 
of the process is more important than the plan itself. The stakeholders must lead 
the process and not leave it to outside experts.  It is critical that the stakeholders 
go through this group learning experience to buy into a common worldview. The 
purpose of expertise is to facilitate, advise, and encourage stakeholders to 
participate, and not to interfere or impose undue influence. 
 Continuity – Stakeholders should plan to continuously revise theirs plans. 
Stakeholders need to recognize that input is temporal. Stakeholders, values and 
perceptions can change over time. Also, stakeholders must plan for emergence, 






 Holism – Stakeholders should plan for the widest array of the systems levels 
possible. This principle means stakeholders need to both coordinate planning 
across the hierarchical levels and integrate at different levels of the hierarchy at 
the same time. It is the inclusiveness that promotes holism and an agreement in 
the worldview needed to address the impact of rising seas. 
 
 Per Ackoff, the iterative planning objective “is directed at creating the future. It is 
based on the belief that an organization’s future depends at least as much on what it does 
between now and then, as on what is done to it. Therefore, this type of planning consists 
of the design of a desirable present and the selection or invention of ways of 
approximating it as closely as possible. It creates its future by continuously closing the 
gap between where it is at any moment of time and where it would most like to 
be.”(Ackoff, 2001). 
 
 The author considers this approach in line with Bayes Theorem for conditional 
probability. Its underlying philosophy is as “we learn about the universe that we learn 
about it through approximations, getting closer and closer to the truth as we gather more 
evidence.” (Silver, 2012) 
 
 The methodology involves five stages as shown in Figure 14. The first two stages 
are termed Idealization, identifying the gaps between business-as-usual and an ideal 
future. The remaining three stages are about removing and reducing these gaps. The 
process is non-linear demanding multi-lateral sharing of knowledge gained and iterative 












 Formulating the Mess (Situational Analysis) – This phase determines how the 
community would eventually destroy itself if it were to continue to behave as 
it is currently doing in the face of a changing environment; even one that is 
predictable. This phase engages in the discussions that lead to the worldview. 
It involves three steps that lead to a reference scenario (problem, problem 
situation, problem domain): (1) A systems analysis, developing a 
representation of the community as a system; (2) An obstruction analysis, 
identification of barriers and constraints to adaptation; and (3) Reference 
projections, if things continue as is, what will the system look like? The 
output is a reference scenario, a synthesis of the three steps that provides a 
description of how and why the community would destroy itself in the face of 
rising sea levels if the assumptions for the future prove valid. 
 Ends Planning – This phase determines what the community would ideally 
like to be if it could do whatever it wanted in the face of changing sea levels, 





 The output is a comparison between the ideal and reference scenarios and the 
identification of the gaps between the two end states. 
 Means Planning – This phase determines needed actions to remove or reduce 
the gaps identified in Ends Planning. This involves the community identifying 
how it can redesign itself to achieve the ideal design. It will require revising 
laws, regulations, policies, and practices. As with any ideal plan, the final 
design is a function of the availability of resources in a timely manner. For the 
case of an uncertain rate of rising sea levels, it becomes a question of whether 
the community has the capacity to adapt at a pace that the environment is 
changing. 
 Resources Planning – This phase identifies resources needed for the 
community to redesign itself. Given the enormity of the impact of rising sea 
levels, identifying financial resources in a timely manner is perhaps most 
critical. 
 Implementation and Control – This is the project management phase. 
Implementation determines who is to do what, when, and where, etc. Control 
monitors implementation-planning decisions to determine whether they are 
producing as expected, and if not, determining corrective action. 
 
 A way to understand how this methodology provides a framework is to describe 
an example of using systems analysis within ‘Formulating the Mess’ to develop a 
representation of the problem situation. As previously noted in section 2.2.2.5 Systems 
Philosophy, the community at large lacks agreement on a way forward in the face of 
uncertain rates of rising sea levels. The author used Figure 11 to categorize the problem 
situation as closer to the top of the Agreement axis and past Zone 3 on the Certainty axis.  
 
 This plots the situation in Zone 5 and possibly Zone 4. In order to find alternatives 





and 3, and possibly 2. This will require iterative discussions at the highest levels in the 
community network, i.e. at Level 1 (Figure 7) and across Levels 2a and b that include 
dialogue with Levels 2c and 3.  
 
 In examining Figure 12, the problem situation in the above paragraph plots on the 
far right of the curve and the three elements of the soft perspective shown in Figure 13 
dominate the process. Table 5 provides the characteristics of a complex system and Table 
4 lists the kind of soft systems thinking needed to address the problem situation. From 
Figure 10, anti-positivism and nominalism will shape how we derive and communicate 
knowledge.  
  
 Another example is assuming that science has identified a projected sea level rise 
scenario, the community has successfully worked through the iterative planning process, 
and there is agreement on adaptive measures. This agreement gives guidance for those 
subsystems at Levels 2c and 3 on how to protect their assets and to take adaptive 
measures specific to their needs. This plots the problem situation within Zones 1, 2 or 3 
in Figure 11 depending on the degree of any disagreement on technical issues and the 
need for stochastic analyses within mathematical models.  
 
 In examining Figure 12, the problem situation in the previous paragraph plots 
more on the left of the curve and the technical element of the hard perspective shown in 
Figure 13 has a greater influence in the process. Table 5 provides the characteristics of a 





kind of problem situation. From Figure 10, positivism and realism will shape the 
philosophical discussions in the form of mathematical models to represent and resolve 
problems at this level in the hierarchy. 
 
 This methodology is flexible enough to engage a large number of stakeholders to 
determine the community’s future in the face of the impending changes in coastal waters. 
Though it has phases, the process is iterative and no phase is ever complete. It allows for 
revisiting the end state as stakeholders’ interests evolve and the rates of change become 
more certain. It helps reduce the social component of the social-technical problem 
through greater agreement, and lets the technical component have a greater influence to 
improve certainty. It is a tool to help shift the intersection of the degree of agreement and 
certainty in Figure 11 from plotting in Zones 4 or 5 to plotting in one of the lower zones. 
 
 An example of successful iterative planning, if not by formal design, but by 
practice is the Elizabeth River Project (ERP) (ERP, 2014). It is the outcome of a 
grassroots, non-profit effort started in 1991 to restore the Elizabeth River, a tributary of 
the Chesapeake Bay. Its mission is to restore the river to the highest practical level of 
environmental quality through government, business and community partnerships while 
maintaining its value to the region’s port economy.  
 
 The key to the ERP’s success is the community effort that has engaged all the 
stakeholders who depend on the river for national defense, business, recreation, etc. 





is a benefit to the community at large. This understanding has resulted in changes in 
policies and practices that have reduced pollution and impacts, as well as projects that 
have restored the environment.  
 
 ODU has taken similar first steps to bring the community together and initiate a 
form of iterative planning. In early June 2014, the university and the Marine Technology 
Society hosted a workshop that announced a pilot project to engage regional government 
leaders in a dialogue (MTS, 2014). The project explores options for a “Whole 
Government” approach to adaptation to sea level rise and other climate change impacts 
on the region.  
 
 Subsequent to the early June meeting, ODU established the Center for Sea Level 
Rise and hosted the Meeting the Challenge: Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise and 
Preparedness Actions at the Federal Level, June 30, 2014 (ODU, 2014). It was a 
bipartisan forum lead by U. S. Senator Tim Kane (D – VA) and regional congressional 
representatives. The conference provided the congressional delegation the opportunity to 
dialogue with regional interests and expertise to understand the potential climate change 
challenges facing the community.  
 
 The purpose of the pilot project is “…to develop a regional ‘whole of 
government’ and ‘whole of community’ approach to sea level rise preparedness and 





regions.” (ODU, 2014). It includes multiple working groups to create an 
intergovernmental planning organization to address preparedness and resilience.  
 
 The author participates on the Infrastructure Working Group, which includes 
representatives of public and private infrastructure. The group’s mission is to 
“…review critical infrastructures in the Hampton Roads region, determine which are 
most suited to and will be most positively affected by adaptation planning, 
and, make recommendations to the Steering Committee for intergovernmental 
coordination of that planning.” (ODU, 2015)  
 
 Overall, these kinds of interactive planning offer the community a process to 
bring multiple stakeholders together to discuss complex issues. They try to create 
alternative futures for consideration and to iteratively work toward an agreed upon future 
state. This forward thinking is necessary for the community to plan future capital 
improvement investments that are compatible with this vision. 
 
2.2.3 Subset Question c: What is the appropriate risk informed decision 
methodology to evaluate impacts? 
 
2.2.3.1 Design Principles 
 
 As noted in section 2.1, ASCE led a national dialogue on critical infrastructure 
following the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast (ASCE, 2009). A key 





communicate, and manage risk. A key component to following ASCE’s framework for 
the design of structures is the need to change from deterministic to probability based 
design principles.  
 
 Philosophically, deterministic design principles assume (1) there is a form of 
causality between the starting condition and the outcome, (2) uncertainty is non-existent, 
and (3) the deterministic model is appropriate given limitations on knowledge, the nature 
of the process, and/or the requirements of the decision scenario (Pinto & Garvey, 2013). 
 
 A classic example is the equation 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎, which expresses a causality between 
the three parameters, force, mass, and acceleration (Pinto & Garvey, 2013). The equation 
provides a value of the force vector, F, without uncertainty when the acceleration vector, 
a, and the mass scalar vector, m are not random values. The outcome is always certain as 
long as the inputs are certain. 
 
 For deterministic design, the basic equation is 𝑅 > 𝑆 𝑥 (𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟), where 
R is the required resistance of the structure and S is the load applied to the structure. The 
safety factor (SF) is a nominal value recommended by code to address uncertainties. It is 
based on the degree of control applied to the manufacturing of construction materials and 
construction of the structure under design.  The code sets the factor of safety to achieve 






 The equation represents the maximum load condition over the life of the structure. 
In this form of analyses, the output is the same every time the input is the same. R and S 
have no random characteristics. Failure occurs when load equals or exceeds resistance, 
𝑅 ≤ 𝑆 (𝑆𝐹). Performance models a step function and the probability of failure, PF, steps 
from 0 to 1.  
 
 A deterministic approach allows decision makers to make simple and economical 
judgments. Failure is a step function because it only occurs when stress exceeds capacity. 
In referring back to Figure 11, this form of analysis is most appropriate for Zone 1 where 
there is a high degree of certainty and agreement. It is best for simple decisions with 
minimal consequences. 
 
 However, the deterministic approach lacks representation of any uncertainty about 
the starting condition necessary for risk analyses. It does not provide any information 
about the possibility that 𝑆 > 𝑆𝐹(𝑅) during the design life of the structure.  For example, 
this form of analysis would not capture the uncertainty in the design variables in Figure 
11 for Zones 3 and 5; nor is it relevant to Zone 4 where the uncertainty is too ambiguous 
to quantify. It is not appropriate for representing any degree of disagreement in Zones 2, 
5 and 4.  
 
 There are philosophical discussions about the meaning of uncertainty and how to 





Garvey, 2013).  This study defines uncertainty as a lack of knowledge about a quantity or 
condition and describes it as either an aleatory or epistemic uncertainty.  
 
 Aleatory uncertainty is a function of randomness independent of anyone’s 
knowledge of it. It represents those starting conditions that are due to chance. Like the 
role of dice, our knowledge has no influence on the outcome. However, we can observe a 
number of trials, identify a degree of frequency and estimate an expected value with a 
range of variability. 
 
 For modeling, we treat natural events such as earthquakes and storms as random 
events. We have no influence over the outcome, but we can observe and define their 
behavior as some frequency of occurrence event. This allows us to apply hard systems 
(systematic) principles to define a hazard as a repeatable event; i.e. two or more observers 
with the same data should converge to a similar observation. 
 
 Epistemic uncertainty is a function of a lack of knowledge and/or a range of 
multiple perspectives.  As it pertains to knowledge, we can apply hard systems principles 
to reduce the lack of knowledge through new or better information. As it pertains to a 
perspective, it is a property of the observer. It plays a role in unique or non-repeatable 
events where the observer is not sure about the conditions and/or outcomes. The basis for 







 Each individual’s perspective is unique and offers a personal view of a condition. 
People can observe the same evidence, but form different opinions. Their perspectives are 
shaped from where they are making the observation and biases people bring to the 
process (Plous, 1993).  This is pertinent to the degree of agreement in Figure 11 and plays 
a role in Zones 2 and 5, and it is critical to avoiding Zone 4. Typically, external peer 
review is a good tool to cross-examine perspectives and reduce this form of epistemic 
uncertainty.  
 
 As noted, given uncertainty, the deterministic approach is inadequate to assess the 
reliability of a design, for example the probability that the design load value is exceeded 
during the design life of the structure. A probabilistic approach makes it possible to 
design a structure for a specific reliability, i.e. understand how it performs under the load 
leading up to the design event, and how it performs when the hazard event exceeds the 
design event.  
 
 Mathematically, probability is defined by the following set of axioms that specify 
properties that probability must have (Pinto & Garvey, 2013): 
Axiom 1  0 ≤ 𝑃(𝐴) ≤ 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴 𝑖𝑛 Ω, the sample space 
Axiom 2 𝑃(Ω) =  1 
Axiom 3  For any infinite sequence of mutually exclusive events A1, A2…defined on 
Ω 






And for any finite sequence of mutually exclusive events A1, A2, …An defined on Ω 
 
𝑃(𝐴1 ∪ 𝐴2 ∪ … ∪ 𝐴𝑛) = 𝑃(𝐴1) + 𝑃(𝐴2) + ⋯ 𝑃(𝐴𝑛)    (2) 
 
Axiom 1 means the probability of any event is a non-negative number in the 0 to 1 range. 
Axiom 2 means the event is certain. Axiom 3 means for any sequence of mutually 
exclusive events, whether the sequence is infinite or finite, the probability of at least one 
of these events occurring is the sum of their respective probabilities.  
 
 From a public works infrastructure perspective, using these axioms requires 
statistical data representing structural performance or outcomes from laboratory or field 
experiments. However, this kind of data is either limited or non-existent. In practice, for 
coastal structures, engineers use the limit state design principle for the probabilistic 
design of structures (Kamphuis, 2010). 
 
 The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has adopted this approach in 
developing design guidance for coastal structures (USACE, 2002). The USACE method 
evaluates the structural safety defined by failure modes. In simplistic terms each failure 
mode must be described by a formula, and the interaction (correlation) between the 
failure modes must be known.  
 
 The USACE probabilistic design ties its concepts to the Limit State Equation in 





and non-failure is when 𝑔 > 0. The quantities R and S are functions of many random 
variables: 𝑅 =  𝑓𝑟(𝑋𝑟1, 𝑋𝑟2, 𝑋𝑟3 … 𝑋𝑟𝑖) and 𝑆 = 𝑓𝑠  (𝑋𝑠1, 𝑋𝑠2, 𝑋𝑠3 … 𝑋𝑠𝑖).  
 
 The limit state 𝑔 = 0, defines a failure surface, a line that delineates between the 
safe and failure region based on the Limit State Equation.  R represents a range of 
resistances and S represents a range of loads within a period of time, T. For design, the 
engineer assumes probability density distributions for R and S are independent of time, T. 
Typically time is represented in years. 
 
 This allows the engineer to represent the probability of failure, PF,  for any 
reference time of duration T years as 𝑃𝐹 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑔 ≤ 0). With this value, the engineer 
can define reliability of the structure, RF, as the inverse to the probability of failure, 
𝑅𝐹 = 1 − 𝑃𝐹 .  
 
 For Limit State Design, engineers design structures to meet two limit states, a 
serviceability limit state and an ultimate limit state. This means engineers can design a 
structure to survive a range of loads. For example, the serviceability limit state represents 
a flood stage or earthquake condition where deformations exceed defined performance 
requirements and the structure only needs minor repairs. The ultimate limit state defines 






 USACE’s classification for methods of probability analysis (USACE, 2002) align 
with those developed by the Joint Committee on Structural Safety for three levels of 
probabilistic design, repeated below (Thoft-Christensen & Baker, 1982). 
 
 Level I: Design methods in which appropriate degrees of structural reliability are 
provided on a structural element basis (occasionally on a structural basis) by the 
use of a number of partial safety factors, or partial coefficients, related to pre-
defined characteristics or nominal values of the major structural and loading 
variables. 
 Level II: Methods involving certain approximate iterative calculations procedures 
to obtain an approximation to the failure probability of a structure or structural 
system, generally requiring an idealization of failure domain and often associated 
with a simplified representation of the joint probability distribution of the 
variables. 
 Level III: Methods in which calculations are made to determine the “exact” 
probability of failure for a structure component, making use of a full probabilistic 
description of the joint occurrence of the various quantities which affect the 
response of the structure and taking into account the true nature of the failure 
domain. 
 
 In general, Level I is a form of a quasi-deterministic method, but with safety 
factors based on probabilistic data. These data come from Levels II and III analyses that 
account for the effects of probability distributions and a target PF. Thoft-Christensen and 
Baker outline the mathematics of probabilistic design for each of the levels (Thoft-
Christensen & Baker, 1982). USACE provides detailed descriptions for each level as it 






 Level III is at the top of the design hierarchy. At this level engineers use actual 
density functions to address a large number of realizations x of the random variables Xi 
representing R and S. It uses simulation tools to estimate a PF and to approximate the 
proportion of outcomes where 𝑔 ≤ 0. 
 
 A random variable is a function that identifies an outcome or event within a 
sample space and its domain. When working with n dimensional variables, the analysis 
works with random vectors expressed in the form of vector-valued random variables ?̅?. 
Mathematically, the random vector can take the form of an ordered set 
?̅? = (𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3 … 𝑋𝑛) of one-dimensional random variables defined on a same sample 
space Ω. 
 
 Assuming only two variables, the order set reduces to ?̅? = (𝑋1, 𝑋2). For the 
condition that the random vector is continuous, a joint probability density function, fx 
expresses the probability of failure in the following equation: 
 






, 𝑥2)𝑑𝑥1𝑑𝑥2   (3). 
 
Note x1 and x2 are values for the random variables X1 and X2. The following equations 
determine the distribution functions 𝐹𝑋1for the single variable X1, and 𝐹𝑋2 for the single 
variable X2: 
 
















  (5). 
 
 When there is more than one random variable, the analysis needs to distinguish 
between the joint probability distributions of X1 and X2. The individual probability 
distributions are termed marginal density functions. Differentiating these two equations 
provides the marginal density functions for X1 and X2: 
 
𝑓𝑋1(𝑥1) = ∫ 𝑓?̅?
∞
−∞
(𝑥1, 𝑥2)𝑑𝑥2   (6) 
and 
𝑓𝑋2(𝑥2) = ∫ 𝑓?̅?
∞
−∞
(𝑥1, 𝑥2)𝑑𝑥1   (7). 
 
 USACE substitutes R and S for X1 and X2 and defines the failure surface as 𝑅 ≤ 𝑆. 
In addition, it assumes R and S are independent simplifying the two equations to the 
following expression: 
 
𝑃𝑓 = ∬ 𝑓𝑟𝑅≤𝑆 (𝑟)𝑓𝑠(𝑠)𝑑𝑟𝑑𝑠   (8). 
 
 R can represent a frequentist or a subjective probability. A frequentist probability 
is for manufactured infrastructure where an engineer can represent variations in strength 
between nominally identified structures. For example, pumps are manufactured and the 
same type used in multiple applications. Engineers can model individual components as 





 However, most civil engineering forms of infrastructure are one of a kind, sited at 
unique locations, and lack frequency performance data. For these conditions, PF is 
dependent upon any lack of knowledge about the actual resistance capacity for the 
specific site and the constructed infrastructure. Also, it is dependent upon physical 
variability of the extreme load effects at that site over the life of the project. The 
structure’s reliability changes as the state of knowledge about the structure changes and is 
referred to as subjective probability or Bayesian reliability. 
 
  For either form of probability, the engineer is most interested in whether the 
structure will fail when exposed to an extreme load or a certain limit state. Therefore, it is 
necessary to represent R as less than or equal to x. This is done by integrating the 
resistance probability density function, fr(x) to generate a resistance probability 
distribution function, Fr(x) to identify the ultimate strength R for some specified mode of 
failure. PF under the action of a single known load effect s is  
 
𝑃𝐹= 𝑃(𝑅 − 𝑠 < 0) =  𝐹𝑟(𝑠) = 𝑃(
𝑅
𝑠⁄ < 1)   (9). 
 
 If the load effect S is a random variable with a distribution function Fs, the 
following equation replaces the above equation where Fr is the distribution function for 
R. Also, the lower limit -∞ is zero since strength is not a negative number: 
 
𝑃𝐹 = 𝑃(𝑅 − 𝑆 ≤ 0) = ∫ 𝐹𝑟
∞
0






 The equation represents the product of the probabilities of two independent 
events, summed over all possible occurrences that the probability S lies in 
the range of x, x + ds; and the probability R is less than or equal to x. Figure 
15, after M. H. Faber and J. D. Sorensen, provides a graphic representation of 










 Level II is the next level of the design hierarchy. The mathematics is the same as 
Level III, but instead of simulating a large number of combinations of random variable, 
Level II assumes random variables have normal distributions. This allows the analysis to 
use expected values and the covariance between random values. This shifts the analysis 
away from determining failure along the entire failure envelope to checking at a single 






 USACE provides a description of Level II methods for linear (first order 
reliability method) and non-linear (second order reliability method) failure functions for 
normally distributed uncorrelated and correlated variables (USACE, 2002). For the linear 
(first order) failure functions, Level II defines a margin of safety function, M, as the 
difference between resistance and load, 𝑀 = 𝑅 − 𝑆.  
 
 When variables R and S are normally distributed, M is also normally distributed 
based on the first and second moments of the random variables. Its mean value is 
𝜇𝑀 = 𝜇𝑅 − 𝜇𝑠 with a variance of 𝜎𝑀
2 = 𝜎𝑅
2 + 𝜎𝑆
2 − 2𝜌𝑅𝑆𝜎𝑅𝜎𝑆 and standard deviation of 
𝜎𝑀 = √𝜎𝑅
2 + 𝜎𝑆
2 − 2𝜌𝑅𝑆𝜎𝑅𝜎𝑆. The parameter 𝜌𝑅𝑆 is the correlation coefficient and when 





 The probability of failure may now use the cumulative standard normal 
distribution function, Φ where  
 










𝜎𝑔⁄ = 𝛽 is the reliability index. Figure 16, after Gregory Baecher and John 
Christian, is an illustration of the reliability index (Baecher & Christen, 2003). The index 
represents the number of standard deviations from the probable value of 𝑔 to the failure 







Figure 16. Probability Density (a) and Cumulative Probability (b) for Margin M. 
Note that the Area in (a) under the Curve and to the Left of the Axis is the 




 For the non-linear failure (second order) of normally distributed random 
variables, the mathematics provides methodologies to approximate values for 𝜇𝑔and 𝜎𝑔. 
The basic variable ?̅? = (𝑋1, 𝑋2 … 𝑋𝑖) are transformed into a set of normalized variables 





 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍𝑆 =
𝑆−𝜇𝑆
𝜎𝑆
   (12). 
 
 Level II methods have shortcomings. Thoft- Christensen and Baker (Thoft-
Christensen & Baker, 1982) discuss the problem of a lack of failure function invariance 
with the reliability index method. The value of 𝛽 can be different for the same case 
dependent on the expression used to define an equivalent failure function. They 



































failure surface and not to the failure function. The USACE reference provides more in-
depth discussion. 
 
 Level I design is the simplest of the three methods. It is similar to deterministic 
design. The methodology develops an equation that has coefficients applied to parameters 
that represent R and S such that 𝑔 =  𝑅 𝛾𝑟⁄ −  𝑆(𝛾𝑠) = 0.  The coefficients are derived 
from Levels II and III probability analyses to reduce the value of R and increase the value 
of S to meet a target PF. The resulting equation is 𝑅 = (𝛾𝑟𝛾𝑠)𝑆 = Γ𝑆 where Γ represents a 
safety factor. 
 
 For the design of coastal structures, all three levels need to consider any time 
variance in random variables. A structure is subject to changes in sea levels, storm surges 
and accompanying wave heights and periods over the life of a project. Also, a structure’s 
resistance is subject to a time-varying strength/degradation as material properties change 
when exposed to loading.   
 
 Design guidance is available to assess coastal hydraulic loading. USACE and 
Kamphuis are two references that provide details ((USACE, 2002) and (Kamphuis, 
2010). However, presently incorporating a change in material properties in reliability 
calculations is difficult. 
 
 The Joint Committee on Structural Safety and USACE offers insights to time 





determine the probability that the structure’s performance enters the failure region during 
some specified time interval. The failure function is 𝑔 (𝑥(𝑡) ≤ 0 for a time period, t 
during a time interval [0, T]. The value x(t) is a realization of a stochastic process.  
 
 The probability of failure during the interval is 
 
𝑃𝐹 = 1 − 𝑃(𝑔(𝑋(𝑡)) > 0, ∀𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]   (13). 
 
Performing such an evaluation is difficult. It requires knowing how resistance changes 
over time, R(t) [0. T], while exposed to changes in loading over the same time interval, 
S(t). An approximation is to determine an upper bound of the probability of failure in the 
time interval [0,T] where v
+
 [R(t)] is a mean-up-crossing rate when S(t) exceeds R(t): 
 
𝑃𝐹(𝑇) ≤ ∫ ∨
+𝑇
0
[𝑅(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡   (14). 
 
 As an alternative to knowing material degradation and understanding the 
maximum load values within the time interval, USACE recommends setting T equal to 
one year (USACE, 2002). Instead of calculating PF over the life of the project, the 
analysis determines the PF in a 1-year period, PF (1 year). If the engineer assumes failure 
each year is independent for all variables, the engineer can apply a binomial distribution 
to determine the probability over T years. It becomes a sum of the probability occurring 
in the first year, the probability occurring in the second year…up to T years where PF 





𝑃𝐹(𝑇 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) = ∑ 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)
𝑇−1 =𝑇𝑖=1 1 − [1 − 𝑃𝐹(1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)]
𝑇  (15). 
 
 Assuming that failure each year is independent simplifies the analysis. However, 
this has its shortcomings. It ignores that deterioration in one year is dependent upon the 
state of resistance in the previous year. Also, computing annual projections of the 
significant wave height, Hs will be different than computing Hs over the life of the 
project. 
 
 However, the binomial distribution offers a means to estimate the probability of 
failure for a design condition during the lifetime of a project. Kamphuis offers the 
following expression where PE is an encounter probability, TR is a return period of a 
design event (load) over T years, and NL is the project design life (Kamphuis, 2010): 
 
𝑃𝐸 = 1 − (1 −
1
𝑇𝑅
)𝑁𝐿 or  𝑇𝑅 = (1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐸)
1
𝑁𝐿
⁄ )−1  (16). 
 
 Equation (17) determines the probability the structure will encounter a particular 
loading (storm, wave, etc.) over the project design life. Kamphuis then uses PE in the 
following equation  
 
𝑃𝐿 = 𝑃𝐸(𝑃𝐹)   (17) 
where PL is the lifetime probability of failure for the design event. For example, using 
equation (16) where 𝑇𝑅 for the design storm surge is 100 years (1% chance of being 





given storm surge, the PF = 0.10, the probability of failure over the lifetime of the project 
is PL = (0.64)(0.10) = 0.06. 
 
 Calculating PF and PL are important because there is always going to be an event 
that equals or exceeds the design event; and there can be consequences whether the 
structure collapses or remains intact and functions. This potential for exceedence is part 
of what defines residual risk, i.e. that portion of the probability distribution that exceeds 
the design event and the resulting consequences.  
 
 This knowledge helps the designers to quantify the residual risk for a range of 
design events and project costs. This gives the decision makers the knowledge to select a 
project based on a balance of risks with net benefits. In addition, it provides the tools 
needed to communicate residual risk to the public and the need for additional actions to 
mitigate residual risk.  
 
 Equation (17) is the frequency component in equation (18) where risk, R equals 
the probability of failure over the life of the project for the given load times the 
consequences, i.e. the probability that an event generates a load that exceeds the design 
during the structure’s lifetime and results in loss of life, property, etc. 
 






Figure 17, after William Lowrance, presents the relationship in a generalized exposure – 
effect correlation plot (Lowrance, 1976). This correlation is also referred to as a fragility 










 USACE provides guidance on the development of fragility curves and resilience 
for coastal type structures (Schultz, Gouldby, et al., 2010; Schultz, McKay, & Hales, 
2012). The 2010 report summarizes a literature review and offers the following 
classification for developing fragility curves: 
 Judgmental – Fragility curves are a function of expert opinion or engineering 
judgment. 
 Empirical – Fragility curves are a function of observational data obtained through 
natural or scientific experiments. 
 Analytical – Fragility curves are a function of models. 













 The report notes no one approach will satisfy all purposes. The appropriate 
approach depends on the availability of data and models, how well the engineers 
understand failure modes, and available resources to perform analyses. However, if the 
distributions of the variables are not normal or lognormal distributions or are unknown, 
the results are approximations. The outcomes can only be interpreted in nominal or 
relative terms, not as absolute values. 
 
 Schultz et al, tie the development of fragility curves to reliability methods based 
on a conditional PF relationship. The approach assumes all of the uncertainty is in the 
capacity term and the method derives the curve by varying the demand parametrically.  It 
assumes the uncertainty follows a lognormal distribution based on recent studies and, 
therefore, the fragility curve does as well.  
 
 The following relationship estimates the conditional PF: 
 
𝑝(𝑍 ≤ 0|𝑆 = 𝑠) = 𝐹𝑅(𝑠) = Φ(−β) = Φ (
ln(𝑠 𝑚𝑅⁄ )
𝜎ln 𝑅
)   (19) 
 
The cumulative distribution function, FR(s) gives PF conditional on the demand applied 
to the system, 𝑝(𝑍 ≤ 0|𝑆 = 𝑠). The variable mR is the median of the probability 
distribution characterizing uncertainty in the capacity and its standard deviation is 
𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑅 = √1 + 𝑉𝑅








 Figure 18 presents the relationship. In Figure 18a, the load mR ranges in values 
from 100 to 1000 while the uncertainty 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑅 is held constant at 0.5. By increasing the 
median load where failure occurs, it reduces the conditional probability of a system at 






Figure 18. Examples of Fragility Curves Derived from the Reliability Index 




In Figure 18b, the uncertainty in the capacity of a system, 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑅 ranges in values from 0.1 
to 1.5 while the load mR is held constant at s =100. As the uncertainty increases, the curve 
tends to flatten out. It implies PF increases when the applied load is less than the constant 
median load and decreases at loads greater than the constant median load, i.e. the greater 
the uncertainty the more likely failure can occur at a lower load. 
 
 Such a probabilistic approach makes it possible to design a structure for a specific 





and how it performs when the hazard exceeds the design event. This is important because 
there is always going to be an event that exceeds the design event and the question is 
whether the structure collapses or remains intact and functions. This potential for 
exceedence is part of what defines residual risk, i.e. that portion of the probability 
distribution that exceeds the design event and the resulting consequences.  
 
 This knowledge helps the designers to quantify the residual risk for a range of 
design events and project costs. This gives the decision makers the knowledge to select a 
project based on a balance of risks with net benefits. In addition, it provides the tools 
needed to communicate residual risk to the public, and the need for additional actions to 
mitigate residual risk.  
 
 However, the challenge for the design of structures is having an adequate 
database of the performance of various components under load. At present, there is 
insufficient data to support empirical and analytical type fragility curves for many types 
of structures exposed to coastal loads.  In the interim, assessments will depend on expert 
elicitation to judge the performance aspects of such systems.  
 
 
2.2.3.2 Tolerable Risk  
 
 As part of the ASCE’s national dialogue, some discussion focused on what is an 
appropriate level of residual risk for the design of coastal flood risk reduction systems. 
The discussion ranged from the standards applied in the Netherlands (10
-4





probability for major metropolitan areas) to lower risk levels associated with modern, 
well-engineered dams (as low as 10
-6
 for new dams).  
 
 Baecher and Zielinski, in an unpublished paper, examined the reasonableness of 
the recommended levels.  In doing so, they make the following points important to this 
paper (Baecher & Zielinski, 2008): 
 
 People are willing to tolerate higher risk when their exposure to the risk is 
voluntary. For the case of living within a coastal system, people choose to live 
close to the ocean for the benefits of living near the water. They voluntarily 
accept the hazards associated with coastal storms in exchange for those walks on 
the beach. This is opposed to involuntary risk such as the construction of a dam 
upstream from where people live. The public has a lower sense of control and 
demand more stringent requirements to reduce their exposure to risk. 
 For civil works infrastructure and exposure to natural hazards, the practice is to 
base criteria on societal risk, i.e. the risk of multiple fatalities from a single event. 
This approach is opposite to using individual risk, i.e., the risk of death to the 
average person. The latter case applies to activities such as accident rates. The 
difference in criterion is that a societal risk is a probability function and individual 
risk is a simple probability. 
 The United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE) approach to safety 
regulation based on societal risk is an appropriate application to public works 
infrastructure (HSE, 2001). The basis for the HSE approach is a 1949 British legal 
case where the court determined whether the defendant had taken actions to lower 
risk ‘so far as reasonably practicable’. This case gave birth to the application of 
the ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) principle to industrial and other 
hazards. The HSE bases ALARP on the concept of tolerable risk and implements 
it in the form of a F:N curve concept. A tolerable risk is one that is acceptable to 





benefits are insufficient given the level of risk, society takes action to lower that 
risk to levels as low as practicable. 
 The recommendation for a 10-4 annual risk of casualty is an appropriate level of 
societal risk for urban areas where the risk is voluntarily accepted and the 
management of risk is subject to the ALARP principle. 
 
 In Figure 19, based on work by the HSE, the upper horizontal line represents the 
maximum risk that society will tolerate in any circumstance and below the lower line the 
risk is small enough to accept (HSE, 2001). In between the lines, society needs to 
implement measures to reduce the risk to a level as low as is practicable. This approach is 
suitable for technical systems where elements can be presented in a hierarchical structure. 
Keys to success with this approach are defined conditions, control of resources, and 
modeling. A drawback of this type of representation is a weakness to predict and control 
possible emergent properties; particularly as the social component of a social-technical 
problem is more dominant relative to the technical component federal and state dam and 
levee safety programs in the U. S. For this study, the upper limit is the 10
-4
 annual risk of 
casualty noted above. The lower limit could be 10
-6
, a level appropriate such that 














 Figure 20, after Dimitri Diamantidas, illustrates an example of using an F-N curve 
with the ALARP framework when assessing the involuntarily accepted risk for loss of 
life (Diamantidis, 2008). For public works infrastructure, the ordinate typically reads F, 
Frequency of N or More Fatalities Per Year and represents the sum of the individual risks 
to all within the exposed population or the population at risk (PAR). This is the 
probability that anyone within the PAR loses his or her life as result of the failure of the 
structure.  
 
 The target is to reduce societal risk to below the unacceptable region to the extent 
achievable by ALARP. At a minimum, the 500-year flood event (0.2% chance of being 
equaled or exceeded in one-year) should be used to calculate tolerable risk levels where 
loss-of-life is an issue. However, for consequences that do not involve loss of life, society 
may accept higher levels of risk based on how much loss it is willing to tolerate. 
Acceptable if the resources to 
reduce risk is greatly 
disproportionate to the 
reduction in risk 
Cannot justify level of risk 
except for extraordinary 
reasons Unacceptable Risk 
Tolerable Risk 
Negligible Risk 
Resources to further reduce 





















 As in the case of submersible wastewater pump stations, the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, the Virginia Administration Code, Agency 25, State Water Control Board, 
Chapter 790, Sewage Collection and Treatment Regulations defines the requirements for 
sewage pumping. Section 9VAC25-790-380. Sewage Pumping states “All mechanical 
and electrical equipment which could be damaged or inactivated by contact with or 
submergence in water (motors, control equipment, blowers, switch gear, bearings, etc.) 
shall be physically located above the 100-year flood/wave action or otherwise protected 
against the 100-year flood/wave action damage (1% chance of being equaled or exceeded 
in one-year). All stations shall be designed to remain fully operational during the 25-year 





































 However, these standards are a function of exposure, not risk. As for the first 
requirement, Pump Station 113 (corner of Walnut Hill and Sylvan Streets) and its 
proposed new location (corner of Walnut Hill Street and Rolfe Avenue) are located 
within Zone AE in accordance with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), Map 
Number 5101040090F, revised September 2, 2009 as shown in Figure 21 (FEMA, 2009).  
 
 Zone AE is land covered by the 100-year base flood defined as having a 1% 
chance of being reached or exceeded in a single year. The NFIP maps designate this 
floodplain as the Special Flood Hazard Area, and for this specific site, the base flood 
elevation is 8.1 feet, North American Vertical Datum, 1988 (NAVD (88)). Whether the 
















 As for the second requirement, the station must remain operational when exposed 
to a 4% annual exceedence flood/wave event. It implies zero probability for failure or no 
risk. However, every structure has a potential for failure most likely due to uncertainty 
due to lack of knowledge. For example, FEMA’s Multi-Hazard Loss Estimation 
Methodology Flood Model, HAZUS-MH MR 4, Technical Manual (undated) available at 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/16579, identifies the vulnerability 
for pump/lift stations in Table 7.1, page 7-3. It identifies inundation as a high 





impact. It makes no mention of the duration of flooding, which this study identifies in the 
following section as a possible failure mode.  
 
 Also, in order to address the city’s request to identify risk, it is essential to define 
a performance level for remaining operational. However, the literature is absent of any 
discussion as to what are appropriate performance levels for pump systems.  
 
2.2.4 Subset Question d: How do rising sea levels impact the performance of a pump 
station? 
 
 There are two basic sources during storm and flooding conditions that impact the 
capacity of wastewater collection systems. One is groundwater infiltration and the other 
is inflow from stormwater runoff and/or coastal flooding. 
 
 Groundwater infiltrates into gravity line segments and manholes. The volume of 
infiltration increases with a rising groundwater table caused by heavy rains, and 
fluctuations in the water table elevation caused by tidal changes. A rise in the sea level 
will induce a natural rise of the watertable increasing infiltration by an increasing head 
and the submergence of more line segments.  
 
  Stormwater runoff drains into manhole covers when intense rainfall events cause 
localized flooding. This volume of inflow increases when rainfall occurs during high tide 





streets and manholes contributing to inflow. Also, coastal storm surge contributes to 
inflow often concurrent with storm runoff and high tides. A rising sea will result in more 
frequent flooding and flooding over a wider extent of terrain along the shoreline. This 
kind of inflow also introduces saline water into wastewater systems.  
 
 A study of four wastewater treatment systems in North Carolina examined 
responses to rainfall and tide levels (Flood & Cahoon, 2011). The portion of total flow 
attributable to infiltration and inflow ranged from 10 to 100% of base flow. Infiltration 
contributed the majority of the flow. Another study identified as much as 60% of 
infiltration occurs along house service laterals or building connections (Field & 
O'Conner, 2002). In addition, a study in Hawaii showed that tidal changes and high-surf 
events caused fluctuations in groundwater levels within the coastal plain as far as 5 
kilometers (km) inland (Norcross-Nu'u, Fletcher, Barbee, Genz, & Romine, 2008).  
 
 The North Carolina study further notes that an increase in groundwater levels 
from rainfall and rising sea level will pose three threats: (1) a reduction in treatment 
efficiencies, (2) an increase in the risk of bypass flow, and (3) the introduction of saline 
water which may have negative consequences for the mechanical and biological integrity 
of these systems. These threats will result in higher operating and maintenance costs. The 
study recommended further investigations of the impacts of saltwater infiltration.  
 
 Hurricane Sandy had a dramatic impact on the infrastructure system within the 





that lift wastewater and stormwater. The storm damage caused the loss of power to 42 of 
the 96 pumping stations. Power outages caused half of the impacts with storm surge 
accountable for the other half of the impacts. Many of these pumping stations are 
underground and were inundated. For these stations, recovery required unwatering and 
repair of electrical equipment caused by the corrosive impact of saltwater. 
  
 Recovery required an immediate response. The city was able to restore operations 
to most of the pump stations and water treatment to 99% of its customers within 4 days. 
However, the consequences included both the cost of recovery and the release of 
wastewater into New York’s waterways. The report did not note any impacts such as 
backups and overflows within service lines. 
 
 The primary concern for the Norfolk study is failure or inefficient pump 
performance results in release of wastewater into floodwaters. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) estimates 400,000 to 500,000 unauthorized discharges of 
untreated raw sewage from sanitary sewage systems in U. S. each year (Robbins, 2007). 
Most occur at manholes releasing untreated wastewater on to roads, into waterways, and 
overland. In addition, approximately 40,000 of these releases occur at sewerage hookups 
backing into basements of customers. These releases pose a health risk and are illegal 
under Section 301 of the Clean Water Act, which prohibits the discharge of pollutants 






 In summary, infiltration and inflow increase the volume of flow reducing the 
capacity of line segments to convey wastewaters to pump stations. In turn, the pump 
stations have to move more fluid to minimize the potential for overflow spilling into the 
streets and open waters. Also, coastal storms disrupt power sources and corrode 
equipment, both causing pump shut downs.  
 
2.2.5 Subset Question e: What is the appropriate means to demonstrate the impact 
on the performance of the pump stations? 
 
 Based on the work presented in section 2.2.2.3, Representation of a Coastal 
System and Figure 7, the pump station is at Level 3 within a technical hierarchical 
structure. Per Table 5 a simple, hard systems approach is appropriate for projects at Level 
3.  As noted in section 2.2.2.5, Systems Methodology, this type of project fits in Zones 1 
or 3, where its degree of certainty and agreement is high. For this case, simplicity will 
shape the dialogue and positivism and realism will shape the philosophical discussions.  
 
 The civil engineering profession has long understood the mechanics of 
wastewater systems and has developed models that can adequately represent systems 
performance. An example is a recent collaborative effort by HRSD to define data 
requirements and choose an appropriate model to represent the entire collection system 
across the 17 jurisdictions it serves (Morgan et al., 2012). Through this effort, the 
community agreed on data standards and selected a common means to represent its 





 From a systems perspective, HRSD is located at Level 2c in Figure 7 within the 
technical hierarchy, just above the jurisdictions it serves. Using the HRSD example 
above, its initial position was in Zone 2 in Figure 11, but through efforts to seek 
agreement HRSD simplified the problem to where it could apply a mathematical model, a 
hard system methodology. The agreement moved the systems representation to Zone 1 or 
Zone 3 depending on whether HRSD needs to perform stochastic analysis to clarify any 
numerical uncertainty. 
 
 Therefore, in accordance with systems thinking, a hard systems analysis is most 
appropriate for understanding the pump’s performance. In the subject literature review, 
efforts comparable to a hard systems approach specific to pump stations are mainly 
studies by utility districts or jurisdictions (King County, 2008). These studies assess 
generalized impacts using risk models based on asset management practices; however, 
there is little information specific to how rising sea levels impact pump stations. The 
consultants used experts to judge performance and qualitative scales to assess relative 
risk levels (O'Neal & Martin, 2005), (Benson & Stahr, 2008), (King County, 2008) and 
(USACE, 2014).  
 
 Based on these examples, the author used the following outline to study the 
impacts of incremental rise in sea levels on PS 113 and its proposed replacement: 
 
 Describe submersible pump stations in an asset management format. 
 Identify what assets are vulnerable and how the increase of flow volume and 





 Use expert elicitation to judge impacts, select an appropriate fragility curve to 
represent the impacts, and identify consequences. 
 
The resulting fragility curve and consequences form the basis for assessing risk. 
 
 The Environmental Protection Agency provides a list of assets for pump stations 
that is sufficient for this study (EPA, 2007). This author complements the list with details 
from a manufacturer’s manual (JES, 2012) 
 
 Inlet Sewerage and Screen 
 Superstructure  
 Wet Well (Capacity) 
 (Dual) Submersible Pump(s) and Motor(s) (power entry gland, motor assembly, 
stator, motor bearings, shaft, oil chamber, mechanical seals, housing, volute, wear 
ring, and impeller) 
 Valves 
 Valve Vault 
 Electrical System 
 Pump Control Systems 
 Force Main 
 Land and Surroundings 
 Power Source 
 Power Generator (as a backup power source) 
 
These assets represent both the design capacity and physical components of a 
submersible pump station. The volume of flow could overwhelm the pump’s capacity and 
water levels could affect physical components disrupting operations, both of which can 





 Figure 22 provides a cross-section of a typical wastewater pump system and 





















The dual system shown in Figure 23 is for pumps in parallel; an arrangement more 
suitable for a wide range of discharge volumes with no appreciable head change. The 
second pump starts when the discharge demand reaches a particular level to supplement 
the first pump.  
 
 Designing a submersible pump system requires identifying the type of wastewater 
to be pumped, determining the inflow rates and occurrence of flows, determining system 
headlosses and the vertical lift elevation difference from the wet well to discharge 
elevation. Headlosses are a function of static losses representing the difference in 





friction of liquid flow through the pipe and fittings. A key understanding for design is 
how losses increase as the flowrate increases (JES, 2012).  
 
 An engineer can use the above information to calculate a system curve, which is 
the required head versus the flowrate. It illustrates the loss of energy in the system with a 
variation of the flowrate and represents the amount of energy the pump must generate to 
operate at a given flowrate. Given the system curve, the engineer can select a type and 
size of pump, determine the size of infrastructure components (wet well, valve vault, 
valve and pipes) and needed electrical system control, etc., (JES, 2012).  
 
 As an illustration of a design, a submersible (centrifugal) pump performance is a 
function of three characteristic curves: (1) pumping head versus discharge, (2) brake 
horsepower versus discharge and (3) efficiency versus discharge. For simplicity, Figure 
24, after Ram Gupta (Gupta, 2001) shows typical curves for a single pump for a single 
pump speed. A key understanding of pump performance is that as headlosses increases a 














 Figure 24 represents the behavior of a particular pump operating at one speed. A 
pump rating is a function of the head and discharge that provides the maximum 













































 Again for simplicity, Figure 25 shows the intersection of the pump characteristic 
curve shown in Figure 24, and the system head curve. This intersection is the same point 
A from Figure 24. However, as infiltration and inflow increases due to flooding, the 
system-head curve shifts up (red arrow in Figure 25). As it shifts, Point A shifts up along 
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 The pump itself has various components that are exposed to inundation and salt 
water. Below is a list of key components and possible impacts. Most of the verbiage is 
directly from a Jensen Engineering System design manual (JES, 2012). 
 Impeller (open, closed, semi-open which includes vortex, or non-clog) - a 
component that is the heart of the pump and the only part that adds energy to the 
fluid. Energy is added by accelerating the liquid from the smaller radius at the 
impeller inlet to a larger radius at the impeller exit. Increasing the outside 
diameter of the impeller, or increasing the speed at which it operates can amplify 
the amount of energy input into the fluid. However, energy added by a spinning 
impeller exits as a high-speed fluid, which is not very useful for process 
applications. Pump output requires higher pressure, not higher speed. To convert 
from higher speed to higher pressure, the flow must be diffused (speed reduced) 
converting high velocity energy into pressure and energy. It is a function of 
Bernoulli’s Equation. (Failure mode – de-ragging trash.) 
 Motor - a function having enough HP to drive the pump and often selected to be 
non-overloading at the end of the curve. Two kinds, (1) oil-filled motors best for 
high thermal transfer and high moisture. Keeps bearings and windings lubricated 
and protects against water leaks into motor system. (2) air-filled motors, which 
have a lower drag. Best where liquids are always cool and provide heat 
dissipation. . (Failure modes – vibration or start-up torque causes insulation on 
windings to wear and short-out the motor; insulation tends to break down in moist 
environments.) 
 Cable Connections - a power cable enters the motor housing at a junction box 
located below the liquid level.  There are two kinds of connections. One is a rigid 
permanent connection with built-in strain relief. Includes packing gland around 
entrance to junction box, and a secondary seal to prevent leakage. The second is a 
quick disconnect to facilitate a frequent pump changes w/o need for electrician for 
de-ragging. (Failure mode – leakage.) 
 Bearings - one of two kinds; (1) is the upper bearing designed to support the rotor 





bearing which is usually responsible for supporting the rotor in both radial and 
axial loading. (Failure mode – improper lubrication either from contamination of 
the lubricant or poor preventive maintenance.) 
 Mechanical Seals - prevent the liquid being pumped from leaking around the 
pump shaft into the bearing and motor housing. Submersible wastewater pumps 
typically have a tandem arrangement. The system contains a seal chamber with 
two shaft seals mounted in the same direction located between the motor and 
pump with an oil barrier between the two seals. Each seal has a set of sealing 
faces with a clean barrier fluid injected between the seal faces. One sealing face 
rotates with the shaft against a stationary surface where the barrier fluid lubricates 
and cools the seal faces. (Failure mode – seal fails quickly when the surfaces run 
dry. Biggest cause for pump down time.)  
 Seal Face Materials - one of four kinds; softer materials are carbon, ceramic, and 
harder materials are tungsten carbide, and silicon carbide. Dissimilar materials are 
typically used, one hard and one softer, to avoid adhesion between the surfaces. In 
wastewater applications, the upper seal is in oil and usually is a carbon versus a 
ceramic material; and the lower seal is exposed to pump fluid (and abrasives) and 
are silicon carbide versus a silicon carbide material or silicon carbide versus 
tungsten carbide material. (Failure mode - Carbon and ceramic materials are 
easily scratched in an abrasive environment causing the seal to fail. Ceramic is 
also subject to thermal shock (quick temperature change) causing it to shatter.) 
 Moisture Sensors - used in submersible pumps to detect moisture in the motor 
cavity where there should be none. (Failure mode – moisture impacts motor and 
bearings requiring an immediate shut down).  
 
  Another critical asset is power supply. In Norfolk, the primary power source is 
separate from the city’s system. Coastal storms can disrupt utility service and the city 
only has one submersible pump with a backup generator to manage power disruptions. 





 From an asset management perspective, rising sea levels and coastal storms will 
impact the capacity of the network to handle larger flows and the operating efficiency of 
pumps as discharges increase. The question remains how best to represent the 
performance of a pump system in the face of such impacts? 
 
 From a systems analysis perspective, there are two basic approaches to identifying 
risk scenarios (Pinto & Garvey, 2013); a bottom-up and top-down approach. The bottom-
up approach uses knowledge of assets and how these assets work together. This method 
is compatible with reliability analyses and tools such as failure mode and effects analysis. 
A top-down approach is more appropriate when there is lack of data to support a bottom-
up approach. The top down methodology works first with an understanding a system’s 
objectives, and second with informed conjecture to establish a general set of risks.  
 
 From a bottom-up perspective, a Functional Dependency Network Analysis 
(FDNA) provides a way to assess impacts to judge dependencies between system 
components. It provides a means to add discipline and to document expert elicitations. 
The methodology “…is a way to measure inflows and outflows of value across a 
topology of feeder-receiver node dependency relationships” (Pinto & Garvey, 2013). It 
uses mathematical graph theory in the form of connected nodes, and applies relationships 
to assess how disruptions to nodal links impact the system’s capability.  
 
 It has applicability to a wastewater network, and in particular, assessing the 





Figure 26 is a modified graphical representation of a pump station based on an asset 
decomposition and dependency flow diagram from a study by the U. S. Army Corps of 
Engineers for Naval Station Norfolk (USACE, 2014). The mission for Norfolk’s pump 
system is to provide support to residential customers. The pump station’s objective is to 











 The pump’s performance is dependent on all components of the system operating 
satisfactorily to avoid any back up and overflow of wastewater, hence all arrows point to 





gravity network and wet well to handle the volume of influent, (2) a continuous supply of 
power and a functioning control system, (3) on the ability of the downstream components 
to handle the volume of effluent, and (4) its motor to function and to operate at an 
efficiency sufficient to handle the volume of influent. 
 
 Per discussions with the City of Norfolk, Operations Division, Department of 
Utilities typical shut downs caused by storms and flooding are (1) a loss of power supply 
because the pump station does not have a backup generator, (2) electrical short in the 
Quasar electrical junction box, (green box at grade level), (3) electrical short in the 
control panel when water levels are about one foot above the bottom of the panel, (4) 
overloaded pump runs continuously for 2 to 3 days of flooding reducing pump efficiency, 
and (5) dirt and sand chokes the pump, slowing it down and driving up the amperage 
burning out the motor. (See Appendix A, March 5, 2015 entry.)  
 
 The FDNA identifies potential ripple effects of losses in a supple network.  It uses 
nodes to represent the various components with each node representing a measurable 
capacity to function. It also uses links between nodes to represent a potential to disrupt 
capacity of nodes and impact the network’s overall capability. The FDNA measures the 
level of “operability loss” and a means to judge whether such impacts are an acceptable 
risk (Garvey & Pinto, 2014).  
 
 Figure 27 is a topology that translates Figure 26 into a mathematically directed 





The graph is a means to visualize dependency relationships between nodes and a 
methodology to measure the transmission of value between nodes (Pinto & Garvey, 














 The graph is a set of points and a set of lines, with each line connecting two 
points. The points of a graph are known as vertices or nodes. Outlying nodes such as N2, 
N5, N6 and N8 are leaf nodes that feed “contributions” to other nodes and are referred to as 
feeder nodes. Nodes such as N1, N3, N4 and N7 both receive and feed other nodes and 
are referred to as feeder and receiver nodes. (Pinto & Garvey, 2013). 
 
 The FDNA uses value functions to express the performance levels of the pairs of 
feeder and receiver nodes. This approach is in line with research by USACE for 
quantifying resiliency in coastal systems (Schultz et al., 2012). Its structure is compatible 
with existing mathematical models of wastewater systems and offers a means to integrate 
risk analysis within these models.  
 
 The challenge for an engineer is to generate data that permits understanding the 
performance of the system. This requires an analysis of current capacity, how the rate of 
infiltration and inflow increase with increasing sea levels, and how that increase affects 
the capacity of the system to function. However, the city has not conducted these kinds of 
studies. (See Appendix A, June 3, 2014 and March 13, 2015 entries.) .  
 
 As noted in this section, the pump’s performance is dependent upon four aspects 
of which two potential failure modes are most pertinent for this analysis. Floodwaters 
cause electrical shorts in the pump station’s electrical and control system; and as the 





decreases. As shown in Figure 23, when the system head curve continues to rise, a pump 
begins to lose efficiency and capacity.   
 
 However, there is very limited available data about the pump station. Also, ASCE 
notes there is a lack of guidelines for assessing the impact of climate change on existing 
infrastructure. In addition, the uncertainty of future weather makes the use of 
probabilistic methods difficult because properties of variables will be statistically 
different in the future (ASCE, 2015).  
 
 Consequently, this means there is a high degree of uncertainty due to a lack of 
knowledge, which makes it difficult to take a bottom-up approach to develop a fragility 
curve. An alternative is to use a top-down approach in the form of expert elicitation for 
informed conjecture to establish a set of relative general risks for the existing pump 
station and the proposed new station.  
 
 Fault and event trees are two forms of representation that can complement expert 
elicitation. A fault tree starts with the failure mode and works backwards to identify 
possible causes. However, the event tree is more in line with this study. It takes a 
mirrored approach starting with the initiating event such as in our case, coastal flooding, 
and works toward the consequences.  
 
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) provides insights on how a system works and 





quantified probability that the system may fail to meet its objective, which is known as 
the probability of system failure. It reflects the aggregate uncertainty in knowledge about 
the performance of the pump station and about the initiating events (Baecher & Christen, 
2003).  
 
 The objective for this pump system is to remove a sufficient volume of 
wastewater to avoid spillage that results in consequences. This study assesses the relative 
risk of the existing and new pump stations that either will fail to meet their objective.  
 
2.3 Summary and Discussion 
 
 The author framed the literature review within ASCE’s guiding principles for 
critical infrastructure. These four principles were born in the aftermath of infamous 
infrastructure failures in the first decade of the 21
st
 Century. The discussions recognized a 
need to integrate a systems approach, risk analysis and decision-making within the life 
cycle of critical infrastructure to help communicate a project’s performance to 
stakeholders.  
 
 An initial step to embracing ASCE’s principles is to answer the first question 
about what is the problem scenario. Ample literature and media coverage about sea level 
rise that has made it obvious that the Tidewater region of Southeast Virginia is one of the 






 The scientific and engineering communities clearly recognize the threat to the 
region and acknowledge the low degree of certainty as to projected rates of sea level rise. 
The mayor of Norfolk is a leading spokesperson in the nation as to the impacts rising sea 
levels pose to the region’s economy and public safety. However, numerous media articles 
highlight the lack of agreement among the elected representatives at various levels of 
government as to whether this is a real or imagined reality. 
 
 Addressing the second question as to what is an appropriate systems approach, 
the technical profession is well versed in using systems engineering in the form of 
mathematical representation to describe a problem situation. Engineers have had great 
success using a hard systems approach, i.e. models to define a system’s performance and 
to identify an optimized solution. However, optimization can inadequately represent or 
disregard aspects difficult to represent mathematically such as environmental impacts and 
social disruptions. Consequently, the public often rejects such optimized solutions. 
 
 The literature shows that systems engineering is evolving to develop soft systems 
approaches that try to cope with problem situations that mathematics cannot easily 
represent. The engineering profession is recognizing the need for ficing alternatives, i.e., 
those that are not necessarily optimal, but good enough to offer options in an undesirable 
situation or unresolved matter. 
 
 This broader view offers a holistic approach to assessing a problem situation. It 





that offers a means to cope with both a well-defined problem and one that is ill defined. It 
is based on attributes that help engineers judge whether the scenario reflects a traditional, 
well defined and agreed upon problem situation or a problem situation that is unique, too 
ambiguous or poorly understood. 
 
 The challenge is judging where in the spectrum the attributes exist and whether 
the nature of the problem is causing shifts within the attributes. Often, the problem 
evolves if the nature of the impacts change or the number and type of stakeholders 
involved change or if there is any new knowledge that better defines the problem. All of 
this makes it difficult to develop optimal, resilient alternatives that could stand the test of 
time. 
 
 The literature review supports a way to use a philosophical worldview approach 
to examine the challenge of rising sea levels less on the response of the physical 
environmental and more on the response of a community. This leads the author to 
examine a coastal system as an enterprise system in the form of a network of 
interdependent organizations whose processes are not fully under control of any single 
entity. 
 
 This above description is in line with our democratic society in a country 
composed of interdependent groups of federal, state and local governments. Our laws, 
regulations, policies and codes are distributed at each of the government levels where we 





enterprise system provides a basis for analyzing risk with stakeholder input, and it offers 
a means to assist decision makers to make informed choices as to appropriate adaptive 
actions. 
 
 The literature shows that where an enterprise system is a social representation of a 
coastal community, understanding impacts on infrastructure performance is a social-
technical problem. The author offers a worldview based on using a network to represent 
the community, and a hierarchy within the network as a subsystem to represent the 
social-technical problem. The hierarchy offers a means to reduce a complicated 
perspective of infrastructure at the top of the hierarchy to a simpler perspective at the 
bottom of the hierarchy. 
 
 The author presents a philosophical spectrum and complements it with a graphic 
depiction of Zones of Complexity to help categorize an appropriate systems approach at 
each level within the hierarchy. It is a simple tool to help engineers judge whether the 
scenario is a traditional, well defined and agreed upon problem situation or a problem 
situation that is messy. Given this understanding, the engineer can judge which 
component of a social-technical problem is dominant and classify whether a hard or soft 
systems approach is appropriate. 
 
 At this point in the summary, systems engineering offers a disciplined way of 
structured thinking grounded in a philosophical worldview; systems environment 





problem; systems representation presents our community as a network where aspects can 
be depicted as a hierarchy; and systems philosophy helps classify the problem situation 
and describe its characteristics at any level in the hierarchy based on its degree of 
complexity. What is needed is a systems methodology that provides the framework to 
apply systems analysis to resolve real problems.  
 
 However, this is one topic in the literature the author found that needs further 
research. There are numerous references describing multiple kinds of methodologies. 
There are many examples of applying hard systems thinking to complicated natural and 
physical systems; and of applying soft systems thinking to complex organizations and 
industrial processes. However, there is limited information and experience on applying 
soft systems thinking specifically to complex public works type infrastructure. 
 
 This author offers a methodology as a framework to apply a systems analysis to 
the challenge of rising sea levels, but it is untested. At the writing of this paper, the U. S. 
Army Corps of Engineers is researching systems approaches in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Sandy in accordance with the Disaster Relief Appropriates Act of 2013 (Public 
Law 113-2) (USACE, 2015a). The Corps seeks optimized solutions within a coastal 
system defined by a sand budget that can cross multiple jurisdictions; but whether 
optimized alternatives can balance social-technical problems across multiple jurisdictions 






 For the third question as to what is an appropriate risk-informed methodology, 
the literature is full of traditional probability math to define the hazard and performance 
components of the risk equation. It also includes publications that address quantifying 
performance specific to coastal infrastructure, and identifying reasonable risk exposure. 
However, the literature is absent of any discussion as to what are appropriate 
performance levels for pump systems.  
 
 As a follow-on to the absence of data of performance levels, the review to answer 
the fourth question about impacts to pump stations identifies a second topic that needs 
research. The literature lacks information specific to mathematically depicting impacts to 
wastewater systems or pump stations exposed to flood waters. Also, the literature lacks 
specifics to quantifying the consequence of pump failure as a component to the risk 
equation.  
 
 As for the fifth question about appropriate means to depict impacts to pump 
stations, available infrastructure concepts use a bottom-up approach focusing on asset 
management to assess performance. The shortcoming to this approach is asset 
management can demand large volumes of data that are lacking and expensive to collect. 
In the absence of a bottom-up approach, the alternative is a top-down approach. 
However, the literature lacks specific examples applicable to depicting impacts to the 






 In summary, the benefit of a systems-based approach is it offers grounding in 
philosophy and systems thinking to cope with whether you are dealing with a unitary 
understanding of objectives or pluralistic perspectives. Tailoring a methodology to the 
problem situation provides a basis for designing an approach with tools capable of coping 
with emerging patterns and new knowledge. If the process is simple, a reductionist, 
prescriptive system analysis may be best, but if it is complex, the soft systems methods 







APPLIED RESEARCH PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Risk Informed Decision Methodology 
 
 Per the literature review in section 2.2.1 Subset question a: “What is the problem 
scenario?” finds that employing an integrated systems approach is a means to structure a 
complex problem into something more manageable. Incorporating risk as a means to 
assess uncertainty aids decision makers to make informed judgments about potential 
trade-offs. It is through risk that decision makers can communicate the potential for loss 
to the public. 
 
 Although, PS 113 is a small system in scope and scale, applying a systems 
perspective made it necessary to frame the research problem within a coastal region 
adapting to the changing sea levels. Section 2.2.2, The Coastal Environment as a System 
and section 2.2.3, Representation of a Coastal System, describe the region as an 
enterprise system in the form of a network as shown in Figure 6. From within that 
network, Figure 7 presents infrastructure as a hierarchy where Pump Station 113 fits 
within Level 3. 
 
 Level 3 represents the various jurisdictions responsible for the collection of their 
own wastewater for transfer to HRSD. It is at this level where Pump Station 113 collects 
and pumps wastewater to a HRSD pump station within the Larchmont neighborhood for 





 Using this hierarchical approach reduces the complex problem to a representation 
of the network that is easier to understand. In accordance with Table 5, a simple, hard 
systems approach is appropriate for projects at Level 3. As noted in section 2.2.2.6, 
Systems Methodology and Figure 11, Zone of Complexity, the degree of certainty and 
agreement is high and this type project fits in Zone 1 or 3, which is most appropriate for 
understanding the pump’s performance. However, per the literature review, there is little 
information specific to how rising sea levels impact pump stations. The general practice 
is to use experts to judge performance and qualitative scales to assess relative risk levels 
(King County, 2008).  
 
 As noted in section 2.2.3.2, Tolerable Risk, the State Water Control Board defines 
the design standards for sewage pumping. Section 9VAC25-790-380, Sewage Pumping 
states Mechanical and electrical equipment must be located above the 100-year 
flood/wave action (1% chance of being equaled or exceeded in one-year). Also, all 
stations shall be designed to remain fully operational during the 25-year flood/wave 
action (4% chance of being equaled or exceeded in one-year). 
 
 The controlling physical factors are infiltration and inflow, which increase the 
volume of flow reducing the capacity of line segments to convey wastewaters to pump 
stations. In turn, the pump stations have to move more fluid to minimize the potential for 
overflow spilling into the streets and open waters. Also, coastal storms disrupt power 






 In section 2.2.5, “What is the appropriate means to demonstrate the impact on the 
performance of the pump stations?”, the author describes submersible pump stations in an 
asset management format. The assets represent both the design capacity and physical 
components of a submersible pump stations. The review identified that the pump 
performance is dependent upon four aspects; (1) a properly sized gravity network and wet 
well to handle the volume of influent, (2) a continuous supply of power and a functioning 
control system, (3) the ability of the downstream components to handle the volume of 
effluent, and (4) its motor to function and its efficiency to handle the volume of influent. 
 
 These aspects can be reduced to three potential failure modes: (1) loss of power 
supply caused by a disruption of service power, (2) electrical shorts caused by 
floodwaters in the pump stations electrical and control system; and (3) the pump’s 
capacity decreases or the motor simply burns out as the depth and duration of inundation 
increases and resulting headlosses increase. There are three key failure points. (See 
Appendix A, March 5, 2015 entry.) The first is the interruption of service power. The 
second is when flood elevations are about one foot higher than the bottom of the control 
panel causing electrical motors to short out. The third is when the duration of floodwaters 
exceeds 72 hours, a time long enough to impact pump efficiency and/or damage the 
pump motor. 
 
 However, this study only focuses on the second and third failure modes. As noted 
in 3.2.2 The Network and Existing and New Pump Station 113 Details, neither station has 





study centers on only those assets within the city’s control and assumes that there will be 
no loss of service power. A broader study of an integrated system would require 
including assets that support the city.   
 
 The author employed a top-down approach. As noted in section 2.2.5, the pump 
station’s objective is to remove a sufficient volume of wastewater to avoid any spillage 
that result in consequences. This study uses expert elicitation for informed conjecture in 
the absence of available data to establish a set of relative risks between the two pump 
station locations for a life cycle of 20 years typical for submersible wastewater pumps 
and over a 50-year design life for a pump station structure.  
 
 As noted in section 2.2.2.2, The Coastal Environment as a System, the basis for 
the decision theory is a value function. The author created an event tree to develop the 
value function. The event tree is a suitable way to represent the cascading effect of the 
impact of a natural event. The event tree is an excellent visual tool that starts with the 
initiating event such as coastal flooding, and works toward the outcomes. Figure 28 

















 The analysis will assess the relative risk between the existing pump station and 
the proposed new pump station for the release of wastewaters, a violation of Section 301 
of the Clean Water Act.  
 
 As discussed in section 2.2.3.1 Design Principles, the equation for computing risk, 
R is as follows: 
 





where PE is the probability of the storm event, PF is the probability the pump station will 
fail when impacted by the storm event, and the consequences are the resulting losses 
from the failure of the pump station. Figure 29, after Desmond Hartford and Gregory 






Figure 29. Risk Analysis Process (Hartford & Baecher, 2004) 
 
 For this study, this author assumes a storm event occurs upon an elevation 
representing a sea level rise scenario and the probability of this combination is 
represented by the annual storm frequency of the storm, 𝑃𝐸. The probability of failure, 
𝑃𝐹, depends on subject matter experts who can qualitatively weigh the sum of the impacts 




Range of Failure Modes 






judge the appropriate consequences for the given failure condition. The assumptions for 
the risk analysis are as follows: 
 
 Probability, 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑃𝐸(𝑃𝐹) 
 Conditioning Event (A) – A flood of [X]% frequency occurs at a sea level rise 
elevation of [X] feet, NAVD (88). 
 Risk Event (B) – The pump station does not work or its operational efficiency is 
insufficient to prevent overflow of waste.  
 Risk Statement –If a flood of [X]% frequency occurs at a sea level rise elevation 
of [X] feet, NAVD (88) then either the pump does not work or the pump’s 
operational capacity is insufficient resulting in an overflow of wastewater. 
 Pump Station System Performance Objective – Pump operates to move a 
sufficient volume of wastewater to prevent backups and overflow.  
 Failure Modes – (1) The electrical system shorts and shuts down pump station. (2) 
The efficiency of the pump drops to a capacity that is insufficient to prevent 
overflow of waste or causes the pump to shut down. 
 Consequences - This study will use a mathematical function to measure 
consequences presented in section 3.3 Consequences. 
 
 The product is a graphic showing the progressive changes of risk as sea levels 
rise. The results will show how this combination changes as flood stages change over 
time, any difference between the existing and new pump station locations, and a tipping 













3.2 Specific Project Research Design 
 
3.2.1 Venn Diagram  
 
 Figure 30 is a Venn diagram showing the probabilistic causation between 
floodwaters and impacts to pump performance, i.e., the likelihood flooding will result in 










A (Flood elevation) and B (spill) are events in a sample space Ω with 𝑃(𝐴) >
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃(𝐵)𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛. The probability of a spill (B) given the occurrence of flood 
elevation (A) is a conditional probability where 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴). 
 






 𝑃(𝐴) > 0 and is equivalent to the annual exceedence probability of a flood stage. 
 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 0 when floodwaters are below a specified elevation where infiltration 
and inflow are sufficiently negligible because most of the network is at higher 
elevations. 
 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) > 0 when floodwaters exceed the specified elevation because at this 
point inflow impacts the pump’s performance. Expert elicitation will judge the 
probability of non-performance given the flood stage. Non-performance can take 
the form of a step function or a S-shaped function as shown in Figure 31. 
 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 1 when flood waters reach the bottom of the electrical control panel 






Figure 31. A Conceptual Fragility Curve. (The fragility curve is a step function (a) 
for a very well understood or brittle system. A fragility curve is an S-shaped 
















3.2.2 The Network and Existing and New Pump Station 113 Details 
 
 The City of Norfolk, Department of Utilities, Sewerage Quads C-9B, 9C, 9D, and 
10A show the plan view of the sewerage shed (service area), which covers about 135 
acres (0.2 square miles). The land use is residential dwellings composed of single-family 
homes. There are approximately 190 to 200 units in the sewerage service area, but it is 
difficult to determine a precise number directly from the drawings. Table 6 lists the 
manholes from lowest to highest manhole elevation and what percent of the manholes are 

















































1 C-09-C, 4+80 Sylvan & Walnut Hill 2.02  
2 C-09-C, 0+21.6 Sylvan & Walnut Hill 2.35  
3 C-09-C, 2+40 Rolfe & Walnut Hill 2.86  
4 C-09-C, 0+00 Sylvan & Walnut Hill 2.9 17% of MH 
under Elev. 3 
5 C-09-B, 2+75 Sylvan 3.42  
6 C-09-B, 5+00 Rolfe 3.92 25% of MH 
under Elev. 4 
7 C-09-D, 8+00 Rolfe 4.09  
8 C-09-B, 6+04.9 Powhatan & So, Eleanor 4.17  
9 C-09-D, 7+50 Sylvan & Catalpa 4.29  
10 C-09-C, 3+74 Sylvan 4.39  
11 C-09-B, 8+57.4 Powhatan 4.91 46% of MH 
under Elev. 5 
12 C-09-B, 3+61.2 Powhatan & Powhatan Pl 5.2  
13 C-09-C, 3+72 Rolfe 5.85  
14 C-09-C, 4+75 Powhatan & Walnut Hill 5.97 58% of MH 
under Elev. 6 
15 C-09-D, 7+79.7 Powhatan & Miscellaneous 6.33  
16 C-09-C, 3+81.6 Powhatan 6.76  
17 C-09-D, 2+35 Glenhaven 6.97 71% of MH 
under Elev. 7 
18 C-09-D, 3+00 Studeley & Miscellaneous 7.21  
19 C-10-A, 5+13.5 Rolfe & McLean 109.36 MLW = 
7.40 
 
20 C-09-C, 3+22.1 Studeley 109.37 MLW = 
7.41 
 
21 C-09-D, 3+06.3 Glenhaven (offset) 7.71  
22 C-10-A, 2+82.2 Magnolia Ave 7.89 92% of MH 
under Elev. 8 
23 C-09-D, 3+66 Glenhaven 8.03  
24 C-09-D, 1+82 Studeley 110.19 MLW = 
8.23 
 
1. Rank of manholes from lowest to highest elevations. 
2. Reference City of Norfolk, Department of Utilities, Sewerage Quads, June 03, 2010 
3. Three elevations shown in old City of Norfolk 99.00 MLW datum where 101.96 feet, MLW = 
0.00 feet, NAVD. 
4. Percentage of manholes inundated by specified flood elevation. Elevations are in feet, NAVD 
(88). 
 
 Appendix A provides photographs of the existing and new pump station sites, and 
of Walnut Hill Street inundated by recent coastal flooding. It also provides a site plan that 





for the new pump station, and cross sections of the existing and new pump station wet 
wells  
 
 For the existing pump station, the top of the pump station manhole elevation is 
2.97 feet, NAVD (88) and the base of the wet well is at an estimated elevation -8.3 feet, 
NAVD (88). The author surveyed the site and measured the bottom of the existing 
control panel at 5.38 feet, NAVD (88). Also, the station does not have a backup 
generator. 
 
 The station has two constant speed Hydro-O-Matic (vertical) 5 Horse Power (HP) 
pumps in parallel. The model number for the pump is SPGF 500. It is a 2-in. x 4-in 
submersible grinder pump with a 3-phase, 60-hertz motor that operates at 1150 
Revolutions Per Minute (RPM). The pump performance curve is for a Yeoman’s Curve 
No. 3501.  
 
 Data in the HRSD files provided by the city is listed below (Appendix A, August 
12, 2014 journal entry). The design pressure is 65 feet with a firm capacity of 150 gpm.  
 
 Norfolk Pump Station 113 
 Number of Pumps: 2 (constant speed type) 
 Design Pressure: 65 ft 
 Firm Capacity: 150 gpm 
 Wet well Top elevation: 2.24 ft NAVD 88 
 Cross-sectional area of wet well: 28.27 square ft 









 Pump curve for each of the two pumps: 
 Total Head          Pump Flow 
 46 feet                 500 gpm 
 65 feet                 150 gpm 
 74 feet                 50 gpm  
 
 During a first of two subject matter expert elicitations described in section 3.5 
Expert Elicitation, one of the experts noted a discrepancy between the top of manhole 
elevation of 2.97 feet, NAVD (88) and of the top of the wet well and the elevation 
indicated in the HRSD files at 2.24 feet, NAVD (88). He thought the top of the manhole 
and wet well are one and the same elevation. The author had discussed the possible 
discrepancy with the city and confirmed the top of manhole elevation at the higher 
elevation (See Appendix A, March 13, 2015). The author did another review and opted to 
use the 2.97 feet, NAVD (88) for the top of the manhole. (See Appendix A, July 14, 2015 
entry.)  
 
 For the new pump station, the top elevation is 8.10 feet, NAVD (88) and the base 
of the wet well is at elevation -17.06 feet, NAVD (88). The bottom of the electrical 
control panel is 11.10 feet, NAVD (88). The new station also does not have a backup 
generator. 
 
 The design of the new station will include two pumps in parallel each capable of 
pumping 120 gpm. The design Total Discharge Head (TDH) is 32 feet. Additional points 
on the pump curve are 140 gpm at 30 feet TDH and 180 gpm at 24 feet TDH. Over a 






 As previously noted, the drawings indicate approximately 190 to 200 residential 
units in the sewerage area. However, using the standard day of 60,000 gpd noted above, 
one can estimate a more accurate number. Based on the Regional Sewage Flow 
Projection Data, the average flow per residential unit is 310 gpd/unit (HRSD, 2015). 
Dividing this rate into the standard day of 60,000 gpd equates to 194 residential units in 
the sewerage service area. 
 
 At present, the city has just one pump manufacturer included on its approved 
products list, last updated 08-27-2014, which is Fairbanks Morse. A Flygt centrifugal 
grinder pump is a pump type currently in service at other pump stations. (See Appendix 
A, August 12, 2014 journal entry). 
 
 Based on the City of Norfolk, Department of Utilities, Sewerage Quads C-9B, 9C, 
9D, and 10A drawings (City of Norfolk, 2010), the existing wet well cross section 
(O'Brien & Gere, 2011), and the new wet well cross section (City of Norfolk, 2014), the 
estimated volume of the network with the existing pump station is 72,400 gallons and 
with the new pump station, 82,800 gallons. This volume includes the 24 manholes, the all 
sewerage lines, all the clean-outs, and the wet well. It does not include lateral service 













The volume that is of most interest is that capacity in the network above the lowest, top 
of manhole elevation at 2.02 feet, NAVD (88). Below this elevation, the network is 
typically full of flow due to sewage and infiltration from groundwater. The local 
groundwater elevations seasonally fluctuate in the 2 to 3 feet, NAVD (88) range and are 
influenced by tidal waters. Table 7 shows how that volume diminishes as the elevation of 
























































Capacity, Gallons x 10^3 





Table 7. Available Sewerage Network Capacity Above Elevation 2 Feet, NAVD (88)
1 
 
Available Network Capacity  
Above Elevation 2 Feet, NAVD (88) 
Elevation Existing Pump 
Station 
New Pump Station 
Feet, NAVD (88) Gallons Gallons 
2 to 3 27,505 30,209 
3 to 4 19,772 22,403 
4 to 5 11,155 13,174 
5 to 6 5,495 6,902 
6 to 7 3025 3,915 
7 to 8 1119 1,585 
8 to 9 55 97 
9+ 0 0 
1. Reference City of Norfolk, Department of Utilities, Sewerage Quads, June 03, 2010  






 This assessment is for an empirical analytical study to measure the impact of the 
rate of rising sea levels on the capacity of PS 113. Figure 33 defines the relationship 
between study variables. The explanatory and intervening variables represent the hazard 
identification and definition portion of the risk analysis process. The explanatory variable 
represents the state of dynamic equilibrium as a series of incremental changes in sea level 
rise elevations based on recommended planning scenarios. The intervening explanatory 
variables represent the state of meta-stable equilibrium, the physical elements that 
contribute to a flood stage at the pump station.  
 
 Storms include a surge elevation, a wave height caused by that storm, the wave 
set-up caused by the breaking wave on the slope of the shoreline and the duration of the 
flood stage. The results are a suite of stage-frequency curves, one for each increment of 





level rise, the storm surge and wave run-up at the pump station location versus the event 
frequency. In addition, the results include a probability distribution of the duration of 
flood stages and how it changes with rising sea levels. 
 
 For each stage-frequency curve, the author uses points on the curve to develop a 
response variable, the failure mode identification and range of failure probabilities 
portion of the risk analysis process. The study presents the response variable in the form 
of an event tree as a form of fragility showing loss of pump performance as the specific 
storm flood stage increases. The author solicited expert elicitation to judge the change in 


















3.2.4.1 Explanatory Variable – Sea Level Rise Scenario 
 
 ASCE notes climate model projections cannot determine probability distributions 
for future climate and requires judgment to determine reasonable conditions for design 
(ASCE, 2015). With this understanding, the author chooses to use the scenario’s 
determined by Sea Level Rise Calculator provided at the USACE website for Responses 
to Climate Change (USACE, 2015b). There are four curves based on modifications to 
National Research Council guidance (NRC, 1987) to include recent Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change projections for global sea level rise.  
 
 The Corps further adjusts these curves to represent the local or relative rate of 
change (USACE, 2013). Figure 34 provides four scenarios, based on NOAA 
representations of sea level rise for the Sewells Point Tide Gauge. The basic equation is 
𝐸(𝑡2 − 𝑡1) = 0.000457(𝑡2 − 𝑡1) + 𝑏(𝑡2
2 − 𝑡1
2) where b is constant for each scenario. The 
Low curve represents the linear historic trend at rate of 4.57 mm/year as of March 26, 















 The benefit of the online calculator is it easily allows the user to set a start date 
and compute potential changes in sea level for all four curves out to the year 2100. 
Figures 35, 36, 37 and 38 show each of the scenarios with the stillwater flood stages 
superimposed to show how rising sea levels can impact future flooding levels.  
 
 However, superimposing historic stillwater levels on projected sea levels is an 
less than accurate representation of future conditions. This assumes that the statistical 
variables of stillwater levels will be similar to past records, but this is not likely. The 
weather in the future will be different due to uncertain changes in the climate. This means 
properties of weather related variables in the future should be statistically different than 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.2.4.2 Intervening Explanatory Variables - Stillwater Level and Wave Set-Up 
 
 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website provides 
data on extreme stillwater levels for the Sewells Point, VA tide gauge available (NOAA, 
2015). Figure 39 provides an annual exceedence probability curve of still water 
elevations with 95% confidence intervals. The datum is MHHW expressed in meters. The 








Figure 39. NOAA Exceedence Probability Curves versus Return Period, Tide Gauge 




 Figure 40 provides a breakdown of the annual exceedence levels. Please note the 
vertical datum used on the ordinate is Mean Sea Level (MSL) expressed in meters. In this 
figure, the adjustment to convert the MSL elevations to MHHL elevations for the tide 







Figure 40. NOAA Tidal Datum and Exceedence Probability Levels Relative to Mean 




 Table 8 converts the MSL elevations in Figure 40 to MHHW in order to estimate 
event probabilities shown in Table 9. It also converts elevations for the pump station 
































1% Event 2.15 1.72 2.06 6.76 
4% Event 1.79 1.36 1.70 5.58 
10% Event 1.55 1.15 1.49 4.88 
50% Event 1.17 0.74 1.08 3.53 
99% Event 0.87 0.44 0.78 2.56 
MHHW 0.43 0.00 0.34 1.12 
MHW 0.37 -0.06 0.28 0.92 





0.09 -0.34 0.00 0.00 




1.00 0.57 0.91 2.97 
Bottom of 




1.73 1.30 1.64 5.38 




2.56 2.13 2.47 8.10 
Bottom of New 




3.47 3.04 3.38 11.1 
 
1. From Figure 40, NOAA Tidal Datums and Exceedence Probability Levels Relative to Mean Sea 
Level (MSL), Tide Gauge 8838610, Sewells Point, VA. Need to convert to MHHW to match 
ordinate in Figure 39. Figure 40 does not provide a value for the 0.2% and 4% annual exceedence 
probability level. See Table 9 for computation of these elevations and for elevations of storms of 
interest. 
2. MSL elevations adjusted to MHHW by subtracting 0.43 meters. 
3. MHHW elevations adjusted to NAVD by adding 0.34 meters. 
4. Elevations in feet, NAVD (88) for Elizabeth River and pump station structures taken from site 
plan in Appendix A. Elevation for bottom of existing PS 113 Control Panel measured by survey 
using top of PS 113 as bench mark = 2.97 feet, NAVD (88). Elevations in meters for bottom of PS 




 Table 9 uses the MHHW elevations in Table 8 to estimate annual exceedence 
probabilities using Figure 39. It provides storm probabilities that would match the 









Table 9. Storm Event Annual Exceedence Probabilities for Stillwater Elevations 
 
  
1. Elevations for pump station structures from Table 8. Elevation for 4% event was back calculated until 
elevation in meters produced the appropriate return period in years in 10
x 
column. 
2. Estimate based on the slope of the median line from Figure 39 of 1.72 – 1.12 meters over Log 100 - 
Log 10 of return period in log years = 0.60 meters/return period in log years. 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑋 = 2 − (1.72 −
𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑊)/0.60). Pump station elevations equated to an event probability. 
3. MHHW elevations adjusted to NAVD by adding 0.34 meters. 




 However, it is necessary to include wave effects in computing base flood 
elevations. Storms generated waves are a function of wind speed, fetch and storm 
duration. When the resulting wave action reaches a shoreline it causes a super elevation 












































2.13 2.6833 482 0.2 2.47 8.10 
1% Event 1.72 2.0000 100 1.0 2.06 6.76 
4.0% 
Event 





1.30 1.3000 20 5.0 1.37 5.38 
10% 
Event 
1.12 1.0000 10 10 1.46 4.79 
50% 
Event 
0.74      
Top of PS 
113 
0.57 0.0833 1 83 0.91 2.97 
99% 
Event 





 As waves cross deep-water there is a mass transport of water in the form of 
momentum. The waves cause a depression in the mean water level, ?̅? behind the wave, 
which is called wave set-down. The following equation computes the set-down where H 
is the wave height, k = 
2𝜋
𝐿
  is the wave number, and h is the water depth (Basco, 2012): 
 
?̅? =  − 
𝐻2𝑘
8𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ2𝑘ℎ
  (21). 
 
 As a wave approaches the near shore, it begins to feel the sub-bottom at a depth to 
wavelength ratio of  𝑑 𝐿⁄ ≥ 0.5. As the wave continues to propagate towards the 
shoreline, it begins to shoal and rise and continues to depress the water level behind the 




) = 0.8 it breaks in the surf zone. At the point the wave breaks, its momentum 
causes the maximum depression in the still water level behind the wave resulting in the 
lowest set down, ?̅?𝑏. 
 
 Once the wave breaks, the momentum dissipates and carries the water up the face 
of the shoreline, which is called wave set-up, ?̅?𝑠. The following equation computes set-up 
where ℎ𝑏is the water depth at ?̅?𝑏, 𝒦 is a dimensionless number, ℎ is the water depth as 
the wave approaches the shore, and hb is the water depth at the breaker line (plunge point 
in Figure 41): 
 







8⁄ )/(1 + 3𝜅
2/8)  (23) 
 
The maximum wave set-up, ?̅?𝑚𝑎𝑥 occurs when the water surge roles to a stop at a depth, 










 For this area, the FEMA flood map shown in Figure 21, shows Walnut Hill Street 
is within Zone AE and has a Base Flood Elevation (BFE) = 8.1 feet, NAVD (88). Zone 
AE means it is an area where FEMA has determined the 1% annual chance flood (1% 
chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year) also known as the base flood or 
100-year flood.  
 
 The author assumes the difference between the FEMA’s BFE at 8.1 feet, NAVD 
(88) and the NOAA Stillwater level at 6.76 feet, NAVD (88), is the wave set-up at the 






 For the sake of simplicity, the author further assumes a semi-log, linear increase 
in set-up for each of the storm frequencies in Table 8 starting at zero feet at the Mean 
Tide Range to 1.3 feet at the 1% event. It is comparable to the level of accuracy and 
precision of an expert elicitation used to judge probabilities of pump failure. A reliability 
analysis may warrant a more detailed analysis. 
 
 Using this assumption, Table 10 presents the base flood stage elevations for the 
year 2015. Figures 42, 43, 44 and 45 show the base flood elevations for each of the sea 
level rise scenarios. Table 11 is a summary of how the base flood elevation changes over 
a 20-year design life (life cycle) for a typical submersible wastewater pump and over a 



























1 100 1.30 6.76 8.06
2
 
4 25 0.91 5.58 6.49 
10 10 0.65 4.88 5.53 
50 2 0.20 3.54 3.74 
99 1.01 0.00 2.56 2.56 
 
1. Assumed linear increase in set-up from zero at Mean Tide Range to 1.3 feet at the 1% event, the 
difference between NOAA stillwater elevation and FEMA BFE. The slope of the line = 0.65 based 
on the delta changing over the Log of the Return Period in Years =100 and the Log of the Return 
Period of MTR =1. Wave Set-Up = 0.65(Log (Return Period) - Log 1). 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11. Summary of Changes in Flood Elevations for 20 and 50 – Year Design 
Life Cycles 
 
20-Year Design Life of Pump, 2015 - 2035 
Scenario Storm Event w/Wave Set-Up, Feet, NAVD (88) 
99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 
2015 BFE 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 
2035 Low 2.86 4.04 5.83 6.79 8.36 
2035 Int-
Low 
2.98 4.16 5.95 6.91 8.48 
2035 Int-
High 
3.17 4.35 6.14 7.10 8.67 
2035 
High 
3.35 4.53 6.32 7.28 8.85 
 
50-Year Design Life of Pump Station Structure, 2015 - 2065 
Scenario Storm Event w/Wave Set-Up, Feet, NAVD (88) 
99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 
2015 BFE 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 
2065 Low 3.31 4.49 6.28 7.24 8.81 
2065 Int-
Low 





5.60 7.39 8.35 9.92 
2065 
High 




3.2.4.3 Intervening Explanatory Variables – Flood Stage Duration 
 
 The performance of the submersible pumps is dependent upon the duration of 
flooding. The proper way to assess duration is to model the infiltration and inflow within 
the network. The duration starts from the time the water levels in the wet well trigger the 
emergency alarm until the water level drops below the alarm-off elevation. It is the time 
it takes floodwaters to fill and drain from the network of pipes and manholes. However, 






 In reviewing this study, the subject matter experts requested additional 
information (See Appendix A, July 14, 2015 entry). They judged that when the pump has 
no power, at some point inflow will overwhelm the capacity of the system and spills will 
occur. They also judged that when the pump does have power, the city’s observation that 
grit could cause the pump motor to burn out after 48 to 72 hours operation to be a 
reasonable expectation 
 
 In order to better estimate probabilities that the network would have insufficient 
capacity and result in a spill, the experts requested an estimate of the volume of the 
network. In examining Table 6, the experts noted that the lowest manhole is elevation 2 
feet, NAVD (88) and at the point floodwaters reach 4 feet, NAVD (88) 25% of the 
manholes are inundated. They qualitatively judged at this floodstage for the condition 
where the power is off, inflow would have a significant impact after 5-hours of 
continuous inundation. For the condition where the power remains on, inflow and grit 
would have a significant impact after 48-hours of continuous inundation.  
 
 Given these possible conditions, the experts also requested the annual probability 
of exceedence for flooding at elevation 4 feet, NAVD (88) for durations of 5 hours and 
48 hours. Also, they requested the probable durations for such a flood for each of the 







 In order to assess durations of flooding at the site, historic tide levels for the year 
1928 through 2014 are used to develop a duration frequency curve. There are a total of 
746,968 hourly tidal readings. As part of this record, 1942 has only data into August, and 
1943 has only data starting in September. For this analysis, these two years are merged. 
Therefore, even though the record covers 87 years, there are only 86 years of data. Then 
for each year from 1928 to 2013, the tide readings are adjusted to equate to 2014 tide 
levels based on the linear historic relative sea level trend at rate of 4.57 mm/year as of 
March 26, 2015 (NOAA, 2015). In addition, the author added 0.5-foot increments up to 3 
feet to the adjusted 2014 tide levels to provide data to estimate how durations will change 
over time. 
 
 The number of hours of flooding at or above Elevation 4 feet, NAVD (88) ranged 
from 283 hours for 70 events at the 0.0-foot increment to 162,828 hours and an estimated 
17,000 events at the 3.0-foot increment for the 1928 to 2014 time period. The author 
started the analysis with the Peak-Over-Threshold method (Kamphuis, 2010) to compute 
the durations for a range of annual frequencies for the 99, 50, 10, 4 and 1% events and for 
computing the probability of exceedence for the 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 and 72 hour flood 
durations. Digital sorting identified the total number of hours of flooding and each 
grouping representing an event, but determining the duration for each event required 
counting the hours by hand using the Excel count function.  
 
 However, hand counting the hours for each event proved a challenge for a large 





durations and attempts to adjust the threshold levels and bin sizes to estimate durations 
proved outcomes were dependent on subjective choices. Instead, the author opted to use 
an Extreme Value Analysis from Order Data method (Kamphuis, 2010) to approximate 
needed values. This method required selecting the most extreme annual event, and 
eliminated making judgments as to what to select. However, the latter method is at best 
an expedient substitute for a full enumeration using the Peak-Over-Threshold method. 
Comparisons of the two methods at the lower increments show that the Extreme Value 
Analysis underestimates both the durations and probabilities of exceedence, a weakness 
in this assessment. 
 
 The methodology follows guidance provided by J. William Kamphuis for extreme 




i is the ranking of the data point and N is the total number of points. The values c1 and c2 
are constants for unbiased plotting positions based on the distribution used to compute Q. 
In addition, this study used the Log Normal, Gumbel and Weibull distributions to analyze 
the extreme values, because they are appropriate methods for ordered statistics and to 
generate a linear expression to extrapolate outcomes.  
 
 Using an Excel generated R-Squared regression analysis; the Weibull distribution 
produced the most robust relationship for interpretation and extrapolation. The linear 
expression for the Weibull model is duration, 𝐷𝑇𝑅 =  𝛾 + 𝛽(ln{𝜆𝑇𝑅})
1/∝. This equation 
is resolved from the linear equation (𝑙𝑛𝜆𝑇𝑅)
1
∝⁄ = 1 𝛽⁄ 𝐷𝑇𝑅 −
𝛾





number of events per year on which the analysis is based (one/year), and TR is the return 
period in years. 
 
 Table 12 provides the annual probability of exceedence for flooding at elevation 4 
feet, NAVD (88) for a range of durations.  The annual probabilities for 5-hours or more 
of flooding is significant ranging from 23% in 2015 to as high as 74% in 2065. However, 




Table 12. Probabilities of Exceedence for Flood Durations 
 
Probability of Exceedence for Flood Duration, % 
For Elevation 4+ Ft., NAVD (88) 
Year 5-Hrs 6-Hrs 12-Hrs 24-Hrs 48-Hrs 72-Hrs 
2015 23.1 16.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2035 33.7 25.6 5.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 




 Table 13 provides the durations for flooding at or above elevation 4 feet, NAVD 
(88) for a range of annual frequencies from the 99 to 1% duration event, and for the 4% 
duration event as the sea level rises. Computations for Tables 12 and 13 are in Appendix 














Table 13. Probable Flood Durations for Range of Return Periods 
 
Summary of Probable Annual Flood Duration Frequencies, Hours 
















2015 0.00 0 1 5 7 10 
2035 0.61    14  
2065 1.86    39  




3.2.4.4 Response Variable – Fragility Curves 
 
 Expert elicitation requires standards, protocols and documentation that can 
withstand professional scrutiny the same as the scientific principles of data collection 
(Clemen & Reilly, 2001). The main difference is experts exercise judgments that are 
influenced by biases, which is different than collecting data in a laboratory setting.  
 
 The first step is to document and justify the expert-selection process similar to the 
scientific process for selecting specific data points. The second step is to provide an 
environment where experts can make judgments in a way that minimizes biases. This is 
similar to a scientist demonstrating his or her measurements are without bias.  
 
 A third step is to combine the judgments of multiple experts into one probability 
distribution representing the impact of an event on the pump station. This requires taking 
into account the relative expertise of and any redundancy within the cadre of experts. 






 The author used the following protocol to assemble a team of experts and to 
conduct the exercise (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). 
 
 Background – Identify what variables the subject matter expert must judge and 
identify the skills, knowledge and abilities experts need to have. For this project, 
the expert is judging the performance of a pump when exposed to flooding waters. 
The objective of the pump station is to remove a sufficient volume of wastewater 
to avoid any spillage that results in consequences. Therefore, the analysis needs 
experts who have design and operations experience of submersible wastewater 
pump stations. Those with design experience should be licensed professional 
engineers, and those with operations experience should have a minimum of 10 
years of experience or experience with city’s pumps.  
 Identification and Recruitment of Experts – The team should be composed of one 
City of Norfolk engineer from the Departments of Utilities, one engineer from 
HRSD, and two consulting engineers familiar with the design of local municipal, 
submersible wastewater systems. 
 Motivating Experts – The primary motivation is both the city and the local 
professional engineering community are keenly aware of the challenges rising sea 
levels pose the region’s infrastructure. Several practicing engineers voluntarily 
expressed an interest to participate as experts. They see is it as an opportunity to 
learn a new methodology that they can apply in their own practice (Baecher & 
Christen, 2003). 
 Structuring and Decomposition – This phase is also known as knowledge 
exploration. Section 3.2.3, Variables describes the relationships among the 
relative variables. It identifies the response variable as a fragility curve needed to 
represent the performance of the pump as it is exposed to rising floodwaters. 
Section 2.2.5 Subset question e: “What is the appropriate means to demonstrate 
the impact on the performance of the pump stations?” provides background on 
pump design and performance and identifies two potential failure modes for this 





system; and (2) as the depth and duration of inundation increases a pump’s 
capacity decreases and/or the motor could burn out.  
 Probability Assessment Training – As a preamble to initiating the elicitation, the 
author explains the purpose of the study, the basics of a risk-informed decision, 
and the role a fragility curve plays in the calculation. A key aspect of the training 
is to make experts aware of potential bias and the need for dialogue among the 
participants to explore possible undue influences (Plous, 1993).  
Biases are beliefs and experiences experts use to view the analysis and the 
information they may choose to judge the problem. Intentional biases are when an 
expert makes a willful decision to influence a decision to satisfy a particular 
agenda. Unintentional biases are cognitive biases that reflect a behavior such as 
the availability heuristic, the representative heuristic and anchoring. The 
following definitions are almost verbatim from work by Patrick Hester, PhD, Old 
Dominion University (Hester, 2012) 
o Availability Heuristic – It is the practice of basing probabilistic evidence on 
an available piece of information. For example, people estimate the 
likelihood of an event based on something similar they can remember. This 
is a particular issue when most recent experiences are fresh in people’s 
memories and have a larger influence than older experiences. 
o Representative Heuristic – It occurs when people assume commonalities 
between objects. For example an expert estimated the probability for 
another pump and assumes the pump under study is the same and estimates 
similar probabilities. The problem is when this assumption causes the 
expert to overlook differences between the two pumps. 
o Anchoring – People anchor their judgments and base subsequent judgments 
on an initial value provided as part of the process. For example, the analyst 
provides a baseline value and people anchor probability values close to that 
baseline value. The analyst needs to be aware of how leading questions 
may anchor people when eliciting their opinion. 
 
 Probabilistic Elicitation and Verification – The objective of this step is to perform 
the needed probability assessments, and to document the reasoning behind the 





expert in the topic to minimize introducing biases into the process. The analyst 
seeking the elicitation should monitor the judgments to insure they comply with 
the three axioms and common understandings or probability described in section 
2.2.3.1 Design Principles. 
 
o The process will use a gaming concept termed Over-Under (O/U) to judge 
whether a particular flood condition does or does not impact the pump 
systems performance. The O/U is a commonly used in sports betting. It is 
based on whether the gambler believes a certain statistical outcome will 
either be above or below some value. A common statistic is the combined 
score of the two competing teams. 
o The gambler’s objective is to judge whether the final total score will be 
higher or lower than the posted O/U score. The aim of the booking agency 
is to have a balance of bets on each side of the O/U statistic. The author is 
choosing this approach because getting a consensus is a challenge and 
betting is a way to cope with any irreconcilable differences. The split also 
represents where a better is indifferent and the risk attitude is neutral. 
o This process will have four experts and preferably an even number to seek 
an even split as explained below. They will use Table 14 as a scale to judge 
probabilities. 
o The flood stages will be divided into increments identified in Table 19. For 
each increment, each expert will judge, given the flood elevation (A), 
whether the probability for non-performance (B) is above or below a 
specified 𝑃((𝐵|𝐴) from Table 14. After each “bet”, the experts will be 
asked to explain their judgment.  
o If the estimates of the experts are not balanced, then the process will repeat 
itself using either a higher or lower 𝑃((𝐵|𝐴) until there is a balance of 
experts across the O/U.  
o The facilitator will document each bet and include notes on any discussion 
following the betting, and the rationale for redoing the bet. 
o The final step will be to review the results and judge whether it is a 













Table 14. Constructed Scale to Judge Performance (Pinto & Garvey, 2013), (Vick, 
2002) 
 
Definition of Non-Performance Verbal Descriptor Probability 
Impacts the system’s operational 
capability to the extent that the 
pump system shuts down and/or 
results in uncontrolled overflow 
(0.85 – 0.99). 
Almost Certain 
 
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 0.99 
 
 
Very High Chance 
 
 
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 0.90 
 
Impacts the system’s operational 
capability to the extent that the 
performance is greatly impaired and 
on the verge of shutting down or 
causing uncontrolled overflows 











𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 0.65 
 
Impacts the system’s operational 
capability to the extent that the 
performance is significantly 
impaired and has the potential to 
shut down and/or cause overflows 











Impacts the system’s operational 
capabilities to the extent that 
performance is impaired, but 
remains operational (0.15 – 0.35). 
Possible 
 








Impacts the system’s operational 
capabilities in a way that result in a 
negligible impact (0.01 – 0.15). 











 Aggregation of Experts Probability Distribution – The objective of this step is to 
develop one fragility curve for each pump station system accounting for the two 
failure modes. This author assumes the failure modes are independent. Also, the 
process must ignore other contributing failure modes caused by major flooding 
such as power outages. For this study, it is necessary to judge the pumps in 
isolation of outside factors to develop a relative risk value to hypothetically 










 A consequence analysis assesses the impacts of non-performance. It consists of 
the identification of potential losses and the magnitude of those loses. For this study, the 
City of Norfolk identified three consequences; social, environmental, and cost impacts. 
(See Appendix A, March 5, 2015, April 23, 2015, and May 7, 2015 entries.)  
 
 The social impact is a function of the number of customers disturbed by a 
disruption of service, the spillage, any odor, and the recovery efforts. The scale is based 
on how much the impacts would extend across the service area. It is possible to impact 
neighboring service areas if it is necessary to divert flows into another network. 
 
 The environmental impact is a function of the extent spillage of wastewater would 
flow within and beyond the service area, colloquially referred to as the sewerage shed. 
The scale is based on the ability to recover the spillage. Once the wastewater extends into 
a body of water, it becomes more difficult to contain the spill.  
 
 The cost impact is a function of the number of different types of costs that the city 
can incur. Cost includes expenses to recover spillage and clean contaminated areas, to 
make repairs to the pump station and any related infrastructure, to perform any bypass 
pumping to a forcemain or to pump and haul spillage, and/or to pay regulatory fines. 
Typically, bypassing involves pumping wastewater from the wet well directly into a 





into a truck and hauls it to waste treatment plant, colloquially referred to as “pump and 
haul”.  
 
 A major cleanup is defined as having to go outside the service area to recover 
spillage. A major repair specific to PS 113 is defined as a cost that exceeds $10,000. (See 
Appendix A, April 23, 2015 entry.) The scale is based on the number of different kinds of 
costs incurred.  
 
 Consequences within a risk equation can take the form of a mathematical “value” 
function defined by criterion that represents a range of performance. It provides a way to 
measure the impact of an event within a set of possible events. It offers a means to 
compare outcomes to identify those events that pose an unacceptable risk based on the 
possible consequences (Pinto & Garvey, 2013).  
 
 The value function is a measure because increasing values of the function 
represent increasing levels of consequences. The measure between the levels is a ratio or 
cardinal measurement scale where the levels are assigned numbers such that the 
differences between levels have meaning. The difference across the levels is a ratio of 
one level to the other levels with a definable beginning (zero) and allows comparison by 
multiplication and division (Pinto & Garvey, 2013) 
 
 For this particular case, the City of Norfolk wants to understand how larger 





Since these kinds of events tend to increasingly strain a pump’s performance, the analysis 
needs a function that represents a monotonically increasing value over a range of 
evaluation criterion. The mathematical expression for a monotonically increasing value is 
an exponential or a linear value function given by the following equations based on an 












⁄ 𝑖𝑓 𝜌 = ∞  (25). 
 
 The parameter ρ represents the shape of the exponential value function and 
reflects whether the decision maker has a risk adverse, risk neutral or risk taking attitude 
(Schultz, Mitchell, Harper, & Bridges, 2010). The definitions for the three attitudes are 
listed below and are verbatim from the reference: 
 Risk adverse behavior is described by a concave utility function and means that 
the decision maker would have to be compensated to voluntarily accept a lottery 
in a choice between a sure thing and a lottery with equal expected payoffs. This is 
the most common attitude toward risk encountered among individuals. 
 
 Risk neutral behavior is described by a linear utility function. The decision maker 
is indifferent between a lottery and a sure thing that have equal expected payoffs. 







 Risk seeking behavior is described by a convex utility function. This function 
suggests an individual would be willing to pay for the exposure to an uncertain 
outcome that has the same expected outcome as an alternative certain outcome. 
Risk seeking utility functions might be used to describe gambling behavior. 
 
 Sensitivity studies would aid public officials to choose an appropriate attitude 
(Schultz, Mitchell, et al., 2010). If the decision maker has a risk-adverse attitude, then ρ 
is a positive number and results in an opportunity cost; a higher project cost than a risk 
neutral position where those extra funds could be allocated to other needed infrastructure. 
If the decision maker has a risk-taking attitude, then ρ is a negative number. Such an 
attitude can be perceived by the tax payer as gambling and would be quick to blame a 
public agency for a bad outcome. If the decision maker is risk-neutral, then ρ is infinite 
and offers a mid-range method for estimating the risk of public funds.  
 
 For public works infrastructure, a public agency has a fiduciary responsibility for 
the use of public funds and a risk-neutral attitude is an appropriate policy decision to 
adopt (Schultz, Mitchell, et al., 2010). For this case, ρ is infinite and the linear expression 
in equation (21) for 𝑉𝑥(𝑥) would apply.  
 
Since the value function for each consequence is defined by a criterion, it is 
referred to as a single-dimensional value function (SDVF). For this study, there are three 
consequences, hence three SDVF’s. Assuming the criterion representing each SDVF is 





sum of the impact of the SDVF’s and the following equation applies (Pinto & Garvey, 
2013): 
𝑉(𝐴) = 𝑤1(𝑉1) + 𝑤2(𝑉2) + 𝑤3(𝑉3)  (26). 
 
 The 𝑉(𝐴) term is a measure of the overall impact of the risk event. The wi terms 
are the relative weight of each consequence expressed as a fraction where the sum of the 
fractions equal 1, ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1.0. The city advised that the impact of the three consequences 
is a function of intensity over a time span and would be specific to characteristics of each 
site and pump station. 
 
 In the case of PS 113 failing and needing repair, Figure 46 represents a 
characterization of how the consequences would play out over a six-month period needed 
to respond and restore the pump station to full operations (See Appendix A, April 23, 
2015, May 7, 2015 and May 20, 2105 entries). The social impacts require the most 
immediate response and demand political assurances to denizens that all issues will be 
resolved to their satisfaction. It is the perception that the city is taking appropriate action 
that makes the social impact the most intense of the three consequences. Concerns for 
environmental impacts would be part of the response to social impacts and regulatory 
agencies, but will play out longer than the need for immediate public assurances of 
appropriate actions. Concerns for cost impacts also start immediately and tend to extend 












 The city advises that the intensity of the social impacts would be twice that of the 
environmental impacts, and environmental impacts would be twice the cost impacts. (See 
Appendix A, May 7, 2015 and May 20, 2015 entries.) However, costs would play out 
over a period 1.5 times environmental impacts and 6 times that of social impacts. For 
simplicity, the author assumes the best way to represent weights is to use the area under 
the respective plots as appropriate ratio between the consequences. The area for the social 
impacts is 1-unit and represents the baseline for computing ratios. The area for the 
environmental impacts is 1.75-units and for the costs it is 3.25-units. The sum of the three 












































Table 15. Weights, wi for Single Dimensional Value Functions 
 
Consequences Ratio of Areas Weight, wi 
𝑤1, Social Impacts  1.0 1/6 = 0.17 
𝑤2, Environmental Impacts 1.75 𝑤1 1.75/6 = 0.29 
𝑤3, Cost Impacts 3.25 𝑤1 3.25/6 = 0.54 
∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑖




 The three 𝑉𝑖terms in the 𝑉(𝐴) equation represent the value of each of the 
consequences. Tables 16, 17 and 18, developed specifically for these studies, provide a 
scale for each consequence reflecting the outcome for a monotonically increasing impact 
for that particular consequence (See Appendix A, April 7, 2015; April 23, 2015; May 7, 
2015 and May 20 2015 entries). As with the weights, the ratio column represents the 
city’s assessment of the differences between the levels.  
 
 Using the equation (25), 𝑉𝑥(𝑥) =  
𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛⁄ 𝑖𝑓 𝜌 = ∞, the ratios are 
converted to fractions in the form of a piecewise linear value function. The value 
𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1 is for Level 1, the base level, and 𝑉𝑥(𝑥) equals zero, the least impact. Each 
succeeding level incrementally sums up the x’s until it reaches 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 10 and 𝑉𝑥(𝑥) 





























5 Recover efforts impact 
neighboring service areas 
10 9/9 = 1.00 
4 Impacts the entire service area 6 5/9 = 0.55 
3 Impacts extend beyond 
immediate block.  
3 2/9 = 0.22 
2 Impacts customers within the 
block 
2 1/9 = 0.11 
1 No impacts on any customers 
in service area 








Definition of Impact Ratio of 
Impact from 
Level to 
Level 1, (x2) 
Value 
Function 
V2 (x2)   
5 Spills within the body of 
water 
10 9/9 = 1.00 
4 Spills within the service 
area 
6 5/9 = 0.55 
3 Spills with blocks of the 
station 
3 2/9 = 0.22 
2 Spills within immediate 
station area 
2 1/9 = 0.11 
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Table 18. Constructed Scale to Judge Cost to Repair, V3 (x3) 
 
 Scale Level 
(Score) 
Definition of Impact Ratio of 
Impact from 
Level to 
Level 1, (x3) 
Value Function 
V3 (x3)   
5 By-pass pumping, major 
repairs, major cleanup and a 
fine 
10 9/9 = 1.00 
4 By-pass pumping, major 
repairs, and minor cleanup 
6 5/9 = 0.55 
3 Major repairs and minor 
cleanup 
3 2/9 = 0.22 
2 Minor repairs and minor 
cleanup 
2 1/9 = 0.11 
1 No costs 
 




3.4 Risk Analysis Methodology 
 
 The risk equation (20) as presented in section 3.1 Risk Informed Decision 
Methodology, is modified as follows to align with the use of an event tree and the 
approach for assessing consequences:  
 
𝑅 = 𝑃𝐸(𝑃𝐹)(𝑉(𝐴))  (27). 
 
The equation determines a relative risk score. The analysis uses an Excel spreadsheet to 
record the event frequency, the estimated probabilities of non-performance within the 
event tree, the selected consequences for that particular step in the event tree, and 

















 As noted in section 2.2.3.2 Tolerable Risk, in order to perform a risk analysis, it is 
necessary to define performance standards. As stated in the Section 9VAC25-790-380, 
specified equipment must be above the Base Flood Elevation. The existing pump station 
does not meet this requirement. The new pump station does meet the 2015 BFE at 
elevation 8.1 feet, NAVD (88) and has set the bottom of the electrical control panel at 
elevation 11.10 feet, NAVD (88). This elevation is also higher than the projected 2065 
BFE for the High SLR Scenario shown in Table 11.  
 
 Table 19 provides a list of the number of cases needed to assess the risk over the 
range of events in 2015 and demonstrate change in the 4% event over the 50-year design 
cycle. The analysis will use the Intermediate High sea level rise scenarios for 2035 and 
2065, because this scenario is a reasonable representation of the potential change in sea 
levels over the next 50 years and the change across all four scenarios is not significant 
except for the outlying years. Each case is listed in increasing increments of flood stage 


















1 2.56 99 2015 
2 3.74 50 2015 
3 5.53 10 2015 
4 6.49 4 2015 
5 7.10 4 2035 Inter High 
6 8.06 1 2015 BFE 





 The expert elicitation uses the following steps to assess risk and how it changes 
by the year 2035, the 20-year design life cycle for the pump; and by 2065, the 50-year 
design life cycles for the pump and pump station, respectively. 
1. The subject matter experts first assessed the new pump station. They repeated the 
process for the existing pump station. 
2. The experts judged impacts to the pump station starting with Case 1 representing 
the minimum flood elevation of the seven flood events and up through Case 7, the 
maximum flood elevation of the events. There are two key failure points. The first 
is when there is no power and the flood stage is 4 feet, NAVD (88) or higher and 
the duration is at least 5 hours.  At this flood stage, the duration may be long 
enough to possibly impact the system’s capacity. The second is when flood 
elevations are about one foot higher than the bottom of the control panel causing 
electrical components to short out. Flood stages do reach the control panel for the 
existing pump station, but do not reach the control panel for the new pump 
station. 
3. The experts used the Over-Under (O/U) gaming concept described in section 
3.2.4.3 Response Variable – Fragility for the Probabilistic Elicitation and 
Verification process. The objective of this step was to perform the needed 
probability assessments, and to document the reasoning behind the assessments.  
4. The experts used Table 14 to judge 𝑃𝐹 probabilities for the POWER OFF, 
INSUFFICIENT CAPACITY and SPILL events. The flood stages are divided 
into increments as identified in Table 19. For each increment, each expert judged, 
given the flood elevation (A), whether the probability for non-performance (B) 
was above or below a specified 𝑃((𝐵|𝐴) from Table 14.  
a. Each initial estimate started with a probability of 50% and the judgment as 
to whether the probability was over/under. Starting at this midpoint tends 
to minimizes biases (Pinto, 2015). After each “bet”, the experts were 





b. If the estimates of the experts were not balanced, then the process repeated 
itself using either a higher or lower 𝑃((𝐵|𝐴) until there was a balance of 
experts across the O/U.  
5. The experts repeated the above process and used Table 20 to judge three 
consequences. The table combines Tables 16, 17 and 18 into one to provide a 
simpler scale to aid the experts. The numbers 1 through 5 are the Scale Levels in 
the tables, which are equated to the appropriate Vi values in the Excel spreadsheet. 
6. The facilitator documented each bet and included notes on any discussion 
following the betting, and the rationale for redoing the bet. The final step was to 
review the results and judge whether it is a reasonable representation. 
7. For each alternative, the analysis developed a risk score for each case. Each case 
showed how the risk changes with increasing flood levels that will be summarized 































Table 20. Constructed Scale for Consequences 
 
Social Impacts of Spill - The social impact is a function of the number of customers 
disturbed by a disruption of service, the spillage, any odor, and the recovery efforts. The 
scale is based on how much the impacts would extend across the service area. It is 
possible to impact neighboring service areas if it is necessary to divert flows into another 
network. 
No impacts on 
any customers 
















1 2 3 4 5 
 
Environmental Impacts of Spill -The environmental impact is a function of the extent 
spillage of wastewater would flow within and beyond the service area, colloquially 
referred to as the sewerage shed. The scale is based on the ability to recover the spillage. 
Once the wastewater extends into a body of water, it becomes more difficult to contain 
the spill. 
No impacts on 
any customers 
















1 2 3 4 5 
 
Cost Impacts of Spill - The cost impact is a function of the number of different types of 
costs that the city can incur. Cost includes expenses to recover spillage and clean 
contaminated areas, to make repairs to the pump station and any related infrastructure, to 
perform any bypass pumping to a forcemain or to pump and haul spillage, and/or 
regulatory fines. Typically, bypassing involves pumping wastewater from the wet well 
directly into a nearby force main. However, if the force main is damaged, the city pumps 
the wastewater into a truck and hauls it to waste treatment plant, colloquially referred to 
as “pump and haul”.  
 
A major cleanup is defined as having to go outside the service area to recover spillage. 
A major repair specific to PS 113 is defined as a cost that exceeds $10,000. The scale is 
based on the number of different kinds of costs incurred. 
No impacts on 
any customers 
























 The spreadsheet in Figure 47 produces three graphics for the existing and new 
pump station:  
 Probability of Failure Over Lifetime, PL versus Time showing how fragility 
changes from 2015 to 2065 and whether at some point it exceeds the performance 
objective. 
 Probability of Failure, PF versus Flood Stage showing how fragility changes 
across the 99, 50, 10, 4 and 1% events and whether it demonstrates a traditional 
generalized exposure versus effect correlation as shown in Figure 18.  
 Relative Risk versus Time showing any reduction of risk from 2015 to 2065 by 
building the new pump station. 
 
 These three graphics enable the city to compare the fragility of the new pump 
station against the existing pump station. Also, the city can gauge how much relative risk 
they can buy down for the amount invested in the new pump station option. It will also 
inform the city how the risk will change over the life cycle of the new pump station. This 
will aid them in judging whether there is some tipping point where the city needs to make 
new investments in resilience.   
 
3.5 Expert Elicitation 
 
 The following people volunteered to participate on the expert elicitation team: 
Michael Barbachem, P.E., Whitman, Requardt & Associates, LLP; Melvin Hopkins, P.E., 
City of Norfolk, Department of Utilities; H. Ali Mahan, P.E., O’Brien & Gere; and 
Robert J. Martz, P E., Hampton Roads Sanitation District. The team first met on July 14, 





 The team received an overview of the study, a training session on the elicitation 
process and presentation on available data. Given, that only three of the four invited 
members participated, the team opted to address any imbalances in the O/U estimates on 
an ad-hoc basis. 
 
 Once the process started, the team quickly rejected data suggested to judge the 
probabilities pertaining to INSUFFICIENT CAPACITY. As noted in section 3.2.4.3 
Intervening Explanatory Variable, the subject matter experts requested different 
information (See Appendix A, July 14, 2015 entry). They judged that when the pump has 
no power, at some point inflow will overwhelm the capacity of the system and spills will 
occur. They also judged that when the pump does have power, the city’s observation that 
grit could cause the pump motor to burn out after 48 to 72 hours operation to be a 
reasonable expectation. 
 
 The extra information the experts requested was an estimate of the volume of the 
network, the probability that durations of flooding at elevation 4 feet, NAVD (88) would 
exceed 5 hours (POWER OFF – INSUFFICIENT CAPACITY) and 48 hours (POWER 
ON – INSUFFICIENT CAPACITY), and the probable durations for such a flood for each 
of the flood stage frequencies from the 99 to 1% events, and for the 4% event as the sea 
level rises.  
 
 The team reconvened on August 14, 2015, but again only Barbachem, Mahan, and 





that the network had insufficient capacity with the power off, they took the following 
steps to construct Table 21 below: 
1. Assumed the network is filled with water below elevation 2 feet, NAVD (88), the 
elevation of the lowest manhole and approximate elevation of local watertable.  
2. Converted the design capacity of 60,000 gpd average flow to 2,500 gph (42 gpm).  
3. For each case in Table 19, listed the flood frequency, year, flood stage elevation 
and storm duration from Table 11 (Table 21, Columns 1, 2 and 3; and from Table 
13 (Table 21, Column 4). 
4. Assumed for each flood stage that after 5 hours without power, the network would 
fill up to that elevation and estimated the available capacity above that elevation 
using the capacities for each of the flood stage frequencies in Table 7 (Table 21, 
Columns 5 and 7). 
5. The experts divided the 2,500 gph rate into the available capacities estimated in 
step (4) to compute the hours it would take for the network to fill-up from 
floodwaters (Table 21, Columns 6 and 8). 
6. Compared the time from step (5) against the durations presented in Table 13.  
7. If the flood duration was greater than the time it took to fill the available capacity, 





















Table 21. Available Network Capacity versus Storm Frequency Flood Stage with 
Power Off 
 







































99 2015 2.56 0 23,200 9 25,800 10 
50 2015 3.74 1 13,400 5 15,600 6 
10 2015 5.53 5 4,200 2 5,400 2 
4 2015 6.49 7 2,100 1 3,700 1 
4 2035 7.10 14 1,000 0 350 0 
1 2015 8.06 10 55 0 72 0 
4 2065 8.36 39 0 0 0 0 
1. From Table 11, Summary of Changes in Flood Elevations for 20 and 50-Year Design Life Cycles 
2. From Table 13, Probable Durations for Range of Flood Stage Frequencies 
3. Estimated based on data in Table 7. 
4. Based on Time to Fill Network Capacity/Average Hourly Flow
5
 = 2,500 gph. 




 For judging the probabilities that the network had insufficient capacity with the 
power on, they first assumed the probability would be the inverse with the power off. 
However, they quickly judged this an inaccurate assumption, because as floodwaters 
increased, probability for insufficient capacity decreased. 
 
 Instead, the experts assumed a continuous operation of the pump would handle 
the inflow. They also assumed that capacity would diminish with increasing flood stages. 
They advised modeling would be necessary to adequately judge impacts, but used their 
experience to estimate probabilities. Also, the maximum duration of any event was 39 






 Also, the experts used the data from Table 6 to understand the areal extent of the 
flooding by the number of manholes inundated.as the flood levels increased. In addition, 
they took the data from Table 12 for the annual probability of exceedence for flooding at 
elevation 4 feet, NAVD (88) to understand how long the area would stay flooded. Plus, 
they used the annual probabilities that the storm could last 5 or more hours with the pump 
off to judge a point where the network would have insufficient capacity; and 48 or more 
hours with the pump on to help judge a point where the pump starts to have enough grit 
to impact performance. (See section 3.2.4.3 Intervening Explanatory Variables – Flood 
Stage Duration) 
 
 As a final step, the experts combined all this information and created an informal 



































































1 2.56 99 2015 0 23.1 0 8 9 10 
2 3.74 50 2015 1 23.1 0 21 5 6 
3 5.53 10 2015 5 23.1 0 50 2 2 




to short out at 
6.38 ft 
1 1 
5 7.10 4 2035  
Inter. High 
14 33.7 0 71 0 0 
6 8.06 1 2015 BFE 10 23.1 0 96 0 0 
7 8.35 4 2065 
Inter. High 
39 73.8 0.6 100 0 0 
1. From Table 19, Study Elevations for the Cases in the Decision Tree Analysis 
2. From Table 13, Probable Durations for Range of Flood Stage Frequences 
3. From Table 12, Probabilities of Exceedence for Flood Durations 
4. From Table 6, Manholes within Sewerage Service Area 















 Appendix D, Decision Event Tree Analysis has the tally sheets of the individual 
judgments (termed Trials). There were 19 probability estimates for each case, seven cases 
per pump station and two pump stations. That adds up to 133 judgments per pump station 
for a total of 266 estimates.  
 
 As noted, only three of the invited experts participated. For judging the pump’s 
performance, the team added a third term, Even (E) to the Over (O) and Under (U) terms. 
As a resolution to seeking a balanced O/U bet, the experts accepted two E’s as long as the 
O or U accepted the E estimate, or estimates were balanced by one O, one U and one E 
and all experts accepted the E estimate.   
 
 Flood levels for Cases 1, 2, and 3, the lower elevations occurring in 2015, 
required the most discussion. As the flood levels reached elevation 6 feet, NAVD (88), it 
was obvious the impacts to the network and the low-lying neighborhood would be 
significantly detrimental. At the higher flood elevations, the exercise became more 
academic as flooding would be so extensive and disruptive to the community at large.  
 
  For judging POWER OFF, INSUFFICIENT CAPACITY and SPILL, each Trial 
(T) estimate started with a probability of 50% (Table 14). Of the 266 T- estimates only 16 
judgments (6%) required up to four Trials. Of the 16, only 12 judgments (4.5%) had a 
mixed response that required discussion to resolve balancing the estimate. All of these 
mixed T-estimates were within the first three cases. Case 2 for both the new and existing 





 The experts included estimates for confidence intervals (CI) for each judgment. 
All three experts were consistent and in agreement. For all estimates at probabilities of 
less than10% or greater than 95%, the CI is 0.01. For those estimates from 10% to 95%, 
the CI is 0.05. The exercise did not estimate a confidence level.  
 
 For judging the Consequences, the T-estimates were based on a constructed scale 
(Table 20). There was a total of 168 T-estimates. The experts discussed the possible 
outcomes and came to a unanimous agreement on all of the estimated scale numbers.  
 
 The decision event tree computations are in Appendix D, Decision Event Tree 
Analysis. The results show that the probability of a spill increases as the flood stages 
increase reflective of an exposure – effect correlation (Figure 17). Figure 48 shows a 
comparison between the new and existing pump stations for the year 2015. At a 
probability of 50%, it would take a flood at least one-foot higher for the new pump 
station to have that probability. The limits plotted at the 0.01 and 0.10% fragility levels 
are performance standards discussed in section 3.6 Performance Standards. 
 
 A key improvement is the control panel for the new station is six feet higher than 
the existing pump station (City of Norfolk, 2014). However, it is the network capacity 
that has a significant influence on the overall systems vulnerability. The new pump 
station and associated piping minimally improves the network capacity above elevation 2 
feet, NAVD (88). As the flood stage approaches the base flood elevation, the probability 











 At the critical 4% flood event shown in Figure 49, the new pump station cuts the 
probability of a spill by more than half from 88 percent to 41%. Also, it shows that by 
2035, the existing pump station would be ineffective in preventing a spill; but the new 
station could still operate. However, by 2065, the new station would be near ineffective; 
but it is a moot point because the whole area would be stressed by storms on an 
additional 1.8 feet of sea level. As noted for Figure 48, the limits plotted at the 0.01 and 































Flood Stage Elevation, Ft, NAVD (88) 
Existing PS 113 New PS 113











 Risk computations show that the investment in the new pump station reduces 
possible consequences. Figure 50 shows that the new pump station cuts the relative risk 
by nearly five-fold over the existing condition at the critical 4% event. The risk remains 
proportional out to 2035, the 20-year design life cycle of the new pumps. However, by 
2065, the 50-year design life cycle of the new pump station, risk to the new pump station 
































Lower PF LImit Existing PS 113











 These risk levels should remain consistent into the future. Since the area is 
developed, there is minimal concern that future growth will increase possible 
consequences and increase risk. However, what is evident is any improvements are 
limited by the overall impact rising seas will have on the region as a whole. In the 
absence of any actions to keep rising seas at bay, future investments in wastewater 
collection systems in low-lying areas will need to consider a shorter replacement life 



































3.6 Performance Standards 
 
 As noted in section 2.2.3.2 Tolerable Risk, for consequences that do not involve 
loss of life, society may accept higher levels of risk based on how much loss they are 
willing to tolerate. The literature review indicates a 10
-4
 annual risk of casualty is an 
appropriate level of societal risk for urban areas where the risk is voluntarily accepted.  
However, the consequences as a result of a wastewater spill generally do not involve a 
loss of human life. Based on Figure 20 in section 2.2.3.2 Tolerable Risk, an upper limit 
for involuntarily accepted annual risk of casualty for a fatality of one (or less) is 10
-3
. 
Given that the voluntarily accepted annual risk of casualty noted above is 10
-4
, it is 
reasonable to assume an annual risk of non-casualty at an order of magnitude higher  
(10
-3
) is tolerable for assessing the pump station.  
 
 Also, in order to assess risk, it is essential to define a performance level for the 
pump to remain operational. The requirements in the State Water Control Board, Chapter 
790, Sewage Collection and Treatment Regulations, Section 9VAC25-790-380 states the 
pump station must remain operational for the 4% exceedence event. It implies zero 
probability for failure or no risk. However, every structure has a potential for failure due 
to uncertainty because of a lack of a full understanding of the problem, an uncertain 
future, imperfections in manufactured components, and variations in design and 
construction quality. 
 
 The literature lacks guidance specific to acceptable performance levels. The ideal 





= 0.01. However, it is the author’s opinion such a level is difficult to achieve for 
designing public works infrastructure, because each project is unique and there is a lack 
of reliability based data for a wide range of infrastructure. The author suggests designing 
facilities to fall within a band where 0.01 is a lower limit and an increase in order of 
magnitude to PF = 0.10 as a practical upper limit. Designers could justify even higher 
upper limits to lower life cycle costs if the city considers the relative risk as low as 
reasonably practical. 
 
 Figures 48 and 49 plot these limits against the fragility curves. Figure 48 shows 
that the performance for both pumps falls outside the performance standards before 
floodwaters reach elevation 5 feet, NAVD (88). Figure 49 shows neither pump currently 
meet a PF = 0.10 performance standard at the 4% flood event.  
 
 The analysis demonstrates the investment in the new pump station reduces the 
relative risk due to coastal flooding in the near term. However, the risk for the new pump 
station at the 4% exceedence event is 0.003 and the probability for a spill is 0.4; both 




3.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In the absence of information on the existing pump station and network, the study 
can best estimate the relative risk. Based on expert elicitation, the annual risk to the 





Investment in a new pump station reduces the relative risk three-fold. This ratio remains 
proportional out to 2035, the design life cycle of the pump. However, over the 50-year 
design life of the new pump station, the relative risk to the new pump station increases 
sevenfold, mainly because the whole neighborhood will be stressed by storms onto a 1.8 
foot increase in sea level.  
 
Short-term efforts to reduce infiltration and inflow by waterproofing manholes, 
the pipe network and service laterals; and modifications to storm drains to prevent 
backflow into the streets would help. However, continued long-term efforts to improve 
wastewater infrastructure seem less practical given the region’s increasing vulnerability 
to flooding. Capital improvements to keep rising sea levels at bay may be a more prudent 
approach to reduce exposure to high flood levels that impact the system’s performance 
and cause the consequences. 
 
 The study’s strength is it offers a way to frame the socio-technical problems 
common with public works infrastructure within systems engineering concepts. It applies 
systems thinking in the form of a hierarchy to tailor an analysis compatible with the 
complexity of a problem situation. The result is a step-by-step outline for engineers to 
choose a design approach in line with the problem’s degree of complexity.  
 
 The study’s weakness is the use of expert elicitation may be the least precise and 
accurate approach to judge performance. The use of expert elicitation has its role and is 
best when there is insufficient information about a project and a lack of resources to 





needed to support reliability based assessments, elicitation will play a dominant role in 
aiding engineers to gauge performance. 
 
 Another weakness is the lack of a model of the network that feeds the pump 
station. It would have enabled sensitivity analyses to aid the experts in assessing potential 
impacts to network capacity and possible spills. Also, for pump stations without backup 
generators, it would be prudent to weigh the potential for loss of commercial power for 
extended periods of time.  
 
 A third weakness is the use of the Extreme Value Analysis from Ordered Data 
method to compute to compute the durations for a range of annual frequencies for the 99, 
50, 10, 4 and 1% events and for computing the probability of exceedence for the 5, 6, 12, 
24, 48 and 72 hour flood durations. This method is at best an expedient approximation 
and in this study under estimates durations and frequencies. Future studies should 
consider a full enumeration using the Peak-Over-Threshold method. 
 
 Fortunately, the construction of the new pump station offers the City of Norfolk a 
research opportunity to better understand the performance of submersible wastewater 
pumps exposed to coastal flooding. Both the university and city should pursue a grant to 
model the impacts of flooding on the sewerage system’s capacity. The sewerage shed is a 
good candidate because it is (1) small and in close proximity to a HRSD wastewater 





constant over time, (3) it is frequently flooded, and (4) the new station has SCADA to 
provide data to assess impacts.  
 
  In summary, this study provides a decision framework for the Director of 
Utilities to use to comprehend impacts on the existing PS 113 and the proposed new 
station. In addition, it provides the Department of Utilities a means to demonstrate how 
well investing in these improvements reduces the risk over the life cycle of the pump 
station. Also, the decision tree analysis is adaptable to other pump stations and the city 
could conduct assessments in-house staff.  
 
 For ODU, it creates research expertise in methodologies to assess the impact of 
rising sea levels on infrastructure. The case study provides a conceptual approach for the 
College of Engineering to develop a library of fragility curves for a range of regional 
infrastructure. In addition, building this knowledge within ASCE’s concepts for critical 
infrastructure enhances the capability of the university’s Coastal Engineering Research 
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APPENDIX A: Project Journal, Photographs and Drawings 
 




April 25, 2014: I had a brief conversation with Kristen Lentz, PE, Director of Utilities, 
City of Norfolk. As a follow-on to earlier discussions about my degree progress, I asked 
if she had projects that I could study and if so, would she be my sponsor and serve on a 
doctoral committee? She said yes and yes. She said the city had applied for FEMA grants 
to modify four low-lying pump stations to project against frequent flooding. FEMA 
rejected the applications stating the risk was too low. We agreed to meet to discuss. 
 
May 23, 2014: I met with the City of Norfolk, Kristen Lentz, PE, Director of Utilities, 
Eric Tucker, Assistant Director of Utilities, and Ken Turner, PE, Engineering Manager. 
The city provided the following information:  
 Copies of Commonwealth of VA, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) 
Pre-Application Form DR-4092-VA for Flood Damage Mitigation of Wastewater 
Pump Stations 109, 112, 113, and 114 located in the Larchmont Neighborhood 
(City of Norfolk, 2013b) 
 PS 113 Flood Control Site Improvements Study, City of Norfolk, Department of 
Utilities, Draft: June 14, 2011, by O’Brien & Gere. The existing station does not 
have a backup generator (O'Brien & Gere, 2011). 
 
The pre-applications noted flooding damages existing pump stations and listed such 
corrective actions as elevating control panels, installing new submersible pumps, raising 
wet well elevations, and installing watertight hatches. 
 
I asked some questions pertaining to primary stakeholders and Turner referenced an 
HRSD assessment by Brown and Caldwell. The POC is Richard Stear. I noted that my 
research committee would need to review to assess whether it has sufficient rigor for a 
doctoral project. Turner will be the City’s POC. 
 
June 2, 2014: I ran into Benjamin J. McFarlane, ACIP at the MTS Tech Surge workshop 
at ODU. Asked if he was aware of any information on local I&I studies. He referred me 
to Whitney Katchmark, PE. 
 
June 2, 2014: Via email, I requested from Turner, for any long-term records on PS 113 
pumping rates during a full range of weather conditions. 
 
June 3, 2014: Turner responded for PS 113 and the other stations, only have monitoring 
for alarm conditions. He advised there is no information on the flow rate, pump run time, 
wet well level or anything for this station. Also, he noted, as the city replaces pumps, the 






In response, I requested any information on the pump station specifications, and design 
calculations for sizing the pump to serve its network. 
 
June 3, 2014: I emailed Katchmark. She responded via email referring me to Mike C. 
Morgan, PE, CDM-Smith who’s doing a regional study for HRSD. 
 
June 4, 2014: Turner responded yes and that he will get back to me. 
 
June 5, 2014: Dr. David Basco, PE and I visited PS 113. He pointed out a gated 
stormwater outlet located at the edge of the Lafayette River that drains from the catch 
basin next to the pump station. He said his neighbor, RADM Kevin Slates, takes it upon 
himself to close the gate during storms. 
  
June 11, 2014: Dr. Gary Schafran had given me Jay Bernas, PE, Chief of Planning & 
Analysis, HRSD. In attempting to call Bernas, I reached Bruce Husselbee, PE. Bernas is 
on vacation this week. Husselbee noted he just received direction to incorporate SLR into 
project design. He expects to contract with one of his large IDC’s on board, HRD or 
CDM-Smith, to develop guidance. I asked him to consider inviting CEE to sit in and 
listen to get a real world experience on the issue. 
 
June 12, 2014: I called Michael C. Morgan, PE, CDM-Smith. He explained HRSD in 
partnership with jurisdictions is doing a regional study. It is a hydraulic model of fluid 
flow and includes rainfall I&I.  Phillip L. Hubbard, PE is the POC at HRSD. As for 
Norfolk, the segment in question is solely theirs and is the owner of the data. He 
referenced a study by Greeley & Hansen. 
 
June 12, 2014: I sent a follow-up email to Turner on June 3
rd
 request for information and 
mentioned Greeley & Hansen study. 
 
June 16, 2014: I met Chris Guvernator, PE, O’Brien & Gere at the ODU CEE Alumni 
tour of new engineering building. His firm did the PS 113 study, which I have a copy of 
the report from the city. He offered information. 
 
June 19, 2014: I called Jay Bernas, PE left a voice message and sent a follow-on email. I 
called to see if HRSD is studying the impacts of infiltration rates on its network and if 
that information is available to ODU? 
 
June 20, 23, and 24, 2014: As follow-up to our June 16 discussion, I exchanged emails 
with Chris Guvernator requesting information on network and pump station. I followed 
up with more emails, June 23, 24 with clarification. 
 
June 23, 2014: I received a call back from Robert Martz, PE, HRSD, 460-7009 about my 
request for information about the Inflow & Infiltration studies. We chatted briefly as I 
was about to enter the Chiropractor’s office. He said they are just starting a study and are 
waiting on data from the jurisdictions for their portion of the network. I asked if he had 





above water. He said they did not have that kind of information. However, he could give 
us information about lines underwater in Tidewater and for lines above groundwater in 
Williamsburg. I begged off to go to my appointment, but asked if I can call him back and 
we agreed to early tomorrow morning. 
 
June 26, 2014: I met with my advisor Dr. Schafran to discuss research proposal. The 
current concept is in the right direction. May need to narrow scope to just the pump 
stations. Examining the network may be too much for a research project scope. Also, the 
schedule is ambitious. He will be on vacation for the month of July. So I am to continue 
to flush out the proposal, consult with other committee members as needed, and meet in 
August to review and discuss when to present to the committee. 
 
June 26, 2014: Martz and I chatted. He said Infiltration & Infiltration rates come from 
the jurisdictions. He will set up a meeting with CDM (Gary St. John, PE) to find the 
needed information. He also noted that Bruce Husselbee has tasked him with developing 
the SLR guidance for HRSD and would like to link in with what ODU is doing. We 
agreed to share. I referred him to HRPDC, Whitney Katchmark as a starting point and to 
get copies of Ben McFarlane’s reports. I sent him a list of local, state, and Federal 
references with links. 
 
June 27, 2014: I met with Dr. Schafran. I had sent ahead a copy of the Module 3: Project 
Problem Statement. He had a few questions for clarification. He thinks the schedule is 
optimistic. I asked him how this will work. He said with the PhD program, it’s usually 
the advisor and the student. However, for the DEng, we may need to invite the full 
committee for advisor meetings. He will be on vacation during July. I am too draft a 
proposal and get back to him in August. 
 
July 17, 2014: I returned July 14 call and email from Michael Morgan, CDM Smith. He 
called per request from Phil Hubbard and Rob Martz. I left a message and email that I 
will call him Thursday at 11 AM.  
 
He sent ahead the following paper, A Collaboration Approach to Modeling the Hampton 
Roads Regional Wastewater Collection System, by Michael C. Morgan, Phillip L. 
Hubbard, Robert J. Martz, Charles J. Moore and Dr. Ing. Matthias Wittenberg. They 
presented the paper at a conference in 2012. I requested information on when and where 
so I can reference the work. 
 
The paper provides information on dry and wet well input to the Regional Hydraulic 
Model HRSD is developing. Ken Turner is the POC with Norfolk and Rick Underhill is 
the POC with Greeley & Hansen who did the work. See June 12 entries. 
 
HRSD should have and will provide what input information the city submitted for PS 113 
such as service area, flow parameters, the transfer of rainfall data into infiltration rates, 






I inquired if the jurisdictions followed HRSD design guidance or something else, such as 
the Health Department. He said they size there lines to HRSD pump stations per HRSD 
standards, but did not know if they used local, state or HRSD standards to design the rest 
of their system. 
 
We discussed how to assess flood impacts. I discussed the development of the fragility 
curve using expert solicitation in the absence of any operations data. 
 
I emailed him the same information on sea levels I had sent to Martz on June 26. 
 
July 17, 2014: In an email, Chris Guvernator provided the following information on the 
calculations for the PS 113 replacement station.  Based on the information he has, it is 
expected to pump 120 gallons per minute.  Over a standard day, it is expected to pump 
approximately 60,000 gallons per day (gpd).  He also attached PDF files of the PS 113 
vicinity contour map and section view. 
 
Aug 12, 2014: In an email, Michael Morgan provided the following information for the 
existing Norfolk Pump Station 113 that HRSD received from Norfolk’s consultant (Rick 
Underhill, Greeley and Hansen).  
 
Norfolk Pump Station 113 
Number of Pumps: 2 (constant speed type) 
Design Pressure: 65 ft 
Firm Capacity: 150 gpm 
Wet well Top elevation: 2.24 ft NAVD 88 
Cross-sectional area of wet well: 28.27 square ft 
Lowest overflow point for the pump station service area: pump station wet well 
 
Pump curve for each of the two pumps: 
Total Head          Pump Flow 
46 feet                 500 gpm 
65 feet                 150 gpm 
74 feet                 50 gpm  
 
With regard to the paper he previously sent on July 17, below is the reference 
information: 
 
Morgan, M; Hubbard, P; Martz, R; Moore, C; Wittenberg, M. (2012), A Collaborative 
Approach to Modeling the Hampton Roads Regional Wastewater Collection System. 
Proceedings of the 2012 Water Environment Federation Collection Systems Conference; 
St. Louis, Missouri. 
 
October 23-24, 2014: I exchanged emails with Chris Guvernator who is now with the 







1. What design standards did you follow? Does the city have its own standards? Did they 
reference HRSD standards and/or state standards (9VAC25-790) or something else? 
 
The pump station was designed in accordance with the Virginia Sewage Collection and 
Treatment (SCAT) regulations, which I think you referenced correctly.  The station was 
also designed in accordance with the Consent Order for the Hampton Roads Area, which 
includes an Attachment called “Exhibit A – Regional Design Guidelines” that further 
governs the design. 
 
2. Do you have a designated design life for the pump system; one for the pump itself (or 
what is a typical service life for the pump itself)? 
 
Generally, a pump is planned for replacement at the 20-year mark.  Some municipalities 
will program in a 10-year life, but it depends on how hard the pump works, 
characteristics of the sewage and flow rates at the station.  It also depends on whether 
they are following the recommended maintenance program. 
 
3. Can you please provide the pump specifications? I assume you cannot 
specify a proprietary pump. Can you advise as to what pumps that meet the 
specification? 
 
The pump specifications are incomplete, and won’t be finalized until the City gives the 
go-ahead to bid the project.  There is only one pump manufacturer included on its 
approved products list, last updated 08-27-2014, which is Fairbanks Morse.  But they 
have other pumps in service, like Flygt and Clow/Yeomans.  You could see if the 
standard manufacturer’s technical specification will work.  That will be close to what the 
City will eventually use. I have attached one for Flygt. See if that is what you are looking 
for.  I can get you others if you want.  I can also get you in touch with a manufacturer’s 
rep for more detailed questions and info. 
 
I also asked him if he knew what types of pumps are in the existing PS 113. He referred 
me to Leticia Quejada, Department of Utilities, who is the PM for the PS 113 project.  
 
October 28, 2014: I sent an email to Leticia Quejada, Department of Utilities requesting 
information on the type of pumps (manufacturer and model) that are in the existing PS 
113. She provided a prompt response with a fact sheet about the pumps. The systems 
model is a Hydro-O-Matic (Vertical), SPDF 500 with 5 HP, 1150 RPM, 3-Phase, 60 
Hertz motor; and a 2”x4” submersible grinder pump. 
 
February 24, 2015: I met with Dr. Christopher Krus, PE, Assistant City Engineer, 
Department of Utilities, City of Norfolk. I had provided him a copy of the draft report 
dated February 23, 2014. He went over his comments. He also forwarded an email before 
the meeting that included three items; (1) A fact sheet on the Hydro-O-Matic (Vertical), 
SPDF 500 with 5 HP previously provided by Leticia Quejada on October 28
th
, (2) 





(3) Manufacturer’s literature for a Pentair, Hydromatic Models HPGF/HPGFH 
Submersible Sewage Grinder Pump as an example of comparable pump in the existing 
PS 113. He noted that the manufacturer cut sheet for the Hydromatic model does not use 
the same model number, and that these names/numbers change with various attachments 
(including horizontal discharge, rails, etc.).  He suggested either using the city’s fact 
sheet or contacting the manufacturer for the exact information. He also provided an aerial 
photograph the site from the city’s Geographical Information Systems website. The 
website is available at the following reference (City of Norfolk, 2015).  
 
We also met H. Leonard Matthews, Jr. PE with the city and discussed the proposed 
analysis for assessing consequences. They agreed with three consequences, one for 
environmental impacts, one for costs to repair, and one for social impacts.  After the 
meeting, Krus forwarded a copy of the December 19, 2014 Consent Order, a 
Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board Enforcement Action, Order by 
Consent issued to the city and other local jurisdictions for the purpose of resolving certain 
violations of State Water Control law and regulations. 
 
March 5, 2015: I called Carey Canty, Operations Division, Department of Utilities, city 
of Norfolk, 757-823-1028. We first talked about failure modes. Other than power supply 
disruptions, he advised typical failures caused by flooding are (1) electrical shorts in the 
Quasar electrical junction box, (green box at grade level), (2) electrical shorts in the 
control panel when water levels are about one foot above the bottom of the panel, (3) the 
pump running continuously for 2 to 3 days overloading the pump motor, and (4) dirt and 
sand chokes the pump, slowing it down and driving up the amperage burning out the 
motor.  
 
When the pump shuts down, the most common emergency response is to by-pass the 
pump. Typically, the crew sets-up a temporary pump to divert wastewater from the wet 
well directly to the force main. When it is flooding, then the crew must walk in and 
whether they can reach the pump and set-up depends on the flood level. Another method 
is to “pump and haul”, i.e. pump the wastewater to a truck to haul out it away. The only 
time they need to “pump and haul” is if the force main is broken. This has not happened 
at PS 113, but it has happened at other stations. 
 
He said the longest time they had to by-pass a pump was one week. The number of days 
depended on how long it took the electrician to get parts to make repairs.  
 
March 13, 2015: I met with Leticia Quejada and Mel Hopkins, Department of Utilities to 
go over some questions on data. (1) The site plan provided by O’Brien & Gere via email 
(see July 17, 2014 entry and included in Appendix A) shows the top of the manhole at 
elevation 2.97 feet, NAVD (88) and the HRSD Regional Hydraulic Model data provided 
by the city from a Greeley & Hansen shows the top of the wet well at elevation 2.24 feet, 
NAVD (88). 
 
They confirmed that the elevation on the site is correct and that the difference between 
the two elevations is the thickness of the manhole cap. (2) The design life cycle for the 





Yeoman pump characteristic curve for the PS 113. (4) For pump characteristic curves, 
contact Susan Stallnaker, O’Brien & Gere for the new pump station, and Rick Underhill, 
Greeley & Hansen the existing pump. (5)  
 
We discussed how best to represent the duration of flooding. Hopkins explained that the 
duration is called the response time. The duration starts from the time the water levels in 
the wet well trigger the emergency alarm until the water level drops below the alarm-off 
elevation. It is the time it takes floodwaters to drain from the entire network of pipes and 
manholes. The city does not calculate the time it takes to drain the system.  
 
April 7, 2015: I met with Mel Hopkins to go over report and discuss proposed 
consequences. He explained that the consequences have a temporal component; they 
change from the time of the event until impacts are mitigated. He will review the report 
and proposed consequence tables and we scheduled a follow-up meeting for April 13, 
2015.  
 
April 13, 2015: I met with Mel Hopkins to review the report and respond to questions. 
We scheduled a follow-up meeting for April 23, 2015. 
 
April 23, 2015: I met with Mel Hopkins to go over the consequence tables. We identified 
and agreed on three outcomes: environmental, cost and social impacts. The 
environmental impact is a function of the extent spillage of wastewater would extend 
within and beyond the service area, colloquially referred to as the sewage shed. The scale 
is based on the ability to recover the sewage. Once the spillage extends into a body of 
water, it becomes far more difficult to contain the spill.  
 
Cost impact is a function of the number of different types of costs that the city can incur. 
Cost includes expenses to recover spillage and clean contaminated areas, to make repairs 
to the pump station and any related infrastructure, to perform any bypass pumping to a 
forcemain or to pump and haul spillage, and/or regulatory fines. A major cleanup is 
defined as having to go outside the sewage shed to recover spillage. A major repair is 
defined as costs that exceed $10,000. The scale is based on the amount of different kinds 
of costs incurred.  
 
Social impact is a function of the number of customers disturbed by disruption of service, 
the spillage, and recovery efforts. The scale is based on the areal extent of the impacts. It 
is possible to impact neighboring service areas if it is necessary to divert flows into 
another network.  
 
We scheduled a follow-up meeting to test the Event Tree Analysis spreadsheet for May 7, 
2015. 
 
May 7, 2015: I met with Mel Hopkins to once again go over the consequence tables. Mr. 
Hopkins is satisfied with the ratios for the three consequences in Tables 13, 14 and 15. 
However, he advised that intensity of the consequences varies over the response time and 






Mr. Hopkins assumes that if PS 113 would fail, the response would take about 6 months 
to restore order. He drafted a sketch of the intensity of the three consequences and how 
they play out over a six-month response period. The intensity of the social impacts would 
be twice that of environmental impacts, and environmental impacts would be twice the 
cost impacts. I suggested the best way to represent weights is to use the area under the 
respective plots to define appropriate ratios between the consequences. 
 
In describing the sketch, he advised that the social impact is the most intense because it 
requires politics to assure the citizens that all issues will be resolved to their satisfaction. 
It is the perception that the city is taking the appropriate actions that makes the social 
impact the most intense of the three consequences. Concerns for environmental impacts 
would be part of the response to social impacts and regulatory agencies, but will play out 
longer than the need for immediate public assurances of appropriate actions. Concerns for 
cost impacts also start immediately and tend to extend over a longer period than the other 
two consequences. However, costs would play out over a period 1.5 times environmental 
impacts and 6 times that of social impacts.  
 
May 20, 2015: I met with Hopkins to test risk analysis EXCEL spreadsheets. The risk 
outcomes are different than expected. Also, in assessing consequences, we decided to 
make minor adjustments to the Constructed Scale to Judge Cost to Repair. I will revisit 
the math used to compute risk and seek a second opinion as to whether the outcomes are 
appropriate.  
 
July 9, 2015: I stopped by the city to pick up a set of plans and specifications from 
Leticia Quejada (City of Norfolk, 2014). 
 
July 14, 2015: Initiated the Expert Elicitation. The following people volunteered to 
participate on the expert elicitation team: Michael Barbachem, P. E., Whitman, Requardt 
& Associates, LLP; Melvin Hopkins, P. E., City of Norfolk, Department of Utilities; H. 
Ali Mahan, P. E., O’Brien & Gere; and Robert J. Martz, P.E., Hampton Roads Sanitation 
District. However, only Barbachem, Mahan and Martz attended. 
 
The team received an overview of the study, a training session on the elicitation process 
and presentation on available data. Given, that only three members showed, the team 
opted to address any imbalances in the O/U estimates on an ad-hoc basis. 
 
Once the process started, the team quickly rejected data suggested to judge the 
probability that the system was insufficient. The subject matter experts requested 
different information. They judged that when the pump has no power, at some point 
inflow will overwhelm the capacity of the system and spills will occur. They also judged 
that when the pump does have power, the city’s observation that grit could cause the 
pump motor to burn after 48 to 72 hours operation to be a reasonable expectation. 
 
In order to better estimate probabilities that the network would have insufficient capacity 





examining Table 6, the experts noted that the lowest manhole is elevation 2.02 feet, 
NAVD (88) and at the point floodwaters reach 4 feet, NAVD (88) 25% of the manholes 
are inundated. They qualitatively judged at this flood stage for the condition where the 
power is off, inflow would have a significant impact after 5-hours of continuous 
inundation. For the condition where the power remains on, inflow and grit could have a 
significant impact after 48-hours of continuous inundation.  
 
Given these possible conditions, the experts also requested the annual probability of 
exceedence for flooding at elevation 4 feet, NAVD (88) for durations of 5 hours and 48 
hours. Also, they requested the probable durations for such a flood for each of the flood 
stage frequencies from the 99 to 1% events, and for the 4% event as the sea level rises. 
 
Martz noted a discrepancy between the top of pump station manhole at elevation 2.97 
feet, NAVD (88) and what was shown in HRSD data as 2.24 feet, NAVD (88). I advised 
that based on a discussion with the city (see March 13, 2015 entry) that elevation 2.97 
was the top of manhole and elevation 2.24 was the top of the wet well. The difference is 
the thickness of the manhole cap. Martz advised that elevation 2.24 should be the correct 
elevation. The contract plans provided by the city on July 9, 2015 do not indicate an 
elevation and contour lines were unclear. A profile of the existing manhole shown in a 
draft O’Brien and Gere report identifies the elevation as 2.73 feet, NAVD (88) (O'Brien 
& Gere, 2011).  
 
Following this session, I opted to accept the city’s original interpretation and chose to 
accept the city’s interpretation because the spread was insignificant. The key elevation 
this impacts is the bottom of the existing pump station control panel. I used the manhole 
as a benchmark to determine the base of the panel at elevation 5.38 feet, NAVD. It could 
be at elevation 5.14 feet, NAVD (88) or as low as elevation 4.65 feet, NAVD. Based on 
city input (see March 5, 2015 entry) electrical shorts occur at flood levels one foot above 
the bottom of the panel. This means these shorts could occur at elevation 6.14 feet, 
NAVD (88) or as low as 5.65 feet, NAVD (88). However, the discrepancy has a minimal 
impact on the estimate of failure probabilities, because all three possible elevations stay 
within the flood stage for Case 4 shown in Table 22. If the lower elevations were below 
elevation 5.53 feet, NAVD (88), then it would have impacted probabilities for Case 3.  
 
August 14, 2015: The team of experts reconvened to perform the elicitation and 
completed it in about 5 hours. Again, only three members showed up: Barbachem, Mahan 
and Martz. The team received an overview of the new data and opted to address any 
imbalances in the O/U estimates with the following guidelines. For judging the pump’s 
performance, the team added a third term, Even (E) to the Over (O) and Under (U) terms. 
As a resolution to seeking a balanced O/U bet, the experts accepted two E’s as long as the 
O or U accepted the E estimate, or estimates were balanced by one O, one U and one E 
and all experts accepted the E estimate. 
 
The team also took Table 19 and expanded it to summarize available information to 





exceeding the 5-hour and 48-hour durations from Table 12, percentage of manholes 
inundated from Table 6, and times to backfill the network from Table 21.  
 
Flood levels at the lower elevations required the most discussion. As the flood levels 
exceeded elevation 6 feet, NAVD (88), it was obvious the impacts to the network and the 
low-lying neighborhood would be significantly detrimental. At the higher flood 
elevations, the exercise became more academic as flooding would be so extensive and 
disruptive to the community at large. 
 
September 29, 2015: In responding to comments provided by Dr. Schafran on the draft 
Final Report, I realized an error in the Sewage Network Volume calculations. As noted in 
the July 14, 2015 entry, there is discussion of the discrepancy of the top of the existing 
pump station wet well. I should have used an elevation for the underside of the wet well 
manhole instead of the one for the top of the manhole. I do not know the thickness of the 
manhole cover. However, the difference is only a few inches and would have reduced the 
volume by a matter of 20-30 gallons, much less than 0.03% of the total volume. 
 
November 3, 2015: In response to my November 2, 2015 email request, Leticia Quejada 







APPENDIX A (Continued) 
 









































































Page 202 - Relative Sea Level Rise Projections – Calculations of four stillwater level sea 
level rise scenarios for years 2015 to 2100. See Figure 34 in body of report. 
 
Page 203 - Stillwater Level (SWL) Flood Stages for Low Historic SLR Scenario - 
Calculations for Figure 35 
 
Page 204 - SWL Flood Stages for Intermediate Low Scenario - Calculations for Figure 36 
 
Page 205 - SWL Flood Stages for Intermediate High Scenario - Calculations for Figure 
37 
 
Page 206 - SWL Flood Stages for High Scenario - Calculations for Figure 38 
 
Page 207 - Low SLR Scenario with Wave Set-Up (WSU) - Calculations for Figure 42 
 
Page 208 - Intermediate Low SLR Scenario with WSU – Calculations for Figure 43 
 
Page 209 - Intermediate High SLR Scenario with WSU – Calculations for Figure 44 
 



















Rate as of March 26, 2015 is 0.00457 mm/year, NOAA
Start year (B3) = 1992
Current year (B4) = 2015
t1 = B4 - B3 23 Future Year t2 = Col D -B3 Low Inter Low Inter High High
2015 23 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2016 24 0.0151 0.0193 0.0260 0.0326
Low, b = 0.0000000 2017 25 0.0302 0.0388 0.0524 0.0660
Inter Low, b = 0.0000271 2018 26 0.0453 0.0584 0.0793 0.1001
Inter High, b = 0.0000700 2019 27 0.0604 0.0783 0.1066 0.1350
High, b = 0.0001130 2020 28 0.0755 0.0983 0.1344 0.1706
2021 29 0.0906 0.1185 0.1627 0.2070
2022 30 0.1056 0.1389 0.1914 0.2441
2023 31 0.1207 0.1594 0.2206 0.2820
2024 32 0.1358 0.1801 0.2503 0.3206
2025 33 0.1509 0.2010 0.2804 0.3599
2026 34 0.1660 0.2221 0.3110 0.4000
2027 35 0.1811 0.2434 0.3420 0.4408
2028 36 0.1962 0.2648 0.3735 0.4824
2029 37 0.2113 0.2865 0.4055 0.5248
2030 38 0.2264 0.3083 0.4379 0.5679
2031 39 0.2415 0.3303 0.4708 0.6117
2032 40 0.2566 0.3524 0.5042 0.6563
2033 41 0.2717 0.3748 0.5380 0.7016
2034 42 0.2868 0.3973 0.5723 0.7476
2035 43 0.3018 0.4200 0.6070 0.7945
2036 44 0.3169 0.4429 0.6422 0.8420
2037 45 0.3320 0.4659 0.6779 0.8903
2038 46 0.3471 0.4892 0.7140 0.9394
2039 47 0.3622 0.5126 0.7506 0.9892
2040 48 0.3773 0.5362 0.7876 1.0397
2041 49 0.3924 0.5599 0.8252 1.0910
Year Design Low Inter Low Inter High High 2042 50 0.4075 0.5839 0.8631 1.1430
2015 Life 0 0 0 0 2043 51 0.4226 0.6080 0.9016 1.1958
2035 Pump 0.3018 0.4200 0.6070 0.7945 2044 52 0.4377 0.6323 0.9405 1.2494
2065 Pump Stat 0.7546 1.1842 1.8643 2.5459 2045 53 0.4528 0.6568 0.9799 1.3036
2046 54 0.4679 0.6815 1.0197 1.3587
2047 55 0.4830 0.7063 1.0600 1.4144
2048 56 0.4981 0.7314 1.1007 1.4709
2049 57 0.5131 0.7566 1.1419 1.5282
2050 58 0.5282 0.7820 1.1836 1.5862
2051 59 0.5433 0.8075 1.2258 1.6450
2052 60 0.5584 0.8333 1.2684 1.7045
2053 61 0.5735 0.8592 1.3114 1.7647
2054 62 0.5886 0.8853 1.3550 1.8257
2055 63 0.6037 0.9116 1.3989 1.8875
2056 64 0.6188 0.9380 1.4434 1.9499
2057 65 0.6339 0.9647 1.4883 2.0132
2058 66 0.6490 0.9915 1.5337 2.0771
2059 67 0.6641 1.0185 1.5795 2.1419
2060 68 0.6792 1.0457 1.6258 2.2073
2061 69 0.6943 1.0730 1.6726 2.2736
2062 70 0.7093 1.1005 1.7198 2.3405
2063 71 0.7244 1.1283 1.7675 2.4082
2064 72 0.7395 1.1561 1.8157 2.4767
2065 73 0.7546 1.1842 1.8643 2.5459
2066 74 0.7697 1.2125 1.9133 2.6159
2067 75 0.7848 1.2409 1.9629 2.6866
2068 76 0.7999 1.2695 2.0129 2.7580
2069 77 0.8150 1.2983 2.0633 2.8302
2070 78 0.8301 1.3272 2.1143 2.9031
2071 79 0.8452 1.3564 2.1657 2.9768
2072 80 0.8603 1.3857 2.2175 3.0512
2073 81 0.8754 1.4152 2.2698 3.1264
2074 82 0.8905 1.4449 2.3226 3.2023
2075 83 0.9055 1.4748 2.3758 3.2790
2076 84 0.9206 1.5048 2.4295 3.3564
2077 85 0.9357 1.5350 2.4837 3.4346
2078 86 0.9508 1.5654 2.5383 3.5135
2079 87 0.9659 1.5960 2.5934 3.5931
2080 88 0.9810 1.6267 2.6489 3.6735
2081 89 0.9961 1.6577 2.7050 3.7547
2082 90 1.0112 1.6888 2.7614 3.8366
2083 91 1.0263 1.7201 2.8184 3.9192
2084 92 1.0414 1.7515 2.8758 4.0026
2085 93 1.0565 1.7832 2.9336 4.0867
2086 94 1.0716 1.8150 2.9919 4.1716
2087 95 1.0867 1.8470 3.0507 4.2572
2088 96 1.1018 1.8792 3.1100 4.3436
2089 97 1.1168 1.9116 3.1697 4.4307
2090 98 1.1319 1.9441 3.2299 4.5186
2091 99 1.1470 1.9769 3.2905 4.6072
2092 100 1.1621 2.0098 3.3516 4.6965
2093 101 1.1772 2.0428 3.4131 4.7866
2094 102 1.1923 2.0761 3.4752 4.8775
2095 103 1.2074 2.1095 3.5376 4.9691
2096 104 1.2225 2.1432 3.6006 5.0614
2097 105 1.2376 2.1770 3.6640 5.1545
2098 106 1.2527 2.2109 3.7279 5.2484
2099 107 1.2678 2.2451 3.7922 5.3429
2100 108 1.2829 2.2794 3.8570 5.4383
Constant Value, b
Figure 34. Stillwater Level Sea Level Rise Scenarios
Change in Sea Level Over Design Life
Ref: USACE ER 1110-2-8162, Incorporating Sea Level Change in Civil Works Projects





Pump Design Life = 20 Years






















































































































Rates of Sea Level Rise 











Storm Event/Storm Elevation, Feet NAVD (88)
Time 99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
Year SWL, Ft= 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
2015 0.00 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
2016 0.02 2.58 3.56 4.90 5.60 6.78 8.16
2017 0.03 2.59 3.57 4.91 5.61 6.79 8.17
2018 0.05 2.61 3.59 4.93 5.63 6.81 8.19
2019 0.06 2.62 3.60 4.94 5.64 6.82 8.20
2020 0.08 2.64 3.62 4.96 5.66 6.84 8.22
2021 0.09 2.65 3.63 4.97 5.67 6.85 8.23
2022 0.11 2.67 3.65 4.99 5.69 6.87 8.25
2023 0.12 2.68 3.66 5.00 5.70 6.88 8.26
2024 0.14 2.70 3.68 5.02 5.72 6.90 8.28
2025 0.15 2.71 3.69 5.03 5.73 6.91 8.29
2026 0.17 2.73 3.71 5.05 5.75 6.93 8.31
2027 0.18 2.74 3.72 5.06 5.76 6.94 8.32
2028 0.20 2.76 3.74 5.08 5.78 6.96 8.34
2029 0.21 2.77 3.75 5.09 5.79 6.97 8.35
2030 0.23 2.79 3.77 5.11 5.81 6.99 8.37
2031 0.24 2.80 3.78 5.12 5.82 7.00 8.38
2032 0.26 2.82 3.80 5.14 5.84 7.02 8.40
2033 0.27 2.83 3.81 5.15 5.85 7.03 8.41
2034 0.29 2.85 3.83 5.17 5.87 7.05 8.43
2035 0.30 2.86 3.84 5.18 5.88 7.06 8.44
2036 0.32 2.88 3.86 5.20 5.90 7.08 8.46
2037 0.33 2.89 3.87 5.21 5.91 7.09 8.47
2038 0.35 2.91 3.89 5.23 5.93 7.11 8.49
2039 0.36 2.92 3.90 5.24 5.94 7.12 8.50
2040 0.38 2.94 3.92 5.26 5.96 7.14 8.52
2041 0.39 2.95 3.93 5.27 5.97 7.15 8.53
2042 0.41 2.97 3.95 5.29 5.99 7.17 8.55
2043 0.42 2.98 3.96 5.30 6.00 7.18 8.56
2044 0.44 3.00 3.98 5.32 6.02 7.20 8.58
2045 0.45 3.01 3.99 5.33 6.03 7.21 8.59
2046 0.47 3.03 4.01 5.35 6.05 7.23 8.61
2047 0.48 3.04 4.02 5.36 6.06 7.24 8.62
2048 0.50 3.06 4.04 5.38 6.08 7.26 8.64
2049 0.51 3.07 4.05 5.39 6.09 7.27 8.65
2050 0.53 3.09 4.07 5.41 6.11 7.29 8.67
2051 0.54 3.10 4.08 5.42 6.12 7.30 8.68
2052 0.56 3.12 4.10 5.44 6.14 7.32 8.70
2053 0.57 3.13 4.11 5.45 6.15 7.33 8.71
2054 0.59 3.15 4.13 5.47 6.17 7.35 8.73
2055 0.60 3.16 4.14 5.48 6.18 7.36 8.74
2056 0.62 3.18 4.16 5.50 6.20 7.38 8.76
2057 0.63 3.19 4.17 5.51 6.21 7.39 8.77
2058 0.65 3.21 4.19 5.53 6.23 7.41 8.79
2059 0.66 3.22 4.20 5.54 6.24 7.42 8.80
2060 0.68 3.24 4.22 5.56 6.26 7.44 8.82
2061 0.69 3.25 4.23 5.57 6.27 7.45 8.83
2062 0.71 3.27 4.25 5.59 6.29 7.47 8.85
2063 0.72 3.28 4.26 5.60 6.30 7.48 8.86
2064 0.74 3.30 4.28 5.62 6.32 7.50 8.88
2065 0.75 3.31 4.29 5.63 6.33 7.51 8.89
2066 0.77 3.33 4.31 5.65 6.35 7.53 8.91
2067 0.78 3.34 4.32 5.66 6.36 7.54 8.92
2068 0.80 3.36 4.34 5.68 6.38 7.56 8.94
2069 0.81 3.37 4.35 5.69 6.39 7.57 8.95
2070 0.83 3.39 4.37 5.71 6.41 7.59 8.97
2071 0.85 3.41 4.39 5.73 6.43 7.61 8.99
2072 0.86 3.42 4.40 5.74 6.44 7.62 9.00
2073 0.88 3.44 4.42 5.76 6.46 7.64 9.02
2074 0.89 3.45 4.43 5.77 6.47 7.65 9.03
2075 0.91 3.47 4.45 5.79 6.49 7.67 9.05
2076 0.92 3.48 4.46 5.80 6.50 7.68 9.06
2077 0.94 3.50 4.48 5.82 6.52 7.70 9.08
2078 0.95 3.51 4.49 5.83 6.53 7.71 9.09
2079 0.97 3.53 4.51 5.85 6.55 7.73 9.11
2080 0.98 3.54 4.52 5.86 6.56 7.74 9.12
2081 1.00 3.56 4.54 5.88 6.58 7.76 9.14
2082 1.01 3.57 4.55 5.89 6.59 7.77 9.15
2083 1.03 3.59 4.57 5.91 6.61 7.79 9.17
2084 1.04 3.60 4.58 5.92 6.62 7.80 9.18
2085 1.06 3.62 4.60 5.94 6.64 7.82 9.20
2086 1.07 3.63 4.61 5.95 6.65 7.83 9.21
2087 1.09 3.65 4.63 5.97 6.67 7.85 9.23
2088 1.10 3.66 4.64 5.98 6.68 7.86 9.24
2089 1.12 3.68 4.66 6.00 6.70 7.88 9.26
2090 1.13 3.69 4.67 6.01 6.71 7.89 9.27
2091 1.15 3.71 4.69 6.03 6.73 7.91 9.29
2092 1.16 3.72 4.70 6.04 6.74 7.92 9.30
2093 1.18 3.74 4.72 6.06 6.76 7.94 9.32
2094 1.19 3.75 4.73 6.07 6.77 7.95 9.33
2095 1.21 3.77 4.75 6.09 6.79 7.97 9.35
2096 1.22 3.78 4.76 6.10 6.80 7.98 9.36
2097 1.24 3.80 4.78 6.12 6.82 8.00 9.38
2098 1.25 3.81 4.79 6.13 6.83 8.01 9.39
2099 1.27 3.83 4.81 6.15 6.85 8.03 9.41
2100 1.28 3.84 4.82 6.16 6.86 8.04 9.42












































































































































Storm Event, %/Feet, NAVD (88)
Time 99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
Year SWL, Ft= 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
2015 0.00 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
2016 0.02 2.58 3.56 4.90 5.60 6.78 8.16
2017 0.04 2.60 3.58 4.92 5.62 6.80 8.18
2018 0.06 2.62 3.60 4.94 5.64 6.82 8.20
2019 0.08 2.64 3.62 4.96 5.66 6.84 8.22
2020 0.10 2.66 3.64 4.98 5.68 6.86 8.24
2021 0.12 2.68 3.66 5.00 5.70 6.88 8.26
2022 0.14 2.70 3.68 5.02 5.72 6.90 8.28
2023 0.16 2.72 3.70 5.04 5.74 6.92 8.30
2024 0.18 2.74 3.72 5.06 5.76 6.94 8.32
2025 0.20 2.76 3.74 5.08 5.78 6.96 8.34
2026 0.22 2.78 3.76 5.10 5.80 6.98 8.36
2027 0.24 2.80 3.78 5.12 5.82 7.00 8.38
2028 0.26 2.82 3.80 5.14 5.84 7.02 8.40
2029 0.29 2.85 3.83 5.17 5.87 7.05 8.43
2030 0.31 2.87 3.85 5.19 5.89 7.07 8.45
2031 0.33 2.89 3.87 5.21 5.91 7.09 8.47
2032 0.35 2.91 3.89 5.23 5.93 7.11 8.49
2033 0.37 2.93 3.91 5.25 5.95 7.13 8.51
2034 0.40 2.96 3.94 5.28 5.98 7.16 8.54
2035 0.42 2.98 3.96 5.30 6.00 7.18 8.56
2036 0.44 3.00 3.98 5.32 6.02 7.20 8.58
2037 0.47 3.03 4.01 5.35 6.05 7.23 8.61
2038 0.49 3.05 4.03 5.37 6.07 7.25 8.63
2039 0.51 3.07 4.05 5.39 6.09 7.27 8.65
2040 0.54 3.10 4.08 5.42 6.12 7.30 8.68
2041 0.56 3.12 4.10 5.44 6.14 7.32 8.70
2042 0.58 3.14 4.12 5.46 6.16 7.34 8.72
2043 0.61 3.17 4.15 5.49 6.19 7.37 8.75
2044 0.63 3.19 4.17 5.51 6.21 7.39 8.77
2045 0.66 3.22 4.20 5.54 6.24 7.42 8.80
2046 0.68 3.24 4.22 5.56 6.26 7.44 8.82
2047 0.71 3.27 4.25 5.59 6.29 7.47 8.85
2048 0.73 3.29 4.27 5.61 6.31 7.49 8.87
2049 0.76 3.32 4.30 5.64 6.34 7.52 8.90
2050 0.78 3.34 4.32 5.66 6.36 7.54 8.92
2051 0.81 3.37 4.35 5.69 6.39 7.57 8.95
2052 0.83 3.39 4.37 5.71 6.41 7.59 8.97
2053 0.86 3.42 4.40 5.74 6.44 7.62 9.00
2054 0.89 3.45 4.43 5.77 6.47 7.65 9.03
2055 0.91 3.47 4.45 5.79 6.49 7.67 9.05
2056 0.94 3.50 4.48 5.82 6.52 7.70 9.08
2057 0.96 3.52 4.50 5.84 6.54 7.72 9.10
2058 0.99 3.55 4.53 5.87 6.57 7.75 9.13
2059 1.02 3.58 4.56 5.90 6.60 7.78 9.16
2060 1.05 3.61 4.59 5.93 6.63 7.81 9.19
2061 1.07 3.63 4.61 5.95 6.65 7.83 9.21
2062 1.10 3.66 4.64 5.98 6.68 7.86 9.24
2063 1.13 3.69 4.67 6.01 6.71 7.89 9.27
2064 1.16 3.72 4.70 6.04 6.74 7.92 9.30
2065 1.18 3.74 4.72 6.06 6.76 7.94 9.32
2066 1.21 3.77 4.75 6.09 6.79 7.97 9.35
2067 1.24 3.80 4.78 6.12 6.82 8.00 9.38
2068 1.27 3.83 4.81 6.15 6.85 8.03 9.41
2069 1.30 3.86 4.84 6.18 6.88 8.06 9.44
2070 1.33 3.89 4.87 6.21 6.91 8.09 9.47
2071 1.36 3.92 4.90 6.24 6.94 8.12 9.50
2072 1.39 3.95 4.93 6.27 6.97 8.15 9.53
2073 1.42 3.98 4.96 6.30 7.00 8.18 9.56
2074 1.44 4.00 4.98 6.32 7.02 8.20 9.58
2075 1.47 4.03 5.01 6.35 7.05 8.23 9.61
2076 1.50 4.06 5.04 6.38 7.08 8.26 9.64
2077 1.54 4.10 5.08 6.42 7.12 8.30 9.68
2078 1.57 4.13 5.11 6.45 7.15 8.33 9.71
2079 1.60 4.16 5.14 6.48 7.18 8.36 9.74
2080 1.63 4.19 5.17 6.51 7.21 8.39 9.77
2081 1.66 4.22 5.20 6.54 7.24 8.42 9.80
2082 1.69 4.25 5.23 6.57 7.27 8.45 9.83
2083 1.72 4.28 5.26 6.60 7.30 8.48 9.86
2084 1.75 4.31 5.29 6.63 7.33 8.51 9.89
2085 1.78 4.34 5.32 6.66 7.36 8.54 9.92
2086 1.82 4.38 5.36 6.70 7.40 8.58 9.96
2087 1.85 4.41 5.39 6.73 7.43 8.61 9.99
2088 1.88 4.44 5.42 6.76 7.46 8.64 10.02
2089 1.91 4.47 5.45 6.79 7.49 8.67 10.05
2090 1.94 4.50 5.48 6.82 7.52 8.70 10.08
2091 1.98 4.54 5.52 6.86 7.56 8.74 10.12
2092 2.01 4.57 5.55 6.89 7.59 8.77 10.15
2093 2.04 4.60 5.58 6.92 7.62 8.80 10.18
2094 2.08 4.64 5.62 6.96 7.66 8.84 10.22
2095 2.11 4.67 5.65 6.99 7.69 8.87 10.25
2096 2.14 4.70 5.68 7.02 7.72 8.90 10.28
2097 2.18 4.74 5.72 7.06 7.76 8.94 10.32
2098 2.21 4.77 5.75 7.09 7.79 8.97 10.35
2099 2.25 4.81 5.79 7.13 7.83 9.01 10.39
2100 2.28 4.84 5.82 7.16 7.86 9.04 10.42














































































































































Time 99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
Year SWL, Ft= 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
2015 0.00 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
2016 0.03 2.59 3.57 4.91 5.61 6.79 8.17
2017 0.05 2.61 3.59 4.93 5.63 6.81 8.19
2018 0.08 2.64 3.62 4.96 5.66 6.84 8.22
2019 0.11 2.67 3.65 4.99 5.69 6.87 8.25
2020 0.13 2.69 3.67 5.01 5.71 6.89 8.27
2021 0.16 2.72 3.70 5.04 5.74 6.92 8.30
2022 0.19 2.75 3.73 5.07 5.77 6.95 8.33
2023 0.22 2.78 3.76 5.10 5.80 6.98 8.36
2024 0.25 2.81 3.79 5.13 5.83 7.01 8.39
2025 0.28 2.84 3.82 5.16 5.86 7.04 8.42
2026 0.31 2.87 3.85 5.19 5.89 7.07 8.45
2027 0.34 2.90 3.88 5.22 5.92 7.10 8.48
2028 0.37 2.93 3.91 5.25 5.95 7.13 8.51
2029 0.41 2.97 3.95 5.29 5.99 7.17 8.55
2030 0.44 3.00 3.98 5.32 6.02 7.20 8.58
2031 0.47 3.03 4.01 5.35 6.05 7.23 8.61
2032 0.50 3.06 4.04 5.38 6.08 7.26 8.64
2033 0.54 3.10 4.08 5.42 6.12 7.30 8.68
2034 0.57 3.13 4.11 5.45 6.15 7.33 8.71
2035 0.61 3.17 4.15 5.49 6.19 7.37 8.75
2036 0.64 3.20 4.18 5.52 6.22 7.40 8.78
2037 0.68 3.24 4.22 5.56 6.26 7.44 8.82
2038 0.71 3.27 4.25 5.59 6.29 7.47 8.85
2039 0.75 3.31 4.29 5.63 6.33 7.51 8.89
2040 0.79 3.35 4.33 5.67 6.37 7.55 8.93
2041 0.83 3.39 4.37 5.71 6.41 7.59 8.97
2042 0.86 3.42 4.40 5.74 6.44 7.62 9.00
2043 0.90 3.46 4.44 5.78 6.48 7.66 9.04
2044 0.94 3.50 4.48 5.82 6.52 7.70 9.08
2045 0.98 3.54 4.52 5.86 6.56 7.74 9.12
2046 1.02 3.58 4.56 5.90 6.60 7.78 9.16
2047 1.06 3.62 4.60 5.94 6.64 7.82 9.20
2048 1.10 3.66 4.64 5.98 6.68 7.86 9.24
2049 1.14 3.70 4.68 6.02 6.72 7.90 9.28
2050 1.18 3.74 4.72 6.06 6.76 7.94 9.32
2051 1.23 3.79 4.77 6.11 6.81 7.99 9.37
2052 1.27 3.83 4.81 6.15 6.85 8.03 9.41
2053 1.31 3.87 4.85 6.19 6.89 8.07 9.45
2054 1.35 3.91 4.89 6.23 6.93 8.11 9.49
2055 1.40 3.96 4.94 6.28 6.98 8.16 9.54
2056 1.44 4.00 4.98 6.32 7.02 8.20 9.58
2057 1.49 4.05 5.03 6.37 7.07 8.25 9.63
2058 1.53 4.09 5.07 6.41 7.11 8.29 9.67
2059 1.58 4.14 5.12 6.46 7.16 8.34 9.72
2060 1.63 4.19 5.17 6.51 7.21 8.39 9.77
2061 1.67 4.23 5.21 6.55 7.25 8.43 9.81
2062 1.72 4.28 5.26 6.60 7.30 8.48 9.86
2063 1.77 4.33 5.31 6.65 7.35 8.53 9.91
2064 1.82 4.38 5.36 6.70 7.40 8.58 9.96
2065 1.86 4.42 5.40 6.74 7.44 8.62 10.00
2066 1.91 4.47 5.45 6.79 7.49 8.67 10.05
2067 1.96 4.52 5.50 6.84 7.54 8.72 10.10
2068 2.01 4.57 5.55 6.89 7.59 8.77 10.15
2069 2.06 4.62 5.60 6.94 7.64 8.82 10.20
2070 2.11 4.67 5.65 6.99 7.69 8.87 10.25
2071 2.17 4.73 5.71 7.05 7.75 8.93 10.31
2072 2.22 4.78 5.76 7.10 7.80 8.98 10.36
2073 2.27 4.83 5.81 7.15 7.85 9.03 10.41
2074 2.32 4.88 5.86 7.20 7.90 9.08 10.46
2075 2.38 4.94 5.92 7.26 7.96 9.14 10.52
2076 2.43 4.99 5.97 7.31 8.01 9.19 10.57
2077 2.48 5.04 6.02 7.36 8.06 9.24 10.62
2078 2.54 5.10 6.08 7.42 8.12 9.30 10.68
2079 2.59 5.15 6.13 7.47 8.17 9.35 10.73
2080 2.65 5.21 6.19 7.53 8.23 9.41 10.79
2081 2.70 5.26 6.24 7.58 8.28 9.46 10.84
2082 2.76 5.32 6.30 7.64 8.34 9.52 10.90
2083 2.82 5.38 6.36 7.70 8.40 9.58 10.96
2084 2.88 5.44 6.42 7.76 8.46 9.64 11.02
2085 2.93 5.49 6.47 7.81 8.51 9.69 11.07
2086 2.99 5.55 6.53 7.87 8.57 9.75 11.13
2087 3.05 5.61 6.59 7.93 8.63 9.81 11.19
2088 3.11 5.67 6.65 7.99 8.69 9.87 11.25
2089 3.17 5.73 6.71 8.05 8.75 9.93 11.31
2090 3.23 5.79 6.77 8.11 8.81 9.99 11.37
2091 3.29 5.85 6.83 8.17 8.87 10.05 11.43
2092 3.35 5.91 6.89 8.23 8.93 10.11 11.49
2093 3.41 5.97 6.95 8.29 8.99 10.17 11.55
2094 3.48 6.04 7.02 8.36 9.06 10.24 11.62
2095 3.54 6.10 7.08 8.42 9.12 10.30 11.68
2096 3.60 6.16 7.14 8.48 9.18 10.36 11.74
2097 3.66 6.22 7.20 8.54 9.24 10.42 11.80
2098 3.73 6.29 7.27 8.61 9.31 10.49 11.87
2099 3.79 6.35 7.33 8.67 9.37 10.55 11.93















































































































































Storm Event/Storm Elevation Feet, NAVD (88)
Time 99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
Year SWL, Ft= 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.48 6.76 8.14
2015 0.00 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.48 6.76 8.14
2016 0.03 2.59 3.57 4.91 5.51 6.79 8.17
2017 0.07 2.63 3.61 4.95 5.55 6.83 8.21
2018 0.10 2.66 3.64 4.98 5.58 6.86 8.24
2019 0.14 2.70 3.68 5.02 5.62 6.90 8.28
2020 0.17 2.73 3.71 5.05 5.65 6.93 8.31
2021 0.21 2.77 3.75 5.09 5.69 6.97 8.35
2022 0.24 2.80 3.78 5.12 5.72 7.00 8.38
2023 0.28 2.84 3.82 5.16 5.76 7.04 8.42
2024 0.32 2.88 3.86 5.20 5.80 7.08 8.46
2025 0.36 2.92 3.90 5.24 5.84 7.12 8.50
2026 0.40 2.96 3.94 5.28 5.88 7.16 8.54
2027 0.44 3.00 3.98 5.32 5.92 7.20 8.58
2028 0.48 3.04 4.02 5.36 5.96 7.24 8.62
2029 0.52 3.08 4.06 5.40 6.00 7.28 8.66
2030 0.57 3.13 4.11 5.45 6.05 7.33 8.71
2031 0.61 3.17 4.15 5.49 6.09 7.37 8.75
2032 0.66 3.22 4.20 5.54 6.14 7.42 8.80
2033 0.70 3.26 4.24 5.58 6.18 7.46 8.84
2034 0.75 3.31 4.29 5.63 6.23 7.51 8.89
2035 0.79 3.35 4.33 5.67 6.27 7.55 8.93
2036 0.84 3.40 4.38 5.72 6.32 7.60 8.98
2037 0.89 3.45 4.43 5.77 6.37 7.65 9.03
2038 0.94 3.50 4.48 5.82 6.42 7.70 9.08
2039 0.99 3.55 4.53 5.87 6.47 7.75 9.13
2040 1.04 3.60 4.58 5.92 6.52 7.80 9.18
2041 1.09 3.65 4.63 5.97 6.57 7.85 9.23
2042 1.14 3.70 4.68 6.02 6.62 7.90 9.28
2043 1.20 3.76 4.74 6.08 6.68 7.96 9.34
2044 1.25 3.81 4.79 6.13 6.73 8.01 9.39
2045 1.30 3.86 4.84 6.18 6.78 8.06 9.44
2046 1.36 3.92 4.90 6.24 6.84 8.12 9.50
2047 1.41 3.97 4.95 6.29 6.89 8.17 9.55
2048 1.47 4.03 5.01 6.35 6.95 8.23 9.61
2049 1.53 4.09 5.07 6.41 7.01 8.29 9.67
2050 1.59 4.15 5.13 6.47 7.07 8.35 9.73
2051 1.64 4.20 5.18 6.52 7.12 8.40 9.78
2052 1.70 4.26 5.24 6.58 7.18 8.46 9.84
2053 1.76 4.32 5.30 6.64 7.24 8.52 9.90
2054 1.83 4.39 5.37 6.71 7.31 8.59 9.97
2055 1.89 4.45 5.43 6.77 7.37 8.65 10.03
2056 1.95 4.51 5.49 6.83 7.43 8.71 10.09
2057 2.01 4.57 5.55 6.89 7.49 8.77 10.15
2058 2.08 4.64 5.62 6.96 7.56 8.84 10.22
2059 2.14 4.70 5.68 7.02 7.62 8.90 10.28
2060 2.21 4.77 5.75 7.09 7.69 8.97 10.35
2061 2.27 4.83 5.81 7.15 7.75 9.03 10.41
2062 2.34 4.90 5.88 7.22 7.82 9.10 10.48
2063 2.41 4.97 5.95 7.29 7.89 9.17 10.55
2064 2.48 5.04 6.02 7.36 7.96 9.24 10.62
2065 2.55 5.11 6.09 7.43 8.03 9.31 10.69
2066 2.62 5.18 6.16 7.50 8.10 9.38 10.76
2067 2.69 5.25 6.23 7.57 8.17 9.45 10.83
2068 2.76 5.32 6.30 7.64 8.24 9.52 10.90
2069 2.83 5.39 6.37 7.71 8.31 9.59 10.97
2070 2.90 5.46 6.44 7.78 8.38 9.66 11.04
2071 2.98 5.54 6.52 7.86 8.46 9.74 11.12
2072 3.05 5.61 6.59 7.93 8.53 9.81 11.19
2073 3.13 5.69 6.67 8.01 8.61 9.89 11.27
2074 3.20 5.76 6.74 8.08 8.68 9.96 11.34
2075 3.28 5.84 6.82 8.16 8.76 10.04 11.42
2076 3.36 5.92 6.90 8.24 8.84 10.12 11.50
2077 3.43 5.99 6.97 8.31 8.91 10.19 11.57
2078 3.51 6.07 7.05 8.39 8.99 10.27 11.65
2079 3.59 6.15 7.13 8.47 9.07 10.35 11.73
2080 3.67 6.23 7.21 8.55 9.15 10.43 11.81
2081 3.75 6.31 7.29 8.63 9.23 10.51 11.89
2082 3.84 6.40 7.38 8.72 9.32 10.60 11.98
2083 3.92 6.48 7.46 8.80 9.40 10.68 12.06
2084 4.00 6.56 7.54 8.88 9.48 10.76 12.14
2085 4.09 6.65 7.63 8.97 9.57 10.85 12.23
2086 4.17 6.73 7.71 9.05 9.65 10.93 12.31
2087 4.26 6.82 7.80 9.14 9.74 11.02 12.40
2088 4.34 6.90 7.88 9.22 9.82 11.10 12.48
2089 4.43 6.99 7.97 9.31 9.91 11.19 12.57
2090 4.52 7.08 8.06 9.40 10.00 11.28 12.66
2091 4.61 7.17 8.15 9.49 10.09 11.37 12.75
2092 4.70 7.26 8.24 9.58 10.18 11.46 12.84
2093 4.79 7.35 8.33 9.67 10.27 11.55 12.93
2094 4.88 7.44 8.42 9.76 10.36 11.64 13.02
2095 4.97 7.53 8.51 9.85 10.45 11.73 13.11
2096 5.06 7.62 8.60 9.94 10.54 11.82 13.20
2097 5.15 7.71 8.69 10.03 10.63 11.91 13.29
2098 5.25 7.81 8.79 10.13 10.73 12.01 13.39
2099 5.34 7.90 8.88 10.22 10.82 12.10 13.48
2100 5.44 8.00 8.98 10.32 10.92 12.20 13.58
















































































































































99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
SWL, Ft= 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
WSU, Ft= 0.00 0.20 0.65 0.91 1.30 1.75
2015 0.00 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2016 0.02 2.58 3.76 5.55 6.51 8.08 9.91
2017 0.03 2.59 3.77 5.56 6.52 8.09 9.92
2018 0.05 2.61 3.79 5.58 6.54 8.11 9.94
2019 0.06 2.62 3.80 5.59 6.55 8.12 9.95
2020 0.08 2.64 3.82 5.61 6.57 8.14 9.97
2021 0.09 2.65 3.83 5.62 6.58 8.15 9.98
2022 0.11 2.67 3.85 5.64 6.60 8.17 10.00
2023 0.12 2.68 3.86 5.65 6.61 8.18 10.01
2024 0.14 2.70 3.88 5.67 6.63 8.20 10.03
2025 0.15 2.71 3.89 5.68 6.64 8.21 10.04
2026 0.17 2.73 3.91 5.70 6.66 8.23 10.06
2027 0.18 2.74 3.92 5.71 6.67 8.24 10.07
2028 0.20 2.76 3.94 5.73 6.69 8.26 10.09
2029 0.21 2.77 3.95 5.74 6.70 8.27 10.10
2030 0.23 2.79 3.97 5.76 6.72 8.29 10.12
2031 0.24 2.80 3.98 5.77 6.73 8.30 10.13
2032 0.26 2.82 4.00 5.79 6.75 8.32 10.15
2033 0.27 2.83 4.01 5.80 6.76 8.33 10.16
2034 0.29 2.85 4.03 5.82 6.78 8.35 10.18
2035 0.30 2.86 4.04 5.83 6.79 8.36 10.19
2036 0.32 2.88 4.06 5.85 6.81 8.38 10.21
2037 0.33 2.89 4.07 5.86 6.82 8.39 10.22 Year 99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
2038 0.35 2.91 4.09 5.88 6.84 8.41 10.24 2015 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2039 0.36 2.92 4.10 5.89 6.85 8.42 10.25 2025 L 2.71 3.89 5.68 6.64 8.21 10.04
2040 0.38 2.94 4.12 5.91 6.87 8.44 10.27 2035 L 2.86 4.04 5.83 6.79 8.36 10.19
2041 0.39 2.95 4.13 5.92 6.88 8.45 10.28 2045 L 3.01 4.19 5.98 6.94 8.51 10.34
2042 0.41 2.97 4.15 5.94 6.90 8.47 10.30 2055 L 3.16 4.34 6.13 7.09 8.66 10.49
2043 0.42 2.98 4.16 5.95 6.91 8.48 10.31 2065 L 3.31 4.49 6.28 7.24 8.81 10.64
2044 0.44 3.00 4.18 5.97 6.93 8.50 10.33
2045 0.45 3.01 4.19 5.98 6.94 8.51 10.34
2046 0.47 3.03 4.21 6.00 6.96 8.53 10.36
2047 0.48 3.04 4.22 6.01 6.97 8.54 10.37
2048 0.50 3.06 4.24 6.03 6.99 8.56 10.39
2049 0.51 3.07 4.25 6.04 7.00 8.57 10.40
2050 0.53 3.09 4.27 6.06 7.02 8.59 10.42
2051 0.54 3.10 4.28 6.07 7.03 8.60 10.43
2052 0.56 3.12 4.30 6.09 7.05 8.62 10.45
2053 0.57 3.13 4.31 6.10 7.06 8.63 10.46
2054 0.59 3.15 4.33 6.12 7.08 8.65 10.48
2055 0.60 3.16 4.34 6.13 7.09 8.66 10.49
2056 0.62 3.18 4.36 6.15 7.11 8.68 10.51
2057 0.63 3.19 4.37 6.16 7.12 8.69 10.52
2058 0.65 3.21 4.39 6.18 7.14 8.71 10.54
2059 0.66 3.22 4.40 6.19 7.15 8.72 10.55
2060 0.68 3.24 4.42 6.21 7.17 8.74 10.57
2061 0.69 3.25 4.43 6.22 7.18 8.75 10.58
2062 0.71 3.27 4.45 6.24 7.20 8.77 10.60
2063 0.72 3.28 4.46 6.25 7.21 8.78 10.61
2064 0.74 3.30 4.48 6.27 7.23 8.80 10.63
2065 0.75 3.31 4.49 6.28 7.24 8.81 10.64
2066 0.77 3.33 4.51 6.30 7.26 8.83 10.66
2067 0.78 3.34 4.52 6.31 7.27 8.84 10.67
2068 0.80 3.36 4.54 6.33 7.29 8.86 10.69
2069 0.81 3.37 4.55 6.34 7.30 8.87 10.70
2070 0.83 3.39 4.57 6.36 7.32 8.89 10.72
2071 0.85 3.41 4.59 6.38 7.34 8.91 10.74
2072 0.86 3.42 4.60 6.39 7.35 8.92 10.75
2073 0.88 3.44 4.62 6.41 7.37 8.94 10.77
2074 0.89 3.45 4.63 6.42 7.38 8.95 10.78
2075 0.91 3.47 4.65 6.44 7.40 8.97 10.80
2076 0.92 3.48 4.66 6.45 7.41 8.98 10.81
2077 0.94 3.50 4.68 6.47 7.43 9.00 10.83
2078 0.95 3.51 4.69 6.48 7.44 9.01 10.84
2079 0.97 3.53 4.71 6.50 7.46 9.03 10.86
2080 0.98 3.54 4.72 6.51 7.47 9.04 10.87
2081 1.00 3.56 4.74 6.53 7.49 9.06 10.89
2082 1.01 3.57 4.75 6.54 7.50 9.07 10.90
2083 1.03 3.59 4.77 6.56 7.52 9.09 10.92
2084 1.04 3.60 4.78 6.57 7.53 9.10 10.93
2085 1.06 3.62 4.80 6.59 7.55 9.12 10.95
2086 1.07 3.63 4.81 6.60 7.56 9.13 10.96
2087 1.09 3.65 4.83 6.62 7.58 9.15 10.98
2088 1.10 3.66 4.84 6.63 7.59 9.16 10.99
2089 1.12 3.68 4.86 6.65 7.61 9.18 11.01
2090 1.13 3.69 4.87 6.66 7.62 9.19 11.02
2091 1.15 3.71 4.89 6.68 7.64 9.21 11.04
2092 1.16 3.72 4.90 6.69 7.65 9.22 11.05
2093 1.18 3.74 4.92 6.71 7.67 9.24 11.07
2094 1.19 3.75 4.93 6.72 7.68 9.25 11.08
2095 1.21 3.77 4.95 6.74 7.70 9.27 11.10
2096 1.22 3.78 4.96 6.75 7.71 9.28 11.11
2097 1.24 3.80 4.98 6.77 7.73 9.30 11.13
2098 1.25 3.81 4.99 6.78 7.74 9.31 11.14
2099 1.27 3.83 5.01 6.80 7.76 9.33 11.16
2100 1.28 3.84 5.02 6.81 7.77 9.34 11.17
Flood Requency Events for Event Tree Analysis, Ft. NAVD (88) 





















































































































































99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
SWL,	Ft= 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
WSU,	Ft= 0.00 0.20 0.65 0.91 1.30 1.75
2015 0.00 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2016 0.02 2.58 3.76 5.55 6.51 8.08 9.91
2017 0.04 2.60 3.78 5.57 6.53 8.10 9.93
2018 0.06 2.62 3.80 5.59 6.55 8.12 9.95
2019 0.08 2.64 3.82 5.61 6.57 8.14 9.97
2020 0.10 2.66 3.84 5.63 6.59 8.16 9.99
2021 0.12 2.68 3.86 5.65 6.61 8.18 10.01
2022 0.14 2.70 3.88 5.67 6.63 8.20 10.03
2023 0.16 2.72 3.90 5.69 6.65 8.22 10.05
2024 0.18 2.74 3.92 5.71 6.67 8.24 10.07
2025 0.20 2.76 3.94 5.73 6.69 8.26 10.09
2026 0.22 2.78 3.96 5.75 6.71 8.28 10.11
2027 0.24 2.80 3.98 5.77 6.73 8.30 10.13
2028 0.26 2.82 4.00 5.79 6.75 8.32 10.15
2029 0.29 2.85 4.03 5.82 6.78 8.35 10.18
2030 0.31 2.87 4.05 5.84 6.80 8.37 10.20
2031 0.33 2.89 4.07 5.86 6.82 8.39 10.22
2032 0.35 2.91 4.09 5.88 6.84 8.41 10.24
2033 0.37 2.93 4.11 5.90 6.86 8.43 10.26
2034 0.40 2.96 4.14 5.93 6.89 8.46 10.29
2035 0.42 2.98 4.16 5.95 6.91 8.48 10.31
2036 0.44 3.00 4.18 5.97 6.93 8.50 10.33
2037 0.47 3.03 4.21 6.00 6.96 8.53 10.36 Year 99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
2038 0.49 3.05 4.23 6.02 6.98 8.55 10.38 2015 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2039 0.51 3.07 4.25 6.04 7.00 8.57 10.40 2025	IL 2.76 3.94 5.73 6.69 8.26 10.09
2040 0.54 3.10 4.28 6.07 7.03 8.60 10.43 2035	IL 2.98 4.16 5.95 6.91 8.48 10.31
2041 0.56 3.12 4.30 6.09 7.05 8.62 10.45 2045	IL 3.22 4.40 6.19 7.15 8.72 10.55
2042 0.58 3.14 4.32 6.11 7.07 8.64 10.47 2055	IL 3.47 4.65 6.44 7.40 8.97 10.80
2043 0.61 3.17 4.35 6.14 7.10 8.67 10.50 2065	IL 3.74 4.92 6.71 7.67 9.24 11.07
2044 0.63 3.19 4.37 6.16 7.12 8.69 10.52
2045 0.66 3.22 4.40 6.19 7.15 8.72 10.55
2046 0.68 3.24 4.42 6.21 7.17 8.74 10.57
2047 0.71 3.27 4.45 6.24 7.20 8.77 10.60
2048 0.73 3.29 4.47 6.26 7.22 8.79 10.62
2049 0.76 3.32 4.50 6.29 7.25 8.82 10.65
2050 0.78 3.34 4.52 6.31 7.27 8.84 10.67
2051 0.81 3.37 4.55 6.34 7.30 8.87 10.70
2052 0.83 3.39 4.57 6.36 7.32 8.89 10.72
2053 0.86 3.42 4.60 6.39 7.35 8.92 10.75
2054 0.89 3.45 4.63 6.42 7.38 8.95 10.78
2055 0.91 3.47 4.65 6.44 7.40 8.97 10.80
2056 0.94 3.50 4.68 6.47 7.43 9.00 10.83
2057 0.96 3.52 4.70 6.49 7.45 9.02 10.85
2058 0.99 3.55 4.73 6.52 7.48 9.05 10.88
2059 1.02 3.58 4.76 6.55 7.51 9.08 10.91
2060 1.05 3.61 4.79 6.58 7.54 9.11 10.94
2061 1.07 3.63 4.81 6.60 7.56 9.13 10.96
2062 1.10 3.66 4.84 6.63 7.59 9.16 10.99
2063 1.13 3.69 4.87 6.66 7.62 9.19 11.02
2064 1.16 3.72 4.90 6.69 7.65 9.22 11.05
2065 1.18 3.74 4.92 6.71 7.67 9.24 11.07
2066 1.21 3.77 4.95 6.74 7.70 9.27 11.10
2067 1.24 3.80 4.98 6.77 7.73 9.30 11.13
2068 1.27 3.83 5.01 6.80 7.76 9.33 11.16
2069 1.30 3.86 5.04 6.83 7.79 9.36 11.19
2070 1.33 3.89 5.07 6.86 7.82 9.39 11.22
2071 1.36 3.92 5.10 6.89 7.85 9.42 11.25
2072 1.39 3.95 5.13 6.92 7.88 9.45 11.28
2073 1.42 3.98 5.16 6.95 7.91 9.48 11.31
2074 1.44 4.00 5.18 6.97 7.93 9.50 11.33
2075 1.47 4.03 5.21 7.00 7.96 9.53 11.36
2076 1.50 4.06 5.24 7.03 7.99 9.56 11.39
2077 1.54 4.10 5.28 7.07 8.03 9.60 11.43
2078 1.57 4.13 5.31 7.10 8.06 9.63 11.46
2079 1.60 4.16 5.34 7.13 8.09 9.66 11.49
2080 1.63 4.19 5.37 7.16 8.12 9.69 11.52
2081 1.66 4.22 5.40 7.19 8.15 9.72 11.55
2082 1.69 4.25 5.43 7.22 8.18 9.75 11.58
2083 1.72 4.28 5.46 7.25 8.21 9.78 11.61
2084 1.75 4.31 5.49 7.28 8.24 9.81 11.64
2085 1.78 4.34 5.52 7.31 8.27 9.84 11.67
2086 1.82 4.38 5.56 7.35 8.31 9.88 11.71
2087 1.85 4.41 5.59 7.38 8.34 9.91 11.74
2088 1.88 4.44 5.62 7.41 8.37 9.94 11.77
2089 1.91 4.47 5.65 7.44 8.40 9.97 11.80
2090 1.94 4.50 5.68 7.47 8.43 10.00 11.83
2091 1.98 4.54 5.72 7.51 8.47 10.04 11.87
2092 2.01 4.57 5.75 7.54 8.50 10.07 11.90
2093 2.04 4.60 5.78 7.57 8.53 10.10 11.93
2094 2.08 4.64 5.82 7.61 8.57 10.14 11.97
2095 2.11 4.67 5.85 7.64 8.60 10.17 12.00
2096 2.14 4.70 5.88 7.67 8.63 10.20 12.03
2097 2.18 4.74 5.92 7.71 8.67 10.24 12.07
2098 2.21 4.77 5.95 7.74 8.70 10.27 12.10
2099 2.25 4.81 5.99 7.78 8.74 10.31 12.14





































































































































Intermediate-Low SLR Scenario  













99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
SWL, Ft= 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
WSU, Ft= 0.00 0.20 0.65 0.91 1.30 1.75
2015 0.00 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2016 0.03 2.59 3.77 5.56 6.52 8.09 9.92
2017 0.05 2.61 3.79 5.58 6.54 8.11 9.94
2018 0.08 2.64 3.82 5.61 6.57 8.14 9.97
2019 0.11 2.67 3.85 5.64 6.60 8.17 10.00
2020 0.13 2.69 3.87 5.66 6.62 8.19 10.02
2021 0.16 2.72 3.90 5.69 6.65 8.22 10.05
2022 0.19 2.75 3.93 5.72 6.68 8.25 10.08
2023 0.22 2.78 3.96 5.75 6.71 8.28 10.11
2024 0.25 2.81 3.99 5.78 6.74 8.31 10.14
2025 0.28 2.84 4.02 5.81 6.77 8.34 10.17
2026 0.31 2.87 4.05 5.84 6.80 8.37 10.20
2027 0.34 2.90 4.08 5.87 6.83 8.40 10.23
2028 0.37 2.93 4.11 5.90 6.86 8.43 10.26
2029 0.41 2.97 4.15 5.94 6.90 8.47 10.30
2030 0.44 3.00 4.18 5.97 6.93 8.50 10.33
2031 0.47 3.03 4.21 6.00 6.96 8.53 10.36
2032 0.50 3.06 4.24 6.03 6.99 8.56 10.39
2033 0.54 3.10 4.28 6.07 7.03 8.60 10.43
2034 0.57 3.13 4.31 6.10 7.06 8.63 10.46
2035 0.61 3.17 4.35 6.14 7.10 8.67 10.50
2036 0.64 3.20 4.38 6.17 7.13 8.70 10.53
2037 0.68 3.24 4.42 6.21 7.17 8.74 10.57 Year 99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
2038 0.71 3.27 4.45 6.24 7.20 8.77 10.60 2015 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2039 0.75 3.31 4.49 6.28 7.24 8.81 10.64 2025 IH 2.84 4.02 5.81 6.77 8.34 10.17
2040 0.79 3.35 4.53 6.32 7.28 8.85 10.68 2035 IH 3.17 4.35 6.14 7.10 8.67 10.50
2041 0.83 3.39 4.57 6.36 7.32 8.89 10.72 2045 IH 3.54 4.72 6.51 7.47 9.04 10.87
2042 0.86 3.42 4.60 6.39 7.35 8.92 10.75 2055 IH 3.96 5.14 6.93 7.89 9.46 11.29
2043 0.90 3.46 4.64 6.43 7.39 8.96 10.79 2065 IH 4.42 5.60 7.39 8.35 9.92 11.75
2044 0.94 3.50 4.68 6.47 7.43 9.00 10.83
2045 0.98 3.54 4.72 6.51 7.47 9.04 10.87
2046 1.02 3.58 4.76 6.55 7.51 9.08 10.91
2047 1.06 3.62 4.80 6.59 7.55 9.12 10.95
2048 1.10 3.66 4.84 6.63 7.59 9.16 10.99
2049 1.14 3.70 4.88 6.67 7.63 9.20 11.03
2050 1.18 3.74 4.92 6.71 7.67 9.24 11.07
2051 1.23 3.79 4.97 6.76 7.72 9.29 11.12
2052 1.27 3.83 5.01 6.80 7.76 9.33 11.16
2053 1.31 3.87 5.05 6.84 7.80 9.37 11.20
2054 1.35 3.91 5.09 6.88 7.84 9.41 11.24
2055 1.40 3.96 5.14 6.93 7.89 9.46 11.29
2056 1.44 4.00 5.18 6.97 7.93 9.50 11.33
2057 1.49 4.05 5.23 7.02 7.98 9.55 11.38
2058 1.53 4.09 5.27 7.06 8.02 9.59 11.42
2059 1.58 4.14 5.32 7.11 8.07 9.64 11.47
2060 1.63 4.19 5.37 7.16 8.12 9.69 11.52
2061 1.67 4.23 5.41 7.20 8.16 9.73 11.56
2062 1.72 4.28 5.46 7.25 8.21 9.78 11.61
2063 1.77 4.33 5.51 7.30 8.26 9.83 11.66
2064 1.82 4.38 5.56 7.35 8.31 9.88 11.71
2065 1.86 4.42 5.60 7.39 8.35 9.92 11.75
2066 1.91 4.47 5.65 7.44 8.40 9.97 11.80
2067 1.96 4.52 5.70 7.49 8.45 10.02 11.85
2068 2.01 4.57 5.75 7.54 8.50 10.07 11.90
2069 2.06 4.62 5.80 7.59 8.55 10.12 11.95
2070 2.11 4.67 5.85 7.64 8.60 10.17 12.00
2071 2.17 4.73 5.91 7.70 8.66 10.23 12.06
2072 2.22 4.78 5.96 7.75 8.71 10.28 12.11
2073 2.27 4.83 6.01 7.80 8.76 10.33 12.16
2074 2.32 4.88 6.06 7.85 8.81 10.38 12.21
2075 2.38 4.94 6.12 7.91 8.87 10.44 12.27
2076 2.43 4.99 6.17 7.96 8.92 10.49 12.32
2077 2.48 5.04 6.22 8.01 8.97 10.54 12.37
2078 2.54 5.10 6.28 8.07 9.03 10.60 12.43
2079 2.59 5.15 6.33 8.12 9.08 10.65 12.48
2080 2.65 5.21 6.39 8.18 9.14 10.71 12.54
2081 2.70 5.26 6.44 8.23 9.19 10.76 12.59
2082 2.76 5.32 6.50 8.29 9.25 10.82 12.65
2083 2.82 5.38 6.56 8.35 9.31 10.88 12.71
2084 2.88 5.44 6.62 8.41 9.37 10.94 12.77
2085 2.93 5.49 6.67 8.46 9.42 10.99 12.82
2086 2.99 5.55 6.73 8.52 9.48 11.05 12.88
2087 3.05 5.61 6.79 8.58 9.54 11.11 12.94
2088 3.11 5.67 6.85 8.64 9.60 11.17 13.00
2089 3.17 5.73 6.91 8.70 9.66 11.23 13.06
2090 3.23 5.79 6.97 8.76 9.72 11.29 13.12
2091 3.29 5.85 7.03 8.82 9.78 11.35 13.18
2092 3.35 5.91 7.09 8.88 9.84 11.41 13.24
2093 3.41 5.97 7.15 8.94 9.90 11.47 13.30
2094 3.48 6.04 7.22 9.01 9.97 11.54 13.37
2095 3.54 6.10 7.28 9.07 10.03 11.60 13.43
2096 3.60 6.16 7.34 9.13 10.09 11.66 13.49
2097 3.66 6.22 7.40 9.19 10.15 11.72 13.55
2098 3.73 6.29 7.47 9.26 10.22 11.79 13.62
2099 3.79 6.35 7.53 9.32 10.28 11.85 13.68
2100 3.86 6.42 7.60 9.39 10.35 11.92 13.75
Flood Requency Events for Event Tree Analysis, Ft. NAVD (88) 
Figure 44. Wave Set-Up Intermediate-High Scenario




















































































































































99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
SWL, Ft= 2.56 3.54 4.88 5.58 6.76 8.14
WSU, Ft= 0.00 0.20 0.65 0.91 1.30 1.75
2015 0.00 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2016 0.03 2.59 3.77 5.56 6.52 8.09 9.92
2017 0.07 2.63 3.81 5.60 6.56 8.13 9.96
2018 0.10 2.66 3.84 5.63 6.59 8.16 9.99
2019 0.14 2.70 3.88 5.67 6.63 8.20 10.03
2020 0.17 2.73 3.91 5.70 6.66 8.23 10.06
2021 0.21 2.77 3.95 5.74 6.70 8.27 10.10
2022 0.24 2.80 3.98 5.77 6.73 8.30 10.13
2023 0.28 2.84 4.02 5.81 6.77 8.34 10.17
2024 0.32 2.88 4.06 5.85 6.81 8.38 10.21
2025 0.36 2.92 4.10 5.89 6.85 8.42 10.25
2026 0.40 2.96 4.14 5.93 6.89 8.46 10.29
2027 0.44 3.00 4.18 5.97 6.93 8.50 10.33
2028 0.48 3.04 4.22 6.01 6.97 8.54 10.37
2029 0.52 3.08 4.26 6.05 7.01 8.58 10.41
2030 0.57 3.13 4.31 6.10 7.06 8.63 10.46
2031 0.61 3.17 4.35 6.14 7.10 8.67 10.50
2032 0.66 3.22 4.40 6.19 7.15 8.72 10.55
2033 0.70 3.26 4.44 6.23 7.19 8.76 10.59
2034 0.75 3.31 4.49 6.28 7.24 8.81 10.64
2035 0.79 3.35 4.53 6.32 7.28 8.85 10.68
2036 0.84 3.40 4.58 6.37 7.33 8.90 10.73
2037 0.89 3.45 4.63 6.42 7.38 8.95 10.78 Year 99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.20%
2038 0.94 3.50 4.68 6.47 7.43 9.00 10.83 2015 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2039 0.99 3.55 4.73 6.52 7.48 9.05 10.88 2025 H 2.92 4.10 5.89 6.85 8.42 10.25
2040 1.04 3.60 4.78 6.57 7.53 9.10 10.93 2035 H 3.35 4.53 6.32 7.28 8.85 10.68
2041 1.09 3.65 4.83 6.62 7.58 9.15 10.98 2045 H 3.86 5.04 6.83 7.79 9.36 11.19
2042 1.14 3.70 4.88 6.67 7.63 9.20 11.03 2055 H 4.45 5.63 7.42 8.38 9.95 11.78
2043 1.20 3.76 4.94 6.73 7.69 9.26 11.09 2065 H 5.11 6.29 8.08 9.04 10.61 12.44
2044 1.25 3.81 4.99 6.78 7.74 9.31 11.14
2045 1.30 3.86 5.04 6.83 7.79 9.36 11.19
2046 1.36 3.92 5.10 6.89 7.85 9.42 11.25
2047 1.41 3.97 5.15 6.94 7.90 9.47 11.30
2048 1.47 4.03 5.21 7.00 7.96 9.53 11.36
2049 1.53 4.09 5.27 7.06 8.02 9.59 11.42
2050 1.59 4.15 5.33 7.12 8.08 9.65 11.48
2051 1.64 4.20 5.38 7.17 8.13 9.70 11.53
2052 1.70 4.26 5.44 7.23 8.19 9.76 11.59
2053 1.76 4.32 5.50 7.29 8.25 9.82 11.65
2054 1.83 4.39 5.57 7.36 8.32 9.89 11.72
2055 1.89 4.45 5.63 7.42 8.38 9.95 11.78
2056 1.95 4.51 5.69 7.48 8.44 10.01 11.84
2057 2.01 4.57 5.75 7.54 8.50 10.07 11.90
2058 2.08 4.64 5.82 7.61 8.57 10.14 11.97
2059 2.14 4.70 5.88 7.67 8.63 10.20 12.03
2060 2.21 4.77 5.95 7.74 8.70 10.27 12.10
2061 2.27 4.83 6.01 7.80 8.76 10.33 12.16
2062 2.34 4.90 6.08 7.87 8.83 10.40 12.23
2063 2.41 4.97 6.15 7.94 8.90 10.47 12.30
2064 2.48 5.04 6.22 8.01 8.97 10.54 12.37
2065 2.55 5.11 6.29 8.08 9.04 10.61 12.44
2066 2.62 5.18 6.36 8.15 9.11 10.68 12.51
2067 2.69 5.25 6.43 8.22 9.18 10.75 12.58
2068 2.76 5.32 6.50 8.29 9.25 10.82 12.65
2069 2.83 5.39 6.57 8.36 9.32 10.89 12.72
2070 2.90 5.46 6.64 8.43 9.39 10.96 12.79
2071 2.98 5.54 6.72 8.51 9.47 11.04 12.87
2072 3.05 5.61 6.79 8.58 9.54 11.11 12.94
2073 3.13 5.69 6.87 8.66 9.62 11.19 13.02
2074 3.20 5.76 6.94 8.73 9.69 11.26 13.09
2075 3.28 5.84 7.02 8.81 9.77 11.34 13.17
2076 3.36 5.92 7.10 8.89 9.85 11.42 13.25
2077 3.43 5.99 7.17 8.96 9.92 11.49 13.32
2078 3.51 6.07 7.25 9.04 10.00 11.57 13.40
2079 3.59 6.15 7.33 9.12 10.08 11.65 13.48
2080 3.67 6.23 7.41 9.20 10.16 11.73 13.56
2081 3.75 6.31 7.49 9.28 10.24 11.81 13.64
2082 3.84 6.40 7.58 9.37 10.33 11.90 13.73
2083 3.92 6.48 7.66 9.45 10.41 11.98 13.81
2084 4.00 6.56 7.74 9.53 10.49 12.06 13.89
2085 4.09 6.65 7.83 9.62 10.58 12.15 13.98
2086 4.17 6.73 7.91 9.70 10.66 12.23 14.06
2087 4.26 6.82 8.00 9.79 10.75 12.32 14.15
2088 4.34 6.90 8.08 9.87 10.83 12.40 14.23
2089 4.43 6.99 8.17 9.96 10.92 12.49 14.32
2090 4.52 7.08 8.26 10.05 11.01 12.58 14.41
2091 4.61 7.17 8.35 10.14 11.10 12.67 14.50
2092 4.70 7.26 8.44 10.23 11.19 12.76 14.59
2093 4.79 7.35 8.53 10.32 11.28 12.85 14.68
2094 4.88 7.44 8.62 10.41 11.37 12.94 14.77
2095 4.97 7.53 8.71 10.50 11.46 13.03 14.86
2096 5.06 7.62 8.80 10.59 11.55 13.12 14.95
2097 5.15 7.71 8.89 10.68 11.64 13.21 15.04
2098 5.25 7.81 8.99 10.78 11.74 13.31 15.14
2099 5.34 7.90 9.08 10.87 11.83 13.40 15.23
2100 5.44 8.00 9.18 10.97 11.93 13.50 15.33
Flood Requency Events for Event Tree Analysis, Ft. NAVD (88) 
Figure 45. Wave Set-Upl Flood Stages for High Sea Level Rise Scenario


































































































































High SLR Scenario  
















Page 212 - Summary of Events – Provides recommended values for durations for a range 
of Return Periods, Tables 12 and 13 in body of report. 
 
Page 213 - Current Year + SLR = 0.0 Feet – Extreme Value Analysis for 2014 
 
Page 214 - Current Year + SLR = 0.5 Feet – Extreme Value Analysis for 2014 plus 0.05 
feet of SLR. 
 
Page 215 - Current Year + SLR = 1.0 Feet – Extreme Value Analysis for 2014 plus 1.0 
feet of SLR. 
 
Page 216 - Current Year + SLR = 1.5 Feet – Extreme Value Analysis for 2014 plus 1.5 
feet of SLR. 
 
Page 217 - Current Year + SLR = 2.0 Feet – Extreme Value Analysis for 2014 plus 2.0 
feet of SLR. 
 
Page 218 - Current Year + SLR = 2.5 Feet – Extreme Value Analysis for 2014 plus 2.5 
feet of SLR. 
 
Page 219 - Current Year + SLR = 2.5 Feet, Adjusted – Extreme Value Analysis for 2014 
plus 2.5 feet of SLR with an adjusted α. The results for the 2.5-foot increment were odd 
compared to the other increments. The Weibull α in the Weibull distribution analysis was 
reduced from 1.8 to 1.4 to align the 99 and 50% durations with those for the 2.0 and 3.0-
foot increments.  
 
Page 220 - Current Year + SLR = 3.0 Feet – Extreme Value Analysis for 2014 plus 3.0 
feet of SLR. 
 
Page 221 - Longest Annual Duration – This is the summary of the longest (most extreme) 
event for each year. The data is from the Summary of Annual Events, 1928 – 2014 










TR, % = 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
TR, Years = 1 2 10 25 100 500
0.0 -6 1 5 9 18 25
0.5 -6 3 7 12 23 31
1.0 -7 6 13 20 37 48
1.5 -8 9 17 27 48 63
2.0 4 13 34 45 63 84
2.5 0 26 38 52 84 106
3.0 7 46 65 86 135 168
TR, % = 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
TR, Years = 1 2 10 25 100 500
0.0 0 1 5 7 10 13
0.5 0 3 10 15 21 28
1.0 -7 6 13 20 37 48
1.5 3 9 23 31 44 58
2.0 4 13 34 45 63 84
2.5 4 17 48 65 91 122
3.0 7 27 73 100 140 186
DTR , Hours = 5 6 12 24 48 72
0.0 11.8 7.30 0.424 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.5 37.9 30.3 7.87 0.532 0.002 0.000
1.0 65.8 56.8 23.3 3.9 0.111 0.003
1.5 87.7 78.1 39.4 9.9 0.637 0.041
2.0 94.3 87.0 54.9 21.7 3.39 0.529
2.5 98.0 93.5 68.0 36.1 10.2 2.85

















































2015 0.00 23.1 16.2 2.0 0.029 0.000 0.000
2035 Low 0.30 27.8 20.3 3.2 0.073 0.000 0.000
2035 Int Low 0.42 30.0 22.2 3.9 0.106 0.000 0.000
2035 Int High 0.61 33.7 25.6 5.2 0.188 0.000 0.000
2035 High 0.79 37.9 29.5 7.0 0.335 0.001 0.000
2065 Low 0.75 36.9 28.6 6.6 0.297 0.001 0.000
2065 Int Low 1.18 48.3 39.6 13.1 1.12 0.009 0.000
2065 Int High 1.86 73.8 66.1 38.7 9.10 0.622 0.044
2065 High 2.55 113 111 115 74.6 45.4 27.3
Year 5-Hours 6-Hours 12-Hours 24-Hours 48-Hours 72-Hours
2015 23.1 16.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2035 33.7 25.6 5.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
2065 73.8 66.1 38.7 9.1 0.6 0.0
Year
Increment 
of SLR, Ft.1 99% Event 50% Event 10% Event 4% Event2 1% Event
2015 0.00 0 1 5 7 10
2035 0.61 14
2065 1.86 39
Table 13 (in body of report). Probable Flood Durations for a Range of Return Periods, %
1. Rates based on Intermediate High SLR Scenario. 
2. Rate for 2015 from Table 2. Rates for 2035 and 2065 from y = 8.2155*EXP(0.8354*x) from 4% Event Figure.
1. Increments of SLR from SLR Curve with Flood Levels Excel 
Table 3 - Summary of Durations, DTR for range of TR , %
Increment 
of SLR, Ft 
=
Table 12 (in body of report). Probability of Exceedence for Flood Duration, %
Table 4 - Probability of Exceedence for  Durations for Range of Scenarios
Summary of Results - Tables 1 and 2 provide results from Current Year plus 
sea level rise increments in the following sheets based on both a Gumbel and 
Weibull Distribution Analysis. The results for the Weibull are for the alpha with 
the highest R-Squared value, except for 1.0 foot increment.The results for the 
2.5 foot increment were odd compared to the other increments. The α was 
reduced from 1.8 to 1.4 to better align the calculated durations with those for the 
increments. The Weibull analysis had the higher R2 values for all increments 
except at 3.0 feet, which was slightly less. Therefore, the author chose to use the 
Weibull results for the duration frequency analysis. Table 3 provides the inverse 
of the return period for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 and 72 hours of flooding in percent of 
probable annual exceedence. Converting the percent to decimel format provides 
the probability of exceedence needed to assess the probability the pump will fail 
Increment 
of SLR, Ft 
=
Table 2 - Summary of Weibull Calcuated DTR
Table 1 - Summary of Gumbel DTR
Increment 
of SLR, Ft 
=
y = 23.064e0.624x 





























Increment of Sea Level Rise, Ft 
Probability of Exceedence for 5 Hour 
Flood Duration for Elev 4+ 
y = 1E-09e9.4392x 

























Increment of Sea Level Rise, Ft 
Probability of Exceedence for 72 
Hour Flood Duration for Elev 4+ 
y = 16.197e0.7545x 





























Increment of Sea Level Rise, Ft 
Probability of Exceedence for 6 Hour 
Flood Duration for Elev 4+ 
y = 1.9705e1.5297x 





























Increment of Sea Level Rise, Ft 
Probability of Exceedence for 12 Hour 
Flood Duration for Elev 4+ 
y = 0.0289e3.0855x 





























Increment of Sea Level Rise, Ft 
Probability of Exceedence for 24 
Hour Flood Duration for Elev 4+ 
y = 5E-06e6.2931x 

























Increment of Sea Level Rise, Ft 
Probability of Exceedence for 48 
























Probability of Exceedence for Range 






y = 8.156e0.8499x 



























Increments of Sea Level Rise, Ft 
4 % Event Versus Increments of SLR 









C1 = 0.44 C1 = 0.5818
C2 = 0.12 C2 = 0.5253
Event Duration α = 0.5
Date Time Elevation Hours i Q G Q W
11/12/09 18:00 6.138 31 1 0.007 5.032 0.005 28.434
9/16/33 18:00 5.719 16 2 0.018 4.002 0.016 16.901
3/7/62 10:00 6.387 9 3 0.030 3.501 0.028 12.798
9/18/03 16:00 6.441 9 4 0.041 3.165 0.040 10.442
9/27/56 2:00 5.174 8 5 0.053 2.911 0.051 8.849
9/18/36 10:00 6.274 7 6 0.065 2.707 0.063 7.677
2/5/98 4:00 5.197 7 7 0.076 2.535 0.074 6.767
10/29/12 8:00 5.178 7 8 0.088 2.387 0.086 6.034
9/19/28 0:00 4.996 6 9 0.099 2.257 0.097 5.429
4/27/78 0:00 5.337 6 10 0.111 2.140 0.109 4.919
10/7/06 9:00 5.002 6 11 0.123 2.034 0.120 4.481
8/27/11 19:00 5.970 6 12 0.134 1.937 0.132 4.102
10/25/82 4:00 4.775 5 13 0.146 1.847 0.144 3.769
10/5/48 11:00 4.756 4 14 0.157 1.764 0.155 3.474
10/6/57 8:00 4.861 4 15 0.169 1.686 0.167 3.211
10/21/58 18:00 4.547 4 16 0.181 1.613 0.178 2.975 Yrs of Rec 86
9/12/60 6:00 4.816 4 17 0.192 1.544 0.190 2.762 N (Events) = 86
9/13/64 16:00 4.657 4 18 0.204 1.478 0.201 2.569 TR, % 99 50 25 10 1 0.2
10/14/77 10:00 4.321 3 19 0.216 1.416 0.213 2.394 TR, Years 1.01 2 4 10 100 500
4/13/88 7:00 4.366 3 20 0.227 1.356 0.224 2.233 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/25/92 8:00 4.267 3 21 0.239 1.299 0.236 2.085 A = 1/β 0.2496
8/30/99 12:00 4.201 3 22 0.250 1.244 0.248 1.949 B = -γ/β 0.0462
9/25/08 18:00 4.283 3 23 0.262 1.192 0.259 1.824 β = 1/A 4.01
1/24/40 8:00 4.397 2 24 0.274 1.141 0.271 1.708 γ = -β*B -0.19
12/5/45 9:00 4.142 2 25 0.285 1.091 0.282 1.601 α = N/A
1/17/46 9:00 4.127 2 26 0.297 1.044 0.294 1.501 DTR -6 1 5 9 18 25
10/21/61 19:00 4.302 2 27 0.308 0.998 0.305 1.408
2/11/73 3:00 4.122 2 28 0.320 0.953 0.317 1.321
10/31/91 16:00 4.029 2 29 0.332 0.909 0.328 1.240
10/19/97 12:00 4.126 2 30 0.343 0.866 0.340 1.164
2/6/10 3:00 4.174 2 31 0.355 0.825 0.352 1.093
8/22/30 20:00 4.166 1 32 0.366 0.784 0.363 1.026
10/4/51 11:00 4.052 1 33 0.378 0.745 0.375 0.964
10/23/53 10:00 4.022 1 34 0.390 0.706 0.386 0.905
3/26/71 21:00 4.051 1 35 0.401 0.667 0.398 0.850
8/17/86 20:00 4.118 1 36 0.413 0.630 0.409 0.798
1/1/87 22:00 4.221 1 37 0.425 0.593 0.421 0.749
1/25/00 12:00 4.058 1 38 0.436 0.557 0.432 0.703
9/22/29 11:00 3.781 0 39 0.448 0.521 0.444 0.659
3/22/31 23:00 3.449 0 40 0.459 0.486 0.456 0.618
9/9/32 17:00 3.335 0 41 0.471 0.451 0.467 0.579
3/20/34 12:00 3.003 0 42 0.483 0.417 0.479 0.543
11/17/35 3:00 3.589 0 43 0.494 0.383 0.490 0.508
1/29/37 10:00 3.959 0 44 0.506 0.350 0.502 0.475 Yrs of Rec 86
5/30/38 22:00 3.745 0 45 0.517 0.317 0.513 0.445 N (Events) = 86
8/28/39 20:00 3.412 0 46 0.529 0.284 0.525 0.415 TR, % 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
1/12/41 8:00 2.699 0 47 0.541 0.251 0.536 0.388 TR, Years 1.01 2 10 25 100 500
9/30/43 10:00 3.870 0 48 0.552 0.219 0.548 0.362 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/14/44 12:00 3.156 0 49 0.564 0.187 0.560 0.337 A = 1/β 0.9501
11/1/47 11:00 3.981 0 50 0.575 0.155 0.571 0.314 B = -γ/β -0.0004
5/11/49 20:00 3.780 0 51 0.587 0.123 0.583 0.292 β = 1/A 1.05
9/6/50 16:00 2.066 0 52 0.599 0.091 0.594 0.271 γ = -β*B 0.00
2/27/52 10:00 3.637 0 53 0.610 0.059 0.606 0.251 α = 0.5
1/23/54 0:00 3.607 0 54 0.622 0.028 0.617 0.233 DTR 0 1 5 7 10 13
6/10/55 0:00 3.191 0 55 0.634 -0.004 0.629 0.215
4/12/59 23:00 3.131 0 56 0.645 -0.035 0.640 0.198 Yrs of Rec 86
9/15/63 20:00 3.570 0 57 0.657 -0.067 0.652 0.183 N (Events) = 86
1/16/65 21:00 3.842 0 58 0.668 -0.099 0.664 0.168 TR, % 11.8 7.30 0.424 0.001 0.000 0.000
1/27/66 0:00 3.427 0 59 0.680 -0.130 0.675 0.154 TR, Years 8.48 13.7 236 70600 1.00E+10 1.00E+15
9/16/67 19:00 3.812 0 60 0.692 -0.162 0.687 0.141 λ = N/YofR 1.00
5/27/68 21:00 3.997 0 61 0.703 -0.195 0.698 0.129 A = 1/β 0.9501
3/2/69 7:00 3.982 0 62 0.715 -0.227 0.710 0.117 B = -γ/β -0.0004
10/27/70 7:00 3.567 0 63 0.726 -0.259 0.721 0.107 β = 1/A 1.05
5/26/72 20:00 3.435 0 64 0.738 -0.292 0.733 0.097 γ = -β*B 0.00
6/28/74 4:00 2.946 0 65 0.750 -0.326 0.745 0.087 α = 0.5
11/24/75 13:00 3.160 0 66 0.761 -0.359 0.756 0.078 DTR 5 6 12 24 48 73
3/10/76 3:00 2.785 0 67 0.773 -0.394 0.768 0.070
9/24/79 11:00 3.160 0 68 0.784 -0.428 0.779 0.062
1/5/80 12:00 3.046 0 69 0.796 -0.464 0.791 0.055
8/20/81 12:00 3.730 0 70 0.808 -0.500 0.802 0.049
1/28/83 9:00 3.811 0 71 0.819 -0.537 0.814 0.042
10/14/84 12:00 3.294 0 72 0.831 -0.575 0.825 0.037
11/2/85 11:00 3.631 0 73 0.843 -0.614 0.837 0.032
2/24/89 11:00 3.370 0 74 0.854 -0.655 0.849 0.027
10/26/90 2:00 3.395 0 75 0.866 -0.697 0.860 0.023
1/10/93 10:00 3.652 0 76 0.877 -0.741 0.872 0.019
11/17/94 9:00 3.955 0 77 0.889 -0.788 0.883 0.015
8/7/95 18:00 3.251 0 78 0.901 -0.837 0.895 0.012
10/8/96 19:00 3.712 0 79 0.912 -0.889 0.906 0.010
9/30/01 20:00 3.387 0 80 0.924 -0.946 0.918 0.007
10/16/02 5:00 3.248 0 81 0.935 -1.008 0.929 0.005
9/19/04 12:00 3.050 0 82 0.947 -1.078 0.941 0.004
4/16/05 2:00 2.760 0 83 0.959 -1.159 0.953 0.002
11/3/07 4:00 3.235 0 84 0.970 -1.257 0.964 0.001
10/10/13 1:00 3.854 0 85 0.982 -1.389 0.976 0.001
11/1/14 16:00 3.422 0 86 0.993 -1.617 0.987 0.000
N (Events) = 86
Inverse of the Return Periods for the Weibull Analysis for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 
and 72 hours, TR , %
Gumbel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                   
DTR (Hrs) = γ - β*ln(ln{λTR/(λTR-1)})  
Event Adjusted to 2014 + SLR = +0.0 ft
Q,	Gumbel Q,	Weibel
Weibel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                               
DTR = γ + β*LN(λ*TR)^(1/α)
Sheet	2-	Current	Year+SLR	=	0.0	Ft.
y = 0.2496x + 0.0462 






























y = 0.9501x - 0.0004 










































C1 = 0.44 C1 = 0.5227
C2 = 0.12 C2 = 0.4749
Event Duration α = 0.7
Date Time Elevation Hours i Q G Q W
11/12/09 18:00 6.638 33 1 0.007 5.032 0.006 10.539
2/5/98 4:00 5.697 20 2 0.018 4.002 0.017 7.427
3/7/62 10:00 6.887 19 3 0.030 3.501 0.029 6.117
9/16/33 18:00 6.219 18 4 0.041 3.165 0.040 5.300
9/27/56 2:00 5.674 18 5 0.053 2.911 0.052 4.715
10/29/12 8:00 5.678 18 6 0.065 2.707 0.063 4.263
10/25/82 4:00 5.275 10 7 0.076 2.535 0.075 3.898
9/18/03 16:00 6.941 10 8 0.088 2.387 0.086 3.593
9/18/36 10:00 6.774 8 9 0.099 2.257 0.098 3.333
10/21/58 18:00 5.047 7 10 0.111 2.140 0.110 3.106
9/13/64 16:00 5.157 7 11 0.123 2.034 0.121 2.907
4/27/78 0:00 5.837 7 12 0.134 1.937 0.133 2.729
8/27/11 19:00 6.470 7 13 0.146 1.847 0.144 2.569
9/19/28 0:00 5.496 6 14 0.157 1.764 0.156 2.425
10/6/57 8:00 5.361 6 15 0.169 1.686 0.167 2.292
10/7/06 9:00 5.502 6 16 0.181 1.613 0.179 2.171 Yrs of Rec 86
10/5/48 11:00 5.256 5 17 0.192 1.544 0.191 2.059 N (Events) = 86
2/11/73 3:00 4.622 5 18 0.204 1.478 0.202 1.955 TR, % 99 50 25 10 1 0.2
4/13/88 7:00 4.866 5 19 0.216 1.416 0.214 1.859 TR, Years 1.01 2 4 10 100 500
10/31/91 16:00 4.529 5 20 0.227 1.356 0.225 1.769 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/25/92 8:00 4.767 5 21 0.239 1.299 0.237 1.684 A = 1/β 0.2126
8/30/99 12:00 4.701 5 22 0.250 1.244 0.248 1.605 B = -γ/β -0.3061
9/25/08 18:00 4.783 5 23 0.262 1.192 0.260 1.531 β = 1/A 4.70
1/29/37 10:00 4.459 4 24 0.274 1.141 0.271 1.461 γ = -β*B 1.44
12/5/45 9:00 4.642 4 25 0.285 1.091 0.283 1.395 α = N/A
10/4/51 11:00 4.552 4 26 0.297 1.044 0.295 1.332 DTR -6 3 7 12 23 31
10/23/53 10:00 4.522 4 27 0.308 0.998 0.306 1.272
9/12/60 6:00 5.316 4 28 0.320 0.953 0.318 1.216
10/21/61 19:00 4.802 4 29 0.332 0.909 0.329 1.162
5/27/68 21:00 4.497 4 30 0.343 0.866 0.341 1.111
3/2/69 7:00 4.482 4 31 0.355 0.825 0.352 1.062
10/14/77 10:00 4.821 4 32 0.366 0.784 0.364 1.015
11/17/94 9:00 4.455 4 33 0.378 0.745 0.376 0.971
10/19/97 12:00 4.626 4 34 0.390 0.706 0.387 0.928
1/25/00 12:00 4.558 4 35 0.401 0.667 0.399 0.887
10/10/13 1:00 4.354 4 36 0.413 0.630 0.410 0.848
9/22/29 11:00 4.281 3 37 0.425 0.593 0.422 0.810
11/29/32 10:00 4.436 3 38 0.436 0.557 0.433 0.774
5/30/38 22:00 4.245 3 39 0.448 0.521 0.445 0.740
1/24/40 8:00 4.897 3 40 0.459 0.486 0.457 0.707
9/30/43 10:00 4.370 3 41 0.471 0.451 0.468 0.675
1/17/46 9:00 4.627 3 42 0.483 0.417 0.480 0.644
11/1/47 11:00 4.481 3 43 0.494 0.383 0.491 0.614
8/12/55 16:00 4.292 3 44 0.506 0.350 0.503 0.586 Yrs of Rec 86
1/16/65 21:00 4.342 3 45 0.517 0.317 0.514 0.558 N (Events) = 86
9/16/67 19:00 4.312 3 46 0.529 0.284 0.526 0.532 TR, % 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
3/26/71 21:00 4.551 3 47 0.541 0.251 0.537 0.506 TR, Years 1 2 10 25 100 500
11/14/81 11:00 4.191 3 48 0.552 0.219 0.549 0.482 λ = N/YofR 1.00
1/28/83 9:00 4.311 3 49 0.564 0.187 0.561 0.458 A = 1/β 0.3209
8/17/86 20:00 4.618 3 50 0.575 0.155 0.572 0.435 B = -γ/β -0.0609
1/1/87 22:00 4.721 3 51 0.587 0.123 0.584 0.413 β = 1/A 3.12
2/6/10 3:00 4.674 3 52 0.599 0.091 0.595 0.392 γ = -β*B 0.19
8/22/30 20:00 4.666 2 53 0.610 0.059 0.607 0.371 α = 0.7
11/17/35 13:00 4.191 2 54 0.622 0.028 0.618 0.351 DTR 0 3 10 15 21 28
5/11/49 20:00 4.280 2 55 0.634 -0.004 0.630 0.332
1/23/54 0:00 4.107 2 56 0.645 -0.035 0.642 0.313 Yrs of Rec 86
11/2/85 11:00 4.131 2 57 0.657 -0.067 0.653 0.296 N (Events) = 86
1/10/93 10:00 4.152 2 58 0.668 -0.099 0.665 0.278 TR, % 37.9 30.30 7.87 0.532 0.002 0.000
10/8/96 19:00 4.212 2 59 0.680 -0.130 0.676 0.262 TR, Years 2.64 3.30 12.7 188.00 41300 1.00E+07
2/27/52 10:00 4.137 1 60 0.692 -0.162 0.688 0.246 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/15/63 20:00 4.070 1 61 0.703 -0.195 0.699 0.230 A = 1/β 0.3209
10/27/70 7:00 4.067 1 62 0.715 -0.227 0.711 0.215 B = -γ/β -0.0609
9/21/72 7:00 4.496 1 63 0.726 -0.259 0.722 0.201 β = 1/A 3.12
12/1/74 10:00 4.177 1 64 0.738 -0.292 0.734 0.187 γ = -β*B 0.19
5/6/05 20:00 4.008 1 65 0.750 -0.326 0.746 0.174 α = 0.7
3/22/31 23:00 3.949 0 66 0.761 -0.359 0.757 0.161 DTR 5 6 12 24 48 72
3/20/34 12:00 3.503 0 67 0.773 -0.394 0.769 0.148
8/28/39 20:00 3.916 0 68 0.784 -0.428 0.780 0.136
1/12/41 8:00 3.199 0 69 0.796 -0.464 0.792 0.125
9/14/44 12:00 3.656 0 70 0.808 -0.500 0.803 0.114
9/6/50 16:00 2.566 0 71 0.819 -0.537 0.815 0.104
4/12/59 23:00 3.631 0 72 0.831 -0.575 0.827 0.094
1/27/66 0:00 3.927 0 73 0.843 -0.614 0.838 0.084
11/24/75 13:00 3.660 0 74 0.854 -0.655 0.850 0.075
3/10/76 3:00 3.285 0 75 0.866 -0.697 0.861 0.066
9/24/79 11:00 3.660 0 76 0.877 -0.741 0.873 0.058
1/5/80 12:00 3.546 0 77 0.889 -0.788 0.884 0.050
10/14/84 12:00 3.794 0 78 0.901 -0.837 0.896 0.043
2/24/89 11:00 3.870 0 79 0.912 -0.889 0.908 0.036
10/26/90 2:00 3.895 0 80 0.924 -0.946 0.919 0.029
8/7/95 18:00 3.751 0 81 0.935 -1.008 0.931 0.023
9/30/01 20:00 3.887 0 82 0.947 -1.078 0.942 0.018
10/16/02 5:00 3.748 0 83 0.959 -1.159 0.954 0.013
9/19/04 12:00 3.550 0 84 0.970 -1.257 0.965 0.008
11/3/07 4:00 3.735 0 85 0.982 -1.389 0.977 0.005
11/1/14 16:00 3.922 0 86 0.993 -1.617 0.988 0.002
N (Events) = 86
Inverse of the Return Periods for the Weibull Analysis for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 
and 72 hours, TR , %
Weibel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                               
DTR = γ + β*LN(λ*TR)^(1/α)
Gumbel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                   
DTR (Hrs) = γ - β*ln(ln{λTR/(λTR-1)})  
Event Adjusted to 2014 + SLR = +0.5 ft
Q, Gumbel Q, WeibelSheet 3 - Current Year+SLR = 0.5 Ft.
y = 0.3209x - 0.0609 




























Weibel Distribution, α = 0.7  
y = 0.2126x - 0.3061 






































C1 = 0.440 C1 = 0.523
C2 = 0.120 C2 = 0.475
Event Duration α = 0.7
Date Time Elevation Hours i Q G Q W
11/12/09 18:00 7.138 45 1 0.007 5.032 0.006 10.539
2/5/98 4:00 6.197 33 2 0.018 4.002 0.017 7.427
3/7/62 10:00 7.387 31 3 0.030 3.501 0.029 6.117
10/29/12 8:00 6.178 31 4 0.041 3.165 0.040 5.300
9/27/56 2:00 6.174 30 5 0.053 2.911 0.052 4.715
4/27/78 0:00 6.337 30 6 0.065 2.707 0.063 4.263
9/16/33 18:00 6.719 20 7 0.076 2.535 0.075 3.898
10/21/58 18:00 5.547 20 8 0.088 2.387 0.086 3.593
9/13/64 16:00 5.657 17 9 0.099 2.257 0.098 3.333
10/25/82 4:00 5.775 17 10 0.111 2.140 0.110 3.106
9/1/06 14:00 5.021 16 11 0.123 2.034 0.121 2.907
9/18/03 16:00 7.441 11 12 0.134 1.937 0.133 2.729
9/18/36 10:00 7.274 10 13 0.146 1.847 0.144 2.569
8/12/55 16:00 4.792 9 14 0.157 1.764 0.156 2.425
10/8/96 19:00 4.712 9 15 0.169 1.686 0.167 2.292
8/27/11 19:00 6.970 9 16 0.181 1.613 0.179 2.171 Yrs of Rec 86
9/19/28 0:00 5.996 8 17 0.192 1.544 0.191 2.059 N (Events) = 86
10/5/48 11:00 5.756 7 18 0.204 1.478 0.202 1.955 TR, % 99 50 25 10 1 0.2
10/6/57 8:00 5.861 7 19 0.216 1.416 0.214 1.859 TR, Years 1.01 2 4 10 100 500
2/11/73 3:00 5.122 7 20 0.227 1.356 0.225 1.769 λ = N/YofR 1.00
4/13/88 7:00 5.366 7 21 0.239 1.299 0.237 1.684 A = 1/β 0.1387
10/31/91 16:00 5.029 7 22 0.250 1.244 0.248 1.605 B = -γ/β -0.4898
9/25/08 18:00 5.283 7 23 0.262 1.192 0.260 1.531 β = 1/A 7.21
11/17/35 3:00 4.589 6 24 0.274 1.141 0.271 1.461 γ = -β*B 3.53
1/29/37 10:00 4.959 6 25 0.285 1.091 0.283 1.395 α = N/A
1/24/40 8:00 5.397 6 26 0.297 1.044 0.295 1.332 DTR -7 6 13 20 37 48
12/5/45 9:00 5.142 6 27 0.308 0.998 0.306 1.272
8/14/53 10:00 4.622 6 28 0.320 0.953 0.318 1.216
10/21/61 19:00 5.302 6 29 0.332 0.909 0.329 1.162
5/27/68 21:00 4.997 6 30 0.343 0.866 0.341 1.111
3/2/69 7:00 4.982 6 31 0.355 0.825 0.352 1.062
2/11/83 9:00 4.782 6 32 0.366 0.784 0.364 1.015
3/10/87 5:00 4.541 6 33 0.378 0.745 0.376 0.971
10/26/90 2:00 4.395 6 34 0.390 0.706 0.387 0.928
10/19/97 12:00 5.126 6 35 0.401 0.667 0.399 0.887
8/30/99 12:00 5.201 6 36 0.413 0.630 0.410 0.848
1/25/00 12:00 5.058 6 37 0.425 0.593 0.422 0.810
10/10/13 1:00 4.854 6 38 0.436 0.557 0.433 0.774
9/22/29 11:00 4.781 5 39 0.448 0.521 0.445 0.740
11/29/32 10:00 4.936 5 40 0.459 0.486 0.457 0.707
5/30/38 22:00 4.745 5 41 0.471 0.451 0.468 0.675
8/28/39 20:00 4.412 5 42 0.483 0.417 0.480 0.644
9/30/43 10:00 4.870 5 43 0.494 0.383 0.491 0.614
1/17/46 9:00 5.127 5 44 0.506 0.350 0.503 0.586
11/1/47 11:00 4.981 5 45 0.517 0.317 0.514 0.558 Yrs of Rec 86
10/4/51 11:00 5.052 5 46 0.529 0.284 0.526 0.532 N (Events) = 86
1/23/54 0:00 4.607 5 47 0.541 0.251 0.537 0.506 TR, % 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
9/12/60 6:00 5.816 5 48 0.552 0.219 0.549 0.482 TR, Years 1 2 10 25 100 500
1/16/65 21:00 4.842 5 49 0.564 0.187 0.561 0.458 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/16/67 19:00 4.812 5 50 0.575 0.155 0.572 0.435 A = 1/β 0.2121
10/27/70 7:00 4.567 5 51 0.587 0.123 0.584 0.413 B = -γ/β -0.3593
3/26/71 21:00 5.051 5 52 0.599 0.091 0.595 0.392 β = 1/A 4.71
10/14/77 10:00 5.321 5 53 0.610 0.059 0.607 0.371 γ = -β*B 1.69
11/14/81 11:00 4.691 5 54 0.622 0.028 0.618 0.351 α = 0.7
8/17/86 20:00 5.118 5 55 0.634 -0.004 0.630 0.332 DTR 2 6 17 23 33 44
9/25/92 8:00 5.267 5 56 0.645 -0.035 0.642 0.313
11/17/94 9:00 4.955 5 57 0.657 -0.067 0.653 0.296 Yrs of Rec 86
8/22/30 20:00 5.166 4 58 0.668 -0.099 0.665 0.278 N (Events) = 86
3/22/31 23:00 4.449 4 59 0.680 -0.130 0.676 0.262 TR, % 65.8 56.82 23.31 3.922 0.111 0.003
9/30/44 20:00 4.455 4 60 0.692 -0.162 0.688 0.246 TR, Years 1.52 1.76 4.29 25.5 899 31800
5/11/49 20:00 4.780 4 61 0.703 -0.195 0.699 0.230 λ = N/YofR 1.00
2/27/52 10:00 4.637 4 62 0.715 -0.227 0.711 0.215 A = 1/β 0.2121
1/27/66 0:00 4.427 4 63 0.726 -0.259 0.722 0.201 B = -γ/β -0.3593
9/21/72 7:00 4.996 4 64 0.738 -0.292 0.734 0.187 β = 1/A 4.71
12/1/74 10:00 4.677 4 65 0.750 -0.326 0.746 0.174 γ = -β*B 1.69
11/2/85 11:00 4.631 4 66 0.761 -0.359 0.757 0.161 α = 0.7
1/10/93 10:00 4.652 4 67 0.773 -0.394 0.769 0.148 DTR 5 6 12 24 48 72
11/3/07 4:00 4.235 4 68 0.784 -0.428 0.780 0.136
2/6/10 3:00 5.174 4 69 0.796 -0.464 0.792 0.125
11/1/14 16:00 4.422 4 70 0.808 -0.500 0.803 0.114
9/12/50 21:00 4.266 3 71 0.819 -0.537 0.815 0.104
9/15/63 20:00 4.570 3 72 0.831 -0.575 0.827 0.094
10/14/84 12:00 4.294 3 73 0.843 -0.614 0.838 0.084
9/19/89 11:00 4.321 3 74 0.854 -0.655 0.850 0.075
9/30/01 20:00 4.387 3 75 0.866 -0.697 0.861 0.066
10/16/02 5:00 4.248 3 76 0.877 -0.741 0.873 0.058
5/6/05 20:00 4.508 3 77 0.889 -0.788 0.884 0.050
4/12/59 23:00 4.131 2 78 0.901 -0.837 0.896 0.043
9/24/79 11:00 4.160 2 79 0.912 -0.889 0.908 0.036
1/5/80 12:00 4.046 2 80 0.924 -0.946 0.919 0.029
8/7/95 18:00 4.251 2 81 0.935 -1.008 0.931 0.023
3/20/34 12:00 4.003 1 82 0.947 -1.078 0.942 0.018
1/28/41 10:00 4.001 1 83 0.959 -1.159 0.954 0.013
11/24/75 13:00 4.160 1 84 0.970 -1.257 0.965 0.008
9/19/04 12:00 4.050 1 85 0.982 -1.389 0.977 0.005
3/10/76 3:00 3.785 0 86 0.993 -1.617 0.988 0.002
N (Events) = 86
Inverse of the Return Periods for the Weibull Analysis for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 
and 72 hours, TR , %
Weibel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                               
DTR = γ + β*LN(λ*TR)^(1/α)
Q, Weibel
Gumbel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                   
DTR (Hrs) = γ - β*ln(ln{λTR/(λTR-1)})  
Event Adjusted to 2014 + SLR = +1.0 ft
Q, GumbelSheet 4 - Current Year+SLR = 1.0 Ft.
y = 0.2121x - 0.3593 





























Weibel Distribution, α = 0.7  
y = 0.1387x - 0.4898 









































C1 = 0.440 C1 = 0.470
C2 = 0.120 C2 = 0.430
Event Duration α = 0.7
Date Time Elevation Hours i Q G Q W
11/12/09 18:00 7.638 57 1 0.007 5.032 0.006 10.236
2/5/98 4:00 6.697 55 2 0.018 4.002 0.018 7.334
3/7/62 10:00 7.887 44 3 0.030 3.501 0.029 6.064
9/27/56 2:00 6.674 32 4 0.041 3.165 0.041 5.263
4/27/78 0:00 6.837 32 5 0.053 2.911 0.052 4.687
10/29/12 8:00 6.678 32 6 0.065 2.707 0.064 4.241
10/21/58 18:00 6.047 31 7 0.076 2.535 0.076 3.879
10/25/82 4:00 6.275 29 8 0.088 2.387 0.087 3.577
9/16/33 18:00 7.219 22 9 0.099 2.257 0.099 3.319
10/7/06 9:00 6.502 20 10 0.111 2.140 0.110 3.094
11/17/35 13:00 5.191 19 11 0.123 2.034 0.122 2.896
9/13/64 16:00 6.157 19 12 0.134 1.937 0.133 2.719
4/13/88 7:00 5.866 19 13 0.146 1.847 0.145 2.561
9/18/36 10:00 7.774 18 14 0.157 1.764 0.157 2.416
3/2/69 7:00 5.482 18 15 0.169 1.686 0.168 2.285
8/27/11 19:00 7.470 18 16 0.181 1.613 0.180 2.164 Yrs of Rec 86
10/8/96 19:00 5.212 17 17 0.192 1.544 0.191 2.052 N (Events) = 86
10/26/90 2:00 4.895 16 18 0.204 1.478 0.203 1.949 TR, % 99 50 25 10 1 0.2
1/25/00 12:00 5.558 16 19 0.216 1.416 0.214 1.853 TR, Years 1.01 2 4 10 100 500
9/18/03 16:00 7.941 13 20 0.227 1.356 0.226 1.763 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/19/28 0:00 6.496 11 21 0.239 1.299 0.238 1.679 A = 1/β 0.1082
8/12/55 16:00 5.292 11 22 0.250 1.244 0.249 1.601 B = -γ/β -0.6226
1/29/37 10:00 5.459 9 23 0.262 1.192 0.261 1.526 β = 1/A 9.24
8/14/53 10:00 5.122 9 24 0.274 1.141 0.272 1.456 γ = -β*B 5.75
3/10/87 5:00 5.041 9 25 0.285 1.091 0.284 1.390 α = N/A
10/31/91 16:00 5.529 9 26 0.297 1.044 0.295 1.328 DTR -8 9 17 27 48 63
12/5/45 9:00 5.642 8 27 0.308 0.998 0.307 1.268
10/5/48 11:00 6.256 8 28 0.320 0.953 0.319 1.212
10/6/57 8:00 6.361 8 29 0.332 0.909 0.330 1.158
5/27/68 21:00 5.497 8 30 0.343 0.866 0.342 1.107
4/6/71 17:00 4.852 8 31 0.355 0.825 0.353 1.059
2/11/73 3:00 5.622 8 32 0.366 0.784 0.365 1.012
2/11/83 9:00 5.282 8 33 0.378 0.745 0.376 0.968
11/4/85 16:00 4.760 8 34 0.390 0.706 0.388 0.925
8/30/99 12:00 5.701 8 35 0.401 0.667 0.400 0.884
9/25/08 18:00 5.783 8 36 0.413 0.630 0.411 0.845
10/10/13 1:00 5.354 8 37 0.425 0.593 0.423 0.808
9/22/29 11:00 5.281 7 38 0.436 0.557 0.434 0.772
1/24/40 8:00 5.897 7 39 0.448 0.521 0.446 0.737
9/30/43 10:00 5.370 7 40 0.459 0.486 0.457 0.704
11/1/47 11:00 5.481 7 41 0.471 0.451 0.469 0.672
10/4/51 11:00 5.552 7 42 0.483 0.417 0.481 0.642
1/23/54 0:00 5.107 7 43 0.494 0.383 0.492 0.612
10/22/61 8:00 5.500 7 44 0.506 0.350 0.504 0.584 Yrs of Rec 86
9/25/92 8:00 5.767 7 45 0.517 0.317 0.515 0.556 N (Events) = 86
11/17/94 9:00 5.455 7 46 0.529 0.284 0.527 0.530 TR, % 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
10/19/97 12:00 5.626 7 47 0.541 0.251 0.538 0.504 TR, Years 1 2 10 25 100 500
8/22/31 17:00 8.198 6 48 0.552 0.219 0.550 0.480 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/9/32 17:00 4.835 6 49 0.564 0.187 0.561 0.456 A = 1/β 0.1635
8/28/39 20:00 4.912 6 50 0.575 0.155 0.573 0.433 B = -γ/β -0.5499
3/19/46 23:00 5.125 6 51 0.587 0.123 0.585 0.411 β = 1/A 6.12
5/11/49 20:00 5.280 6 52 0.599 0.091 0.596 0.390 γ = -β*B 3.36
9/12/60 6:00 6.316 6 53 0.610 0.059 0.608 0.369 α = 0.7
1/16/65 21:00 5.342 6 54 0.622 0.028 0.619 0.350 DTR 3 9 23 31 44 58
1/27/66 0:00 4.927 6 55 0.634 -0.004 0.631 0.330
9/16/67 19:00 5.312 6 56 0.645 -0.035 0.642 0.312 Yrs of Rec 86
10/27/70 7:00 5.067 6 57 0.657 -0.067 0.654 0.294 N (Events) = 86
9/21/72 7:00 5.496 6 58 0.668 -0.099 0.666 0.277 TR, % 87.7 78.1 39.4 9.9 0.64 0.04
10/14/77 10:00 5.821 6 59 0.680 -0.130 0.677 0.260 TR, Years 1.14 1.28 2.54 10.1 157.0 2440.0
8/20/81 12:00 5.230 6 60 0.692 -0.162 0.689 0.244 λ = N/YofR 1.00
8/17/86 20:00 5.618 6 61 0.703 -0.195 0.700 0.229 A = 1/β 0.1635
10/25/05 3:00 4.850 6 62 0.715 -0.227 0.712 0.214 B = -γ/β -0.5499
11/3/07 4:00 4.735 6 63 0.726 -0.259 0.723 0.200 β = 1/A 6.12
2/6/10 3:00 5.674 6 64 0.738 -0.292 0.735 0.186 γ = -β*B 3.36
11/1/14 16:00 4.922 6 65 0.750 -0.326 0.747 0.172 α = 0.7
8/22/30 20:00 5.666 5 66 0.761 -0.359 0.758 0.160 DTR 5 6 12 24 48 72
5/30/38 22:00 5.245 5 67 0.773 -0.394 0.770 0.147
9/30/44 20:00 4.955 5 68 0.784 -0.428 0.781 0.135
9/12/50 21:00 4.766 5 69 0.796 -0.464 0.793 0.124
2/27/52 10:00 5.137 5 70 0.808 -0.500 0.804 0.113
4/12/59 23:00 4.631 5 71 0.819 -0.537 0.816 0.103
9/15/63 20:00 5.070 5 72 0.831 -0.575 0.828 0.093
12/1/74 10:00 5.177 5 73 0.843 -0.614 0.839 0.083
11/24/75 13:00 4.660 5 74 0.854 -0.655 0.851 0.074
9/24/79 11:00 4.660 5 75 0.866 -0.697 0.862 0.065
10/14/84 12:00 4.794 5 76 0.877 -0.741 0.874 0.057
9/19/89 11:00 4.821 5 77 0.889 -0.788 0.885 0.049
1/10/93 10:00 5.152 5 78 0.901 -0.837 0.897 0.042
8/19/95 16:00 4.521 5 79 0.912 -0.889 0.909 0.035
9/30/01 20:00 4.887 5 80 0.924 -0.946 0.920 0.029
3/20/34 12:00 4.503 4 81 0.935 -1.008 0.932 0.023
3/10/76 3:00 4.285 4 82 0.947 -1.078 0.943 0.017
8/22/80 17:00 4.415 4 83 0.959 -1.159 0.955 0.012
10/16/02 5:00 4.748 4 84 0.970 -1.257 0.966 0.008
9/19/04 12:00 4.550 4 85 0.982 -1.389 0.978 0.004
1/28/41 10:00 4.501 3 86 0.993 -1.617 0.990 0.001
N (Events) = 86
Inverse of the Return Periods for the Weibull Analysis for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 and 
72 hours, TR , %
Gumbel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                   
DTR (Hrs) = γ - β*ln(ln{λTR/(λTR-1)})  
Weibel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                               
DTR = γ + β*LN(λ*TR)^(1/α)
Event Adjusted to 2014 + SLR = +1.5 ft
Q, Gumbel Q, WeibelSheet 5 - Current Year+SLR = 1.5 Ft.
y = 0.1082x - 0.6226 
































y = 0.1635x - 0.5499 






































C1 = 0.440 C1 = 0.470
C2 = 0.120 C2 = 0.430
Event Duration α = 0.9
Date Time Elevation Hours i Q G Q W
11/12/09 18:00 8.138 69 1 0.007 5.032 0.006 6.104
2/5/98 4:00 7.197 57 2 0.018 4.002 0.018 4.710
8/30/99 12:00 6.201 46 3 0.030 3.501 0.029 4.062
10/21/58 18:00 6.547 45 4 0.041 3.165 0.041 3.639
9/27/56 2:00 7.174 44 5 0.053 2.911 0.052 3.325
3/7/62 10:00 8.387 44 6 0.065 2.707 0.064 3.076
4/27/78 0:00 7.337 43 7 0.076 2.535 0.076 2.870
9/16/33 18:00 7.719 34 8 0.088 2.387 0.087 2.695
10/29/12 8:00 7.178 34 9 0.099 2.257 0.099 2.542
10/25/82 4:00 6.775 32 10 0.111 2.140 0.110 2.407
4/13/88 7:00 6.366 32 11 0.123 2.034 0.122 2.287
10/7/06 9:00 7.002 32 12 0.134 1.937 0.133 2.177
4/10/03 15:00 5.515 31 13 0.146 1.847 0.145 2.078
12/5/45 9:00 6.142 29 14 0.157 1.764 0.157 1.986
5/27/68 21:00 5.997 29 15 0.169 1.686 0.168 1.901
9/19/28 0:00 6.996 21 16 0.181 1.613 0.180 1.823 Yrs of Rec 86
9/13/64 16:00 6.657 21 17 0.192 1.544 0.191 1.749 N (Events) = 86
9/25/08 18:00 6.283 21 18 0.204 1.478 0.203 1.680 TR, % 99 50 25 10 1 0.2
9/18/36 10:00 8.274 20 19 0.216 1.416 0.214 1.616 TR, Years 1.01 2 4 10 100 500
10/6/57 8:00 6.861 20 20 0.227 1.356 0.226 1.554 λ = N/YofR 1.00
3/2/69 7:00 5.982 20 21 0.239 1.299 0.238 1.497 A = 1/β 0.0924
3/10/87 5:00 5.541 20 22 0.250 1.244 0.249 1.442 B = -γ/β -0.9072
2/6/10 3:00 6.174 20 23 0.262 1.192 0.261 1.389 β = 1/A 10.82
10/10/13 1:00 5.854 20 24 0.274 1.141 0.272 1.340 γ = -β*B 9.82
11/17/35 13:00 5.691 19 25 0.285 1.091 0.284 1.292 α = N/A
11/6/53 9:00 5.622 19 26 0.297 1.044 0.295 1.247 DTR -7 14 23 34 60 77
10/5/92 16:00 4.827 19 27 0.308 0.998 0.307 1.203
11/17/94 9:00 5.955 19 28 0.320 0.953 0.319 1.161
8/27/11 19:00 7.970 19 29 0.332 0.909 0.330 1.121
1/29/37 10:00 5.959 18 30 0.343 0.866 0.342 1.082
2/11/83 9:00 5.782 18 31 0.355 0.825 0.353 1.045
10/26/90 2:00 5.395 18 32 0.366 0.784 0.365 1.009
10/8/96 19:00 5.712 18 33 0.378 0.745 0.376 0.975
4/16/05 2:00 4.760 18 34 0.390 0.706 0.388 0.941
1/25/00 12:00 6.058 17 35 0.401 0.667 0.400 0.909
4/6/71 17:00 5.352 16 36 0.413 0.630 0.411 0.877
8/12/55 16:00 5.792 13 37 0.425 0.593 0.423 0.847
1/24/40 8:00 6.397 11 38 0.436 0.557 0.434 0.818
10/31/91 16:00 6.029 11 39 0.448 0.521 0.446 0.789
1/23/54 0:00 5.607 10 40 0.459 0.486 0.457 0.761
11/4/85 16:00 5.260 10 41 0.471 0.451 0.469 0.734
9/22/29 11:00 5.781 9 42 0.483 0.417 0.481 0.708
9/30/43 10:00 5.870 9 43 0.494 0.383 0.492 0.683
10/5/48 11:00 6.756 9 44 0.506 0.350 0.504 0.658
10/4/51 11:00 6.052 9 45 0.517 0.317 0.515 0.634
10/22/61 8:00 6.000 9 46 0.529 0.284 0.527 0.610 Yrs of Rec 86
1/27/66 0:00 5.427 9 47 0.541 0.251 0.538 0.587 N (Events) = 86
8/22/31 17:00 8.698 8 48 0.552 0.219 0.550 0.565 TR, % 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
8/28/39 20:00 5.412 8 49 0.564 0.187 0.561 0.543 TR, Years 1 2 10 25 100 500
9/14/44 12:00 5.156 8 50 0.575 0.155 0.573 0.522 λ = N/YofR 1.00
10/16/49 16:00 5.081 8 51 0.587 0.123 0.585 0.501 A = 1/β 0.086
9/16/67 19:00 5.812 8 52 0.599 0.091 0.596 0.481 B = -γ/β -0.3271
10/27/70 19:00 5.465 8 53 0.610 0.059 0.608 0.461 β = 1/A 11.63
12/1/74 10:00 5.677 8 54 0.622 0.028 0.619 0.441 γ = -β*B 3.80
8/20/81 12:00 5.730 8 55 0.634 -0.004 0.631 0.423 α = 0.9
8/19/95 16:00 5.021 8 56 0.645 -0.035 0.642 0.404 DTR 4 13 34 45 63 84
10/19/97 12:00 6.126 8 57 0.657 -0.067 0.654 0.386
11/3/07 4:00 5.235 8 58 0.668 -0.099 0.666 0.368 Yrs of Rec 86
8/22/30 20:00 6.166 7 59 0.680 -0.130 0.677 0.351 N (Events) = 86
9/9/32 17:00 5.335 7 60 0.692 -0.162 0.689 0.334 TR, % 94.3 87.0 54.9 21.7 3.4 0.5
5/30/38 22:00 5.745 7 61 0.703 -0.195 0.700 0.318 TR, Years 1.06 1.15 1.82 4.60 29.5 189.00
3/19/46 23:00 5.625 7 62 0.715 -0.227 0.712 0.301 λ = N/YofR 1.00
11/1/47 11:00 5.981 7 63 0.726 -0.259 0.723 0.286 A = 1/β 0.086
4/12/59 23:00 5.131 7 64 0.738 -0.292 0.735 0.270 B = -γ/β -0.3271
9/12/60 6:00 6.816 7 65 0.750 -0.326 0.747 0.255 β = 1/A 11.63
9/15/63 20:00 5.570 7 66 0.761 -0.359 0.758 0.240 γ = -β*B 3.80
1/16/65 21:00 5.842 7 67 0.773 -0.394 0.770 0.225 α = 0.9
9/21/72 7:00 5.996 7 68 0.784 -0.428 0.781 0.211 DTR 5 6 12 24 48 72
10/14/77 10:00 6.321 7 69 0.796 -0.464 0.793 0.197
10/14/84 12:00 5.294 7 70 0.808 -0.500 0.804 0.184
8/17/86 20:00 6.118 7 71 0.819 -0.537 0.816 0.170
1/10/93 10:00 5.652 7 72 0.831 -0.575 0.828 0.157
9/30/01 20:00 5.387 7 73 0.843 -0.614 0.839 0.144
11/1/14 16:00 5.422 7 74 0.854 -0.655 0.851 0.132
3/20/34 12:00 5.003 6 75 0.866 -0.697 0.862 0.120
9/12/50 21:00 5.266 6 76 0.877 -0.741 0.874 0.108
2/27/52 10:00 5.637 6 77 0.889 -0.788 0.885 0.096
11/24/75 13:00 5.160 6 78 0.901 -0.837 0.897 0.085
3/10/76 3:00 4.785 6 79 0.912 -0.889 0.909 0.074
9/24/79 11:00 5.160 6 80 0.924 -0.946 0.920 0.063
8/22/80 17:00 4.915 6 81 0.935 -1.008 0.932 0.053
9/19/89 11:00 5.321 6 82 0.947 -1.078 0.943 0.043
10/16/02 5:00 5.248 6 83 0.959 -1.159 0.955 0.033
9/19/04 12:00 5.050 6 84 0.970 -1.257 0.966 0.023
1/28/41 10:00 5.001 5 85 0.982 -1.389 0.978 0.015
2/11/73 3:00 6.122 1 86 0.993 -1.617 0.990 0.006
N (Events) = 86
Inverse of the Return Periods for the Weibull Analysis for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 and 
72 hours, TR , %
Event Adjusted to 2014 + SLR = +2.0 ft
Gumbel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                   
DTR (Hrs) = γ - β*ln(ln{λTR/(λTR-1)})  
Weibel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                               
DTR = γ + β*LN(λ*TR)^(1/α)
Q, Gumbel Q, WeibelSheet 6 - Current+SLR = 2.0 Ft.
y = 0.086x - 0.3271 






























Weibel Distribution, α = 0.9  
y = 0.0924x - 0.9072 








































C1 = 0.440 C1 = 0.470
C2 = 0.120 C2 = 0.430
Event Duration α = 1.8
Date Time Elevation Hours i Q G Q W
11/12/09 18:00 8.638 71 1 0.007 5.032 0.006 2.471
10/21/58 18:00 7.047 70 2 0.018 4.002 0.018 2.170
2/5/98 4:00 7.697 70 3 0.030 3.501 0.029 2.016
8/30/99 12:00 6.701 70 4 0.041 3.165 0.041 1.908
11/2/85 11:00 6.131 69 5 0.053 2.911 0.052 1.823
3/7/62 10:00 8.887 57 6 0.065 2.707 0.064 1.754
9/25/08 18:00 6.783 56 7 0.076 2.535 0.076 1.694
12/5/45 9:00 6.642 55 8 0.088 2.387 0.087 1.642
9/27/56 2:00 7.674 46 9 0.099 2.257 0.099 1.594
10/29/12 8:00 7.678 46 10 0.111 2.140 0.110 1.552
9/16/33 18:00 8.219 45 11 0.123 2.034 0.122 1.512
4/27/78 0:00 7.837 45 12 0.134 1.937 0.133 1.476
11/22/06 10:00 7.663 45 13 0.146 1.847 0.145 1.441
11/20/39 16:00 5.610 44 14 0.157 1.764 0.157 1.409
10/27/70 7:00 6.067 44 15 0.169 1.686 0.168 1.379
10/25/82 4:00 7.275 44 16 0.181 1.613 0.180 1.350 Yrs of Rec 86
10/14/84 12:00 5.794 44 17 0.192 1.544 0.191 1.323 N (Events) = 86
10/31/91 16:00 6.529 44 18 0.204 1.478 0.203 1.296 TR, % 99 50 25 10 1 0.2
9/13/64 16:00 7.157 43 19 0.216 1.416 0.214 1.271 TR, Years 1.01 2 4 10 100 500
9/30/01 20:00 5.887 43 20 0.227 1.356 0.226 1.247 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/5/00 14:00 5.758 42 21 0.239 1.299 0.238 1.223 A = 1/β 0.0728
4/16/05 2:00 5.260 42 22 0.250 1.244 0.249 1.201 B = -γ/β -1.4994
3/10/87 5:00 6.041 35 23 0.262 1.192 0.261 1.179 β = 1/A 13.74
11/2/47 11:00 6.481 34 24 0.274 1.141 0.272 1.157 γ = -β*B 20.60
4/13/88 7:00 6.866 34 25 0.285 1.091 0.284 1.137 α = N/A
10/26/43 7:00 5.871 33 26 0.297 1.044 0.295 1.117 DTR 0 26 38 52 84 106
10/21/61 19:00 6.802 33 27 0.308 0.998 0.307 1.097
5/26/72 20:00 5.935 33 28 0.320 0.953 0.319 1.078
12/19/77 5:00 5.811 33 29 0.332 0.909 0.330 1.059
4/10/03 15:00 6.015 33 30 0.343 0.866 0.342 1.040
10/10/13 1:00 6.354 33 31 0.355 0.825 0.353 1.022
10/6/57 8:00 7.361 32 32 0.366 0.784 0.365 1.005
10/19/71 9:00 6.052 32 33 0.378 0.745 0.376 0.987
8/19/95 16:00 5.521 32 34 0.390 0.706 0.388 0.970
2/6/10 3:00 6.674 32 35 0.401 0.667 0.400 0.953
9/19/28 0:00 7.496 31 36 0.413 0.630 0.411 0.937
10/4/51 11:00 6.552 31 37 0.425 0.593 0.423 0.920
5/27/68 21:00 6.497 31 38 0.436 0.557 0.434 0.904
2/11/73 3:00 6.622 31 39 0.448 0.521 0.446 0.888
10/26/90 2:00 5.895 31 40 0.459 0.486 0.457 0.872
10/5/92 16:00 5.327 31 41 0.471 0.451 0.469 0.857
11/17/94 9:00 6.455 31 42 0.483 0.417 0.481 0.841
11/3/07 4:00 5.735 31 43 0.494 0.383 0.492 0.826
8/12/55 16:00 6.292 24 44 0.506 0.350 0.504 0.811
3/2/69 7:00 6.482 22 45 0.517 0.317 0.515 0.796 Yrs of Rec 86
11/17/35 13:00 6.191 21 46 0.529 0.284 0.527 0.781 N (Events) = 86
3/19/46 23:00 6.125 21 47 0.541 0.251 0.538 0.766 TR, % 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
9/29/83 15:00 5.780 21 48 0.552 0.219 0.550 0.752 TR, Years 1 2 10 25 100 500
10/16/02 5:00 5.748 21 49 0.564 0.187 0.561 0.737 λ = N/YofR 1.00
8/27/11 19:00 8.470 21 50 0.575 0.155 0.573 0.722 A = 1/β 0.0295
8/22/31 17:00 8.798 20 51 0.587 0.123 0.585 0.708 B = -γ/β 0.0533
9/18/36 10:00 8.774 20 52 0.599 0.091 0.596 0.693 β = 1/A 33.90
1/29/37 10:00 6.459 20 53 0.610 0.059 0.608 0.679 γ = -β*B -1.81
10/5/48 11:00 7.256 20 54 0.622 0.028 0.619 0.664 α = 1.8
1/23/54 0:00 6.107 20 55 0.634 -0.004 0.631 0.650 DTR -2 11 42 59 85 115
2/1/60 0:00 5.915 20 56 0.645 -0.035 0.642 0.636
1/16/65 21:00 6.342 20 57 0.657 -0.067 0.654 0.621 Yrs of Rec 86
1/27/66 0:00 5.927 20 58 0.668 -0.099 0.666 0.607 N (Events) = 86
9/16/67 19:00 6.312 20 59 0.680 -0.130 0.677 0.592 TR, % 71.4 67.6 49.3 26.0 7.2 2.0
10/8/96 19:00 6.212 20 60 0.692 -0.162 0.689 0.578 TR, Years 1.40 1.48 2.03 3.84 13.80 49.10
10/19/97 12:00 6.626 20 61 0.703 -0.195 0.700 0.564 λ = N/YofR 1.00
11/6/53 9:00 6.122 19 62 0.715 -0.227 0.712 0.549 A = 1/β 0.0295
11/24/75 13:00 5.660 19 63 0.726 -0.259 0.723 0.534 B = -γ/β 0.0533
2/24/89 11:00 5.870 19 64 0.738 -0.292 0.735 0.520 β = 1/A 33.90
9/19/04 12:00 5.550 19 65 0.750 -0.326 0.747 0.505 γ = -β*B -1.81
9/14/44 12:00 5.656 17 66 0.761 -0.359 0.758 0.490 α = 1.8
1/24/40 8:00 6.897 16 67 0.773 -0.394 0.770 0.475 DTR 5 6 12 24 48 72
9/22/29 11:00 6.281 11 68 0.784 -0.428 0.781 0.460
11/27/32 8:00 6.334 9 69 0.796 -0.464 0.793 0.444
10/16/49 16:00 5.581 9 70 0.808 -0.500 0.804 0.429
4/12/59 23:00 5.631 9 71 0.819 -0.537 0.816 0.413
3/10/76 3:00 5.285 9 72 0.831 -0.575 0.828 0.397
8/22/30 20:00 6.666 8 73 0.843 -0.614 0.839 0.380
3/20/34 12:00 5.503 8 74 0.854 -0.655 0.851 0.363
5/30/38 22:00 6.245 8 75 0.866 -0.697 0.862 0.346
11/21/52 11:00 5.937 8 76 0.877 -0.741 0.874 0.328
9/15/63 20:00 6.070 8 77 0.889 -0.788 0.885 0.310
12/1/74 10:00 6.177 8 78 0.901 -0.837 0.897 0.291
8/20/81 12:00 6.230 8 79 0.912 -0.889 0.909 0.272
1/10/93 10:00 6.152 8 80 0.924 -0.946 0.920 0.251
11/1/14 16:00 5.922 8 81 0.935 -1.008 0.932 0.230
1/12/41 8:00 5.199 7 82 0.947 -1.078 0.943 0.206
9/12/50 21:00 5.766 7 83 0.959 -1.159 0.955 0.181
9/24/79 11:00 5.660 7 84 0.970 -1.257 0.966 0.153
8/22/80 17:00 5.415 7 85 0.982 -1.389 0.978 0.121
8/17/86 20:00 6.618 7 86 0.993 -1.617 0.990 0.079
N (Events) = 86
Inverse of the Return Periods for the Weibull Analysis for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 
and 72 hours, TR , %
Event Adjusted to 2014 + SLR = +2.5 ft
Gumbel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                   
DTR (Hrs) = γ - β*ln(ln{λTR/(λTR-1)})  
Weibel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                               
DTR = γ + β*LN(λ*TR)^(1/α)
Q, Gumbel Q, WeibelSheet 7 - Current Year+SLR = 2.5 Ft.
y = 0.0295x + 0.0533 



























Weibel Distribution, α = 1.8 
y = 0.0728x - 1.4994 







































C1 = 0.440 C1 = 0.470
C2 = 0.120 C2 = 0.430
Event Duration α = 1.4
Date Time Elevation Hours i Q G Q W
11/12/09 18:00 8.638 71 1 0.007 5.032 0.006 3.199
10/21/58 18:00 7.047 70 2 0.018 4.002 0.018 2.708
2/5/98 4:00 7.697 70 3 0.030 3.501 0.029 2.462
8/30/99 12:00 6.701 70 4 0.041 3.165 0.041 2.294
11/2/85 11:00 6.131 69 5 0.053 2.911 0.052 2.165
3/7/62 10:00 8.887 57 6 0.065 2.707 0.064 2.059
9/25/08 18:00 6.783 56 7 0.076 2.535 0.076 1.970
12/5/45 9:00 6.642 55 8 0.088 2.387 0.087 1.891
9/27/56 2:00 7.674 46 9 0.099 2.257 0.099 1.822
10/29/12 8:00 7.678 46 10 0.111 2.140 0.110 1.759
9/16/33 18:00 8.219 45 11 0.123 2.034 0.122 1.702
4/27/78 0:00 7.837 45 12 0.134 1.937 0.133 1.649
11/22/06 10:00 7.663 45 13 0.146 1.847 0.145 1.600
11/20/39 16:00 5.610 44 14 0.157 1.764 0.157 1.554
10/27/70 7:00 6.067 44 15 0.169 1.686 0.168 1.512
10/25/82 4:00 7.275 44 16 0.181 1.613 0.180 1.471 Yrs of Rec 86
10/14/84 12:00 5.794 44 17 0.192 1.544 0.191 1.433 N (Events) = 86
10/31/91 16:00 6.529 44 18 0.204 1.478 0.203 1.396 TR, % 99 50 25 10 1 0.2
9/13/64 16:00 7.157 43 19 0.216 1.416 0.214 1.361 TR, Years 1.01 2 4 10 100 500
9/30/01 20:00 5.887 43 20 0.227 1.356 0.226 1.328 λ = N/YofR 1.00
9/5/00 14:00 5.758 42 21 0.239 1.299 0.238 1.296 A = 1/β 0.0728
4/16/05 2:00 5.260 42 22 0.250 1.244 0.249 1.265 B = -γ/β -1.4994
3/10/87 5:00 6.041 35 23 0.262 1.192 0.261 1.235 β = 1/A 13.74
11/2/47 11:00 6.481 34 24 0.274 1.141 0.272 1.207 γ = -β*B 20.60
4/13/88 7:00 6.866 34 25 0.285 1.091 0.284 1.179 α = N/A
10/26/43 7:00 5.871 33 26 0.297 1.044 0.295 1.152 DTR 0 26 38 52 84 106
10/21/61 19:00 6.802 33 27 0.308 0.998 0.307 1.126
5/26/72 20:00 5.935 33 28 0.320 0.953 0.319 1.101
12/19/77 5:00 5.811 33 29 0.332 0.909 0.330 1.076
4/10/03 15:00 6.015 33 30 0.343 0.866 0.342 1.052
10/10/13 1:00 6.354 33 31 0.355 0.825 0.353 1.029
10/6/57 8:00 7.361 32 32 0.366 0.784 0.365 1.006
10/19/71 9:00 6.052 32 33 0.378 0.745 0.376 0.984
8/19/95 16:00 5.521 32 34 0.390 0.706 0.388 0.962
2/6/10 3:00 6.674 32 35 0.401 0.667 0.400 0.940
9/19/28 0:00 7.496 31 36 0.413 0.630 0.411 0.919
10/4/51 11:00 6.552 31 37 0.425 0.593 0.423 0.899
5/27/68 21:00 6.497 31 38 0.436 0.557 0.434 0.879
2/11/73 3:00 6.622 31 39 0.448 0.521 0.446 0.859
10/26/90 2:00 5.895 31 40 0.459 0.486 0.457 0.839
10/5/92 16:00 5.327 31 41 0.471 0.451 0.469 0.820
11/17/94 9:00 6.455 31 42 0.483 0.417 0.481 0.801
11/3/07 4:00 5.735 31 43 0.494 0.383 0.492 0.782
8/12/55 16:00 6.292 24 44 0.506 0.350 0.504 0.764
3/2/69 7:00 6.482 22 45 0.517 0.317 0.515 0.746 Yrs of Rec 86
11/17/35 13:00 6.191 21 46 0.529 0.284 0.527 0.728 N (Events) = 86
3/19/46 23:00 6.125 21 47 0.541 0.251 0.538 0.710 TR, % 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
9/29/83 15:00 5.780 21 48 0.552 0.219 0.550 0.693 TR, Years 1 2 10 25 100 500
10/16/02 5:00 5.748 21 49 0.564 0.187 0.561 0.675 λ = N/YofR 1.00
8/27/11 19:00 8.470 21 50 0.575 0.155 0.573 0.658 A = 1/β 0.0378
8/22/31 17:00 8.798 20 51 0.587 0.123 0.585 0.641 B = -γ/β -0.1618
9/18/36 10:00 8.774 20 52 0.599 0.091 0.596 0.624 β = 1/A 26.46
1/29/37 10:00 6.459 20 53 0.610 0.059 0.608 0.608 γ = -β*B 4.28
10/5/48 11:00 7.256 20 54 0.622 0.028 0.619 0.591 α = 1.4
1/23/54 0:00 6.107 20 55 0.634 -0.004 0.631 0.575 DTR 4 17 48 65 91 122
2/1/60 0:00 5.915 20 56 0.645 -0.035 0.642 0.558
1/16/65 21:00 6.342 20 57 0.657 -0.067 0.654 0.542 Yrs of Rec 86
1/27/66 0:00 5.927 20 58 0.668 -0.099 0.666 0.526 N (Events) = 86
9/16/67 19:00 6.312 20 59 0.680 -0.130 0.677 0.510 TR, % 98.0 93.5 68.0 36.1 10.2 2.8
10/8/96 19:00 6.212 20 60 0.692 -0.162 0.689 0.494 TR, Years 1.02 1.07 1.47 2.77 9.85 35.1
10/19/97 12:00 6.626 20 61 0.703 -0.195 0.700 0.478 λ = N/YofR 1.00
11/6/53 9:00 6.122 19 62 0.715 -0.227 0.712 0.463 A = 1/β 0.0378
11/24/75 13:00 5.660 19 63 0.726 -0.259 0.723 0.447 B = -γ/β -0.1618
2/24/89 11:00 5.870 19 64 0.738 -0.292 0.735 0.431 β = 1/A 26.46
9/19/04 12:00 5.550 19 65 0.750 -0.326 0.747 0.415 γ = -β*B 4.28
9/14/44 12:00 5.656 17 66 0.761 -0.359 0.758 0.400 α = 1.4
1/24/40 8:00 6.897 16 67 0.773 -0.394 0.770 0.384 DTR 5 6 12 24 48 72
9/22/29 11:00 6.281 11 68 0.784 -0.428 0.781 0.368
11/27/32 8:00 6.334 9 69 0.796 -0.464 0.793 0.352
10/16/49 16:00 5.581 9 70 0.808 -0.500 0.804 0.336
4/12/59 23:00 5.631 9 71 0.819 -0.537 0.816 0.320
3/10/76 3:00 5.285 9 72 0.831 -0.575 0.828 0.304
8/22/30 20:00 6.666 8 73 0.843 -0.614 0.839 0.288
3/20/34 12:00 5.503 8 74 0.854 -0.655 0.851 0.272
5/30/38 22:00 6.245 8 75 0.866 -0.697 0.862 0.256
11/21/52 11:00 5.937 8 76 0.877 -0.741 0.874 0.239
9/15/63 20:00 6.070 8 77 0.889 -0.788 0.885 0.222
12/1/74 10:00 6.177 8 78 0.901 -0.837 0.897 0.205
8/20/81 12:00 6.230 8 79 0.912 -0.889 0.909 0.187
1/10/93 10:00 6.152 8 80 0.924 -0.946 0.920 0.169
11/1/14 16:00 5.922 8 81 0.935 -1.008 0.932 0.151
1/12/41 8:00 5.199 7 82 0.947 -1.078 0.943 0.131
9/12/50 21:00 5.766 7 83 0.959 -1.159 0.955 0.111
9/24/79 11:00 5.660 7 84 0.970 -1.257 0.966 0.090
8/22/80 17:00 5.415 7 85 0.982 -1.389 0.978 0.066
8/17/86 20:00 6.618 7 86 0.993 -1.617 0.990 0.039
N (Events) = 86
Inverse of the Return Periods for the Weibull Analysis for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 
and 72 hours, TR , %
Q, Gumbel Q, Weibel
Event Adjusted to 2014 + SLR = +2.5 ft
Gumbel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                   
DTR (Hrs) = γ - β*ln(ln{λTR/(λTR-1)})  
Weibel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                               
DTR = γ + β*LN(λ*TR)^(1/α)
Sheet 8 - Current Year+SLR = 2.5 Ft. ADJUSTED
y = 0.0378x - 0.1618 




























Weibel Distribution, α = 1.4 
y = 0.0728x - 1.4994 






































C1 = 0.440 C1 = 0.470
C2 = 0.120 C2 = 0.430
Event Duration α = 1.7
Date Time Elevation Hours i Q G Q W
2/5/98 4:00 8.197 133 1 0.007 5.032 0.006 2.606
11/2/85 11:00 6.631 132 2 0.018 4.002 0.018 2.272
10/28/56 17:00 6.577 120 3 0.030 3.501 0.029 2.100
10/17/49 17:00 6.380 96 4 0.041 3.165 0.041 1.981
10/23/04 18:00 6.057 96 5 0.053 2.911 0.052 1.889
10/29/77 11:00 6.150 93 6 0.065 2.707 0.064 1.813
8/30/99 12:00 7.201 84 7 0.076 2.535 0.076 1.748
10/21/61 19:00 7.302 83 8 0.088 2.387 0.087 1.690
11/12/09 18:00 9.138 83 9 0.099 2.257 0.099 1.639
11/1/47 11:00 6.981 82 10 0.111 2.140 0.110 1.592
10/21/58 18:00 7.547 82 11 0.123 2.034 0.122 1.549
10/31/91 16:00 7.029 82 12 0.134 1.937 0.133 1.510
10/29/38 13:00 5.646 81 13 0.146 1.847 0.145 1.473
4/10/03 15:00 6.515 81 14 0.157 1.764 0.157 1.438
9/25/08 18:00 7.283 71 15 0.169 1.686 0.168 1.405
10/19/71 9:00 6.552 70 16 0.181 1.613 0.180 1.374 Yrs of Rec 86
12/12/92 10:00 6.836 70 17 0.192 1.544 0.191 1.345 N (Events) = 86
11/20/39 16:00 6.110 69 18 0.204 1.478 0.203 1.316 TR, % 99 50 25 10 1 0.2
12/5/45 9:00 7.142 69 19 0.216 1.416 0.214 1.289 TR, Years 1.01 2 4 10 100 500
11/27/62 9:00 7.186 69 20 0.227 1.356 0.226 1.263 λ = N/YofR 1.00
10/27/70 7:00 6.567 69 21 0.239 1.299 0.238 1.238 A = 1/β 0.048
10/14/84 12:00 6.294 68 22 0.250 1.244 0.249 1.214 B = -γ/β -1.864
11/22/06 10:00 8.163 67 23 0.262 1.192 0.261 1.190 β = 1/A 20.83
8/19/95 16:00 6.021 59 24 0.274 1.141 0.272 1.167 γ = -β*B 38.83
9/22/29 11:00 6.781 58 25 0.285 1.091 0.284 1.145 α = N/A
4/27/78 0:00 8.337 58 26 0.297 1.044 0.295 1.124 DTR 7 46 65 86 135 168
11/12/10 13:00 6.078 58 27 0.308 0.998 0.307 1.103
8/22/31 17:00 9.198 57 28 0.320 0.953 0.319 1.082
9/16/33 18:00 8.719 57 29 0.332 0.909 0.330 1.062
11/17/35 13:00 6.691 57 30 0.343 0.866 0.342 1.043
9/22/64 9:00 6.657 57 31 0.355 0.825 0.353 1.024
9/24/79 11:00 6.160 57 32 0.366 0.784 0.365 1.005
4/13/88 7:00 7.366 57 33 0.378 0.745 0.376 0.987
3/19/46 23:00 6.625 56 34 0.390 0.706 0.388 0.968
5/26/72 20:00 6.435 56 35 0.401 0.667 0.400 0.951
10/25/82 4:00 7.775 56 36 0.413 0.630 0.411 0.933
11/17/94 9:00 6.955 56 37 0.425 0.593 0.423 0.916
4/16/05 2:00 5.760 56 38 0.436 0.557 0.434 0.899
9/5/00 14:00 6.258 55 39 0.448 0.521 0.446 0.882
10/29/12 8:00 8.178 48 40 0.459 0.486 0.457 0.866
3/10/87 5:00 6.541 47 41 0.471 0.451 0.469 0.849
10/10/13 1:00 6.854 46 42 0.483 0.417 0.481 0.833
10/26/43 7:00 6.371 45 43 0.494 0.383 0.492 0.817
10/6/57 8:00 7.861 45 44 0.506 0.350 0.504 0.801 Yrs of Rec 86
9/15/63 20:00 6.570 45 45 0.517 0.317 0.515 0.785 N (Events) = 86
9/29/83 15:00 6.280 45 46 0.529 0.284 0.527 0.770 TR, % 99 50 10 4 1 0.2
9/30/01 20:00 6.387 45 47 0.541 0.251 0.538 0.754 TR, Years 1 2 10 25 100 500
2/6/37 5:00 5.561 44 48 0.552 0.219 0.550 0.739 λ = N/YofR 1.00
3/14/51 0:00 5.831 44 49 0.564 0.187 0.561 0.724 A = 1/β 0.0204
6/16/65 23:00 6.041 44 50 0.575 0.155 0.573 0.709 B = -γ/β -0.1402
3/2/69 7:00 6.982 44 51 0.587 0.123 0.585 0.694 β = 1/A 49.02
10/26/90 2:00 6.395 44 52 0.599 0.091 0.596 0.678 γ = -β*B 6.87
11/3/07 4:00 6.235 44 53 0.610 0.059 0.608 0.664 α = 1.7
1/23/54 0:00 6.607 43 54 0.622 0.028 0.619 0.649 DTR 7 27 73 100 140 186
2/1/60 0:00 6.415 35 55 0.634 -0.004 0.631 0.634
9/16/67 19:00 6.812 34 56 0.645 -0.035 0.642 0.619 Yrs of Rec 86
9/19/28 0:00 7.996 33 57 0.657 -0.067 0.654 0.604 N (Events) = 86
6/10/55 0:00 6.191 33 58 0.668 -0.099 0.666 0.589 TR, % 102 101 95 86 70 56
5/27/68 21:00 6.997 33 59 0.680 -0.130 0.677 0.575 TR, Years 0.980 0.989 1.05 1.16 1.430 1.77
2/11/73 3:00 7.122 33 60 0.692 -0.162 0.689 0.560 λ = N/YofR 1.00
11/24/75 13:00 6.160 33 61 0.703 -0.195 0.700 0.545 A = 1/β 0.0204
10/10/86 15:00 5.736 33 62 0.715 -0.227 0.712 0.530 B = -γ/β -0.1402
12/16/93 11:00 6.379 33 63 0.726 -0.259 0.723 0.515 β = 1/A 49.02
6/3/97 20:00 6.523 33 64 0.738 -0.292 0.735 0.500 γ = -β*B 6.87
11/5/11 5:00 6.244 33 65 0.750 -0.326 0.747 0.485 α = 0.4
12/9/14 11:00 6.179 33 66 0.761 -0.359 0.758 0.470 DTR 5 6 12 24 48 72
10/5/48 11:00 7.756 32 67 0.773 -0.394 0.770 0.454
9/6/50 16:00 5.066 32 68 0.784 -0.428 0.781 0.439
10/16/02 5:00 6.248 32 69 0.796 -0.464 0.793 0.423
1/27/66 0:00 6.427 31 70 0.808 -0.500 0.804 0.408
3/10/76 3:00 5.785 31 71 0.819 -0.537 0.816 0.392
9/9/32 17:00 6.385 22 72 0.831 -0.575 0.828 0.376
9/18/36 10:00 8.274 22 73 0.843 -0.614 0.839 0.359
10/1/40 9:00 6.895 22 74 0.854 -0.655 0.851 0.342
10/23/53 10:00 7.022 22 75 0.866 -0.697 0.862 0.325
8/20/81 12:00 6.730 22 76 0.877 -0.741 0.874 0.308
10/8/96 19:00 6.712 22 77 0.889 -0.788 0.885 0.290
12/4/52 11:00 6.135 21 78 0.901 -0.837 0.897 0.271
6/28/74 4:00 5.946 21 79 0.912 -0.889 0.909 0.252
10/5/34 7:00 5.606 20 80 0.924 -0.946 0.920 0.232
4/12/59 23:00 6.131 20 81 0.935 -1.008 0.932 0.210
2/24/89 11:00 6.370 20 82 0.947 -1.078 0.943 0.188
9/14/44 12:00 6.156 18 83 0.959 -1.159 0.955 0.164
8/22/30 20:00 7.166 10 84 0.970 -1.257 0.966 0.137
1/12/41 8:00 5.699 8 85 0.982 -1.389 0.978 0.107
8/22/80 17:00 5.914 8 86 0.993 -1.617 0.990 0.068
N (Events) = 86
Inverse of the Return Periods for the Weibull Analysis for 5, 6, 12, 24, 48 
and 72 hours, TR , %
Event Adjusted to 2014 + SLR = +3.0 ft
Gumbel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                   
DTR (Hrs) = γ - β*ln(ln{λTR/(λTR-1)}) 
Weibel Distribution Analysis for Duration by Return Period                                               
DTR = γ + β*LN(λ*TR)^(1/α)
Q, Gumbel Q, WeibelSheet 9 - Current Year+SLR = 3.0 Ft.
y = 0.0204x - 0.1402 




























Weibel Distribution, α = 1.7  
y = 0.048x - 1.864 







































Event Duration Event Duration Event Duration Event Duration Event Duration Event Duration Event Duration
Date Time Elevation Hours Date Time Elevation Hours Date Time Elevation Hours Date Time Elevation Hours Date Time Elevation Hours Date Time Elevation Hours Date Time Elevation Hours
9/19/28 0:00 4.996 6 9/19/28 0:00 5.496 6 9/19/28 0:00 5.996 8 9/19/28 0:00 6.496 11 9/19/28 0:00 6.996 21 9/19/28 0:00 7.496 31 9/19/28 0:00 7.996 33
9/22/29 11:00 3.781 0 9/22/29 11:00 4.281 3 9/22/29 11:00 4.781 5 9/22/29 11:00 5.281 7 9/22/29 11:00 5.781 9 9/22/29 11:00 6.281 11 9/22/29 11:00 6.781 58
8/22/30 20:00 4.166 1 8/22/30 20:00 4.666 2 8/22/30 20:00 5.166 4 8/22/30 20:00 5.666 5 8/22/30 20:00 6.166 7 8/22/30 20:00 6.666 8 8/22/30 20:00 7.166 10
3/22/31 23:00 3.449 0 3/22/31 23:00 3.949 0 3/22/31 23:00 4.449 4 8/22/31 17:00 8.198 6 8/22/31 17:00 8.698 8 8/22/31 17:00 8.798 20 8/22/31 17:00 9.198 57
9/9/32 17:00 3.335 0 11/29/32 10:00 4.436 3 11/29/32 10:00 4.936 5 9/9/32 17:00 4.835 6 9/9/32 17:00 5.335 7 11/27/32 8:00 6.334 9 9/9/32 17:00 6.385 22
9/16/33 18:00 5.719 16 9/16/33 18:00 6.219 18 9/16/33 18:00 6.719 20 9/16/33 18:00 7.219 22 9/16/33 18:00 7.719 34 9/16/33 18:00 8.219 45 9/16/33 18:00 8.719 57
3/20/34 12:00 3.003 0 3/20/34 12:00 3.503 0 3/20/34 12:00 4.003 1 3/20/34 12:00 4.503 4 3/20/34 12:00 5.003 6 3/20/34 12:00 5.503 8 10/5/34 7:00 5.606 20
11/17/35 3:00 3.589 0 11/17/35 13:00 4.191 2 11/17/35 3:00 4.589 6 11/17/35 13:00 5.191 19 11/17/35 13:00 5.691 19 11/17/35 13:00 6.191 21 11/17/35 13:00 6.691 57
9/18/36 10:00 6.274 7 9/18/36 10:00 6.774 8 9/18/36 10:00 7.274 10 9/18/36 10:00 7.774 18 9/18/36 10:00 8.274 20 9/18/36 10:00 8.774 20 9/18/36 10:00 8.274 22
1/29/37 10:00 3.959 0 1/29/37 10:00 4.459 4 1/29/37 10:00 4.959 6 1/29/37 10:00 5.459 9 1/29/37 10:00 5.959 18 1/29/37 10:00 6.459 20 2/6/37 5:00 5.561 44
5/30/38 22:00 3.745 0 5/30/38 22:00 4.245 3 5/30/38 22:00 4.745 5 5/30/38 22:00 5.245 5 5/30/38 22:00 5.745 7 5/30/38 22:00 6.245 8 10/29/38 13:00 5.646 81
8/28/39 20:00 3.412 0 8/28/39 20:00 3.916 0 8/28/39 20:00 4.412 5 8/28/39 20:00 4.912 6 8/28/39 20:00 5.412 8 11/20/39 16:00 5.610 44 11/20/39 16:00 6.110 69
1/24/40 8:00 4.397 2 1/24/40 8:00 4.897 3 1/24/40 8:00 5.397 6 1/24/40 8:00 5.897 7 1/24/40 8:00 6.397 11 1/24/40 8:00 6.897 16 10/1/40 9:00 6.895 22
1/12/41 8:00 2.699 0 1/12/41 8:00 3.199 0 1/28/41 10:00 4.001 1 1/28/41 10:00 4.501 3 1/28/41 10:00 5.001 5 1/12/41 8:00 5.199 7 1/12/41 8:00 5.699 8
9/30/43 10:00 3.870 0 9/30/43 10:00 4.370 3 9/30/43 10:00 4.870 5 9/30/43 10:00 5.370 7 9/30/43 10:00 5.870 9 10/26/43 7:00 5.871 33 10/26/43 7:00 6.371 45
9/14/44 12:00 3.156 0 9/14/44 12:00 3.656 0 9/30/44 20:00 4.455 4 9/30/44 20:00 4.955 5 9/14/44 12:00 5.156 8 9/14/44 12:00 5.656 17 9/14/44 12:00 6.156 18
12/5/45 9:00 4.142 2 12/5/45 9:00 4.642 4 12/5/45 9:00 5.142 6 12/5/45 9:00 5.642 8 12/5/45 9:00 6.142 29 12/5/45 9:00 6.642 55 12/5/45 9:00 7.142 69
1/17/46 9:00 4.127 2 1/17/46 9:00 4.627 3 1/17/46 9:00 5.127 5 3/19/46 23:00 5.125 6 3/19/46 23:00 5.625 7 3/19/46 23:00 6.125 21 3/19/46 23:00 6.625 56
11/1/47 11:00 3.981 0 11/1/47 11:00 4.481 3 11/1/47 11:00 4.981 5 11/1/47 11:00 5.481 7 11/1/47 11:00 5.981 7 11/2/47 11:00 6.481 34 11/1/47 11:00 6.981 82
10/5/48 11:00 4.756 4 10/5/48 11:00 5.256 5 10/5/48 11:00 5.756 7 10/5/48 11:00 6.256 8 10/5/48 11:00 6.756 9 10/5/48 11:00 7.256 20 10/5/48 11:00 7.756 32
5/11/49 20:00 3.780 0 5/11/49 20:00 4.280 2 5/11/49 20:00 4.780 4 5/11/49 20:00 5.280 6 10/16/49 16:00 5.081 8 10/16/49 16:00 5.581 9 10/17/49 17:00 6.380 96
9/6/50 16:00 2.066 0 9/6/50 16:00 2.566 0 9/12/50 21:00 4.266 3 9/12/50 21:00 4.766 5 9/12/50 21:00 5.266 6 9/12/50 21:00 5.766 7 9/6/50 16:00 5.066 32
10/4/51 11:00 4.052 1 10/4/51 11:00 4.552 4 10/4/51 11:00 5.052 5 10/4/51 11:00 5.552 7 10/4/51 11:00 6.052 9 10/4/51 11:00 6.552 31 3/14/51 0:00 5.831 44
2/27/52 10:00 3.637 0 2/27/52 10:00 4.137 1 2/27/52 10:00 4.637 4 2/27/52 10:00 5.137 5 2/27/52 10:00 5.637 6 11/21/52 11:00 5.937 8 12/4/52 11:00 6.135 21
10/23/53 10:00 4.022 1 10/23/53 10:00 4.522 4 8/14/53 10:00 4.622 6 8/14/53 10:00 5.122 9 11/6/53 9:00 5.622 19 11/6/53 9:00 6.122 19 10/23/53 10:00 7.022 22
1/23/54 0:00 3.607 0 1/23/54 0:00 4.107 2 1/23/54 0:00 4.607 5 1/23/54 0:00 5.107 7 1/23/54 0:00 5.607 10 1/23/54 0:00 6.107 20 1/23/54 0:00 6.607 43
6/10/55 0:00 3.191 0 8/12/55 16:00 4.292 3 8/12/55 16:00 4.792 9 8/12/55 16:00 5.292 11 8/12/55 16:00 5.792 13 8/12/55 16:00 6.292 24 6/10/55 0:00 6.191 33
9/27/56 2:00 5.174 8 9/27/56 2:00 5.674 18 9/27/56 2:00 6.174 30 9/27/56 2:00 6.674 32 9/27/56 2:00 7.174 44 9/27/56 2:00 7.674 46 10/28/56 17:00 6.577 120
10/6/57 8:00 4.861 4 10/6/57 8:00 5.361 6 10/6/57 8:00 5.861 7 10/6/57 8:00 6.361 8 10/6/57 8:00 6.861 20 10/6/57 8:00 7.361 32 10/6/57 8:00 7.861 45
10/21/58 18:00 4.547 4 10/21/58 18:00 5.047 7 10/21/58 18:00 5.547 20 10/21/58 18:00 6.047 31 10/21/58 18:00 6.547 45 10/21/58 18:00 7.047 70 10/21/58 18:00 7.547 82
4/12/59 23:00 3.131 0 4/12/59 23:00 3.631 0 4/12/59 23:00 4.131 2 4/12/59 23:00 4.631 5 4/12/59 23:00 5.131 7 4/12/59 23:00 5.631 9 4/12/59 23:00 6.131 20
9/12/60 6:00 4.816 4 9/12/60 6:00 5.316 4 9/12/60 6:00 5.816 5 9/12/60 6:00 6.316 6 9/12/60 6:00 6.816 7 2/1/60 0:00 5.915 20 2/1/60 0:00 6.415 35
10/21/61 19:00 4.302 2 10/21/61 19:00 4.802 4 10/21/61 19:00 5.302 6 10/22/61 8:00 5.500 7 10/22/61 8:00 6.000 9 10/21/61 19:00 6.802 33 10/21/61 19:00 7.302 83
3/7/62 10:00 6.387 9 3/7/62 10:00 6.887 19 3/7/62 10:00 7.387 31 3/7/62 10:00 7.887 44 3/7/62 10:00 8.387 44 3/7/62 10:00 8.887 57 11/27/62 9:00 7.186 69
9/15/63 20:00 3.570 0 9/15/63 20:00 4.070 1 9/15/63 20:00 4.570 3 9/15/63 20:00 5.070 5 9/15/63 20:00 5.570 7 9/15/63 20:00 6.070 8 9/15/63 20:00 6.570 45
9/13/64 16:00 4.657 4 9/13/64 16:00 5.157 7 9/13/64 16:00 5.657 17 9/13/64 16:00 6.157 19 9/13/64 16:00 6.657 21 9/13/64 16:00 7.157 43 9/22/64 9:00 6.657 57
1/16/65 21:00 3.842 0 1/16/65 21:00 4.342 3 1/16/65 21:00 4.842 5 1/16/65 21:00 5.342 6 1/16/65 21:00 5.842 7 1/16/65 21:00 6.342 20 6/16/65 23:00 6.041 44
1/27/66 0:00 3.427 0 1/27/66 0:00 3.927 0 1/27/66 0:00 4.427 4 1/27/66 0:00 4.927 6 1/27/66 0:00 5.427 9 1/27/66 0:00 5.927 20 1/27/66 0:00 6.427 31
9/16/67 19:00 3.812 0 9/16/67 19:00 4.312 3 9/16/67 19:00 4.812 5 9/16/67 19:00 5.312 6 9/16/67 19:00 5.812 8 9/16/67 19:00 6.312 20 9/16/67 19:00 6.812 34
5/27/68 21:00 3.997 0 5/27/68 21:00 4.497 4 5/27/68 21:00 4.997 6 5/27/68 21:00 5.497 8 5/27/68 21:00 5.997 29 5/27/68 21:00 6.497 31 5/27/68 21:00 6.997 33
3/2/69 7:00 3.982 0 3/2/69 7:00 4.482 4 3/2/69 7:00 4.982 6 3/2/69 7:00 5.482 18 3/2/69 7:00 5.982 20 3/2/69 7:00 6.482 22 3/2/69 7:00 6.982 44
10/27/70 7:00 3.567 0 10/27/70 7:00 4.067 1 10/27/70 7:00 4.567 5 10/27/70 7:00 5.067 6 10/27/70 19:00 5.465 8 10/27/70 7:00 6.067 44 10/27/70 7:00 6.567 69
3/26/71 21:00 4.051 1 3/26/71 21:00 4.551 3 3/26/71 21:00 5.051 5 4/6/71 17:00 4.852 8 4/6/71 17:00 5.352 16 10/19/71 9:00 6.052 32 10/19/71 9:00 6.552 70
5/26/72 20:00 3.435 0 9/21/72 7:00 4.496 1 9/21/72 7:00 4.996 4 9/21/72 7:00 5.496 6 9/21/72 7:00 5.996 7 5/26/72 20:00 5.935 33 5/26/72 20:00 6.435 56
2/11/73 3:00 4.122 2 2/11/73 3:00 4.622 5 2/11/73 3:00 5.122 7 2/11/73 3:00 5.622 8 2/11/73 3:00 6.122 1 2/11/73 3:00 6.622 31 2/11/73 3:00 7.122 33
6/28/74 4:00 2.946 0 12/1/74 10:00 4.177 1 12/1/74 10:00 4.677 4 12/1/74 10:00 5.177 5 12/1/74 10:00 5.677 8 12/1/74 10:00 6.177 8 6/28/74 4:00 5.946 21
11/24/75 13:00 3.160 0 11/24/75 13:00 3.660 0 11/24/75 13:00 4.160 1 11/24/75 13:00 4.660 5 11/24/75 13:00 5.160 6 11/24/75 13:00 5.660 19 11/24/75 13:00 6.160 33
3/10/76 3:00 2.785 0 3/10/76 3:00 3.285 0 3/10/76 3:00 3.785 0 3/10/76 3:00 4.285 4 3/10/76 3:00 4.785 6 3/10/76 3:00 5.285 9 3/10/76 3:00 5.785 31
10/14/77 10:00 4.321 3 10/14/77 10:00 4.821 4 10/14/77 10:00 5.321 5 10/14/77 10:00 5.821 6 10/14/77 10:00 6.321 7 12/19/77 5:00 5.811 33 10/29/77 11:00 6.150 93
4/27/78 0:00 5.337 6 4/27/78 0:00 5.837 7 4/27/78 0:00 6.337 30 4/27/78 0:00 6.837 32 4/27/78 0:00 7.337 43 4/27/78 0:00 7.837 45 4/27/78 0:00 8.337 58
9/24/79 11:00 3.160 0 9/24/79 11:00 3.660 0 9/24/79 11:00 4.160 2 9/24/79 11:00 4.660 5 9/24/79 11:00 5.160 6 9/24/79 11:00 5.660 7 9/24/79 11:00 6.160 57
1/5/80 12:00 3.046 0 1/5/80 12:00 3.546 0 1/5/80 12:00 4.046 2 8/22/80 17:00 4.415 4 8/22/80 17:00 4.915 6 8/22/80 17:00 5.415 7 8/22/80 17:00 5.914 8
8/20/81 12:00 3.730 0 11/14/81 11:00 4.191 3 11/14/81 11:00 4.691 5 8/20/81 12:00 5.230 6 8/20/81 12:00 5.730 8 8/20/81 12:00 6.230 8 8/20/81 12:00 6.730 22
10/25/82 4:00 4.775 5 10/25/82 4:00 5.275 10 10/25/82 4:00 5.775 17 10/25/82 4:00 6.275 29 10/25/82 4:00 6.775 32 10/25/82 4:00 7.275 44 10/25/82 4:00 7.775 56
1/28/83 9:00 3.811 0 1/28/83 9:00 4.311 3 2/11/83 9:00 4.782 6 2/11/83 9:00 5.282 8 2/11/83 9:00 5.782 18 9/29/83 15:00 5.780 21 9/29/83 15:00 6.280 45
10/14/84 12:00 3.294 0 10/14/84 12:00 3.794 0 10/14/84 12:00 4.294 3 10/14/84 12:00 4.794 5 10/14/84 12:00 5.294 7 10/14/84 12:00 5.794 44 10/14/84 12:00 6.294 68
11/2/85 11:00 3.631 0 11/2/85 11:00 4.131 2 11/2/85 11:00 4.631 4 11/4/85 16:00 4.760 8 11/4/85 16:00 5.260 10 11/2/85 11:00 6.131 69 11/2/85 11:00 6.631 132
8/17/86 20:00 4.118 1 8/17/86 20:00 4.618 3 8/17/86 20:00 5.118 5 8/17/86 20:00 5.618 6 8/17/86 20:00 6.118 7 8/17/86 20:00 6.618 7 10/10/86 15:00 5.736 33
1/1/87 22:00 4.221 1 1/1/87 22:00 4.721 3 3/10/87 5:00 4.541 6 3/10/87 5:00 5.041 9 3/10/87 5:00 5.541 20 3/10/87 5:00 6.041 35 3/10/87 5:00 6.541 47
4/13/88 7:00 4.366 3 4/13/88 7:00 4.866 5 4/13/88 7:00 5.366 7 4/13/88 7:00 5.866 19 4/13/88 7:00 6.366 32 4/13/88 7:00 6.866 34 4/13/88 7:00 7.366 57
2/24/89 11:00 3.370 0 2/24/89 11:00 3.870 0 9/19/89 11:00 4.321 3 9/19/89 11:00 4.821 5 9/19/89 11:00 5.321 6 2/24/89 11:00 5.870 19 2/24/89 11:00 6.370 20
10/26/90 2:00 3.395 0 10/26/90 2:00 3.895 0 10/26/90 2:00 4.395 6 10/26/90 2:00 4.895 16 10/26/90 2:00 5.395 18 10/26/90 2:00 5.895 31 10/26/90 2:00 6.395 44
10/31/91 16:00 4.029 2 10/31/91 16:00 4.529 5 10/31/91 16:00 5.029 7 10/31/91 16:00 5.529 9 10/31/91 16:00 6.029 11 10/31/91 16:00 6.529 44 10/31/91 16:00 7.029 82
9/25/92 8:00 4.267 3 9/25/92 8:00 4.767 5 9/25/92 8:00 5.267 5 9/25/92 8:00 5.767 7 10/5/92 16:00 4.827 19 10/5/92 16:00 5.327 31 12/12/92 10:00 6.836 70
1/10/93 10:00 3.652 0 1/10/93 10:00 4.152 2 1/10/93 10:00 4.652 4 1/10/93 10:00 5.152 5 1/10/93 10:00 5.652 7 1/10/93 10:00 6.152 8 12/16/93 11:00 6.379 33
11/17/94 9:00 3.955 0 11/17/94 9:00 4.455 4 11/17/94 9:00 4.955 5 11/17/94 9:00 5.455 7 11/17/94 9:00 5.955 19 11/17/94 9:00 6.455 31 11/17/94 9:00 6.955 56
8/7/95 18:00 3.251 0 8/7/95 18:00 3.751 0 8/7/95 18:00 4.251 2 8/19/95 16:00 4.521 5 8/19/95 16:00 5.021 8 8/19/95 16:00 5.521 32 8/19/95 16:00 6.021 59
10/8/96 19:00 3.712 0 10/8/96 19:00 4.212 2 10/8/96 19:00 4.712 9 10/8/96 19:00 5.212 17 10/8/96 19:00 5.712 18 10/8/96 19:00 6.212 20 10/8/96 19:00 6.712 22
10/19/97 12:00 4.126 2 10/19/97 12:00 4.626 4 10/19/97 12:00 5.126 6 10/19/97 12:00 5.626 7 10/19/97 12:00 6.126 8 10/19/97 12:00 6.626 20 6/3/97 20:00 6.523 33
2/5/98 4:00 5.197 7 2/5/98 4:00 5.697 20 2/5/98 4:00 6.197 33 2/5/98 4:00 6.697 55 2/5/98 4:00 7.197 57 2/5/98 4:00 7.697 70 2/5/98 4:00 8.197 133
8/30/99 12:00 4.201 3 8/30/99 12:00 4.701 5 8/30/99 12:00 5.201 6 8/30/99 12:00 5.701 8 8/30/99 12:00 6.201 46 8/30/99 12:00 6.701 70 8/30/99 12:00 7.201 84
1/25/00 12:00 4.058 1 1/25/00 12:00 4.558 4 1/25/00 12:00 5.058 6 1/25/00 12:00 5.558 16 1/25/00 12:00 6.058 17 9/5/00 14:00 5.758 42 9/5/00 14:00 6.258 55
9/30/01 20:00 3.387 0 9/30/01 20:00 3.887 0 9/30/01 20:00 4.387 3 9/30/01 20:00 4.887 5 9/30/01 20:00 5.387 7 9/30/01 20:00 5.887 43 9/30/01 20:00 6.387 45
10/16/02 5:00 3.248 0 10/16/02 5:00 3.748 0 10/16/02 5:00 4.248 3 10/16/02 5:00 4.748 4 10/16/02 5:00 5.248 6 10/16/02 5:00 5.748 21 10/16/02 5:00 6.248 32
9/18/03 16:00 6.441 9 9/18/03 16:00 6.941 10 9/18/03 16:00 7.441 11 9/18/03 16:00 7.941 13 4/10/03 15:00 5.515 31 4/10/03 15:00 6.015 33 4/10/03 15:00 6.515 81
9/19/04 12:00 3.050 0 9/19/04 12:00 3.550 0 9/19/04 12:00 4.050 1 9/19/04 12:00 4.550 4 9/19/04 12:00 5.050 6 9/19/04 12:00 5.550 19 10/23/04 18:00 6.057 96
4/16/05 2:00 2.760 0 5/6/05 20:00 4.008 1 5/6/05 20:00 4.508 3 10/25/05 3:00 4.850 6 4/16/05 2:00 4.760 18 4/16/05 2:00 5.260 42 4/16/05 2:00 5.760 56
10/7/06 9:00 5.002 6 10/7/06 9:00 5.502 6 9/1/06 14:00 5.021 16 10/7/06 9:00 6.502 20 10/7/06 9:00 7.002 32 11/22/06 10:00 7.663 45 11/22/06 10:00 8.163 67
11/3/07 4:00 3.235 0 11/3/07 4:00 3.735 0 11/3/07 4:00 4.235 4 11/3/07 4:00 4.735 6 11/3/07 4:00 5.235 8 11/3/07 4:00 5.735 31 11/3/07 4:00 6.235 44
9/25/08 18:00 4.283 3 9/25/08 18:00 4.783 5 9/25/08 18:00 5.283 7 9/25/08 18:00 5.783 8 9/25/08 18:00 6.283 21 9/25/08 18:00 6.783 56 9/25/08 18:00 7.283 71
11/12/09 18:00 6.138 31 11/12/09 18:00 6.638 33 11/12/09 18:00 7.138 45 11/12/09 18:00 7.638 57 11/12/09 18:00 8.138 69 11/12/09 18:00 8.638 71 11/12/09 18:00 9.138 83
2/6/10 3:00 4.174 2 2/6/10 3:00 4.674 3 2/6/10 3:00 5.174 4 2/6/10 3:00 5.674 6 2/6/10 3:00 6.174 20 2/6/10 3:00 6.674 32 11/12/10 13:00 6.078 58
8/27/11 19:00 5.970 6 8/27/11 19:00 6.470 7 8/27/11 19:00 6.970 9 8/27/11 19:00 7.470 18 8/27/11 19:00 7.970 19 8/27/11 19:00 8.470 21 11/5/11 5:00 6.244 33
10/29/12 8:00 5.178 7 10/29/12 8:00 5.678 18 10/29/12 8:00 6.178 31 10/29/12 8:00 6.678 32 10/29/12 8:00 7.178 34 10/29/12 8:00 7.678 46 10/29/12 8:00 8.178 48
10/10/13 1:00 3.854 0 10/10/13 1:00 4.354 4 10/10/13 1:00 4.854 6 10/10/13 1:00 5.354 8 10/10/13 1:00 5.854 20 10/10/13 1:00 6.354 33 10/10/13 1:00 6.854 46
11/1/14 16:00 3.422 0 11/1/14 16:00 3.922 0 11/1/14 16:00 4.422 4 11/1/14 16:00 4.922 6 11/1/14 16:00 5.422 7 11/1/14 16:00 5.922 8 12/9/14 11:00 6.179 33









Part 1: Event Tree Tally Sheets 
 
Page 223 - New Pump Station Case 1 
 
Page 224 - New Pump Station Case 2 
 
Page 225 - New Pump Station Case 3 
 
Page 226 - New Pump Station Case 4 
 
Page 227 - New Pump Station Case 5 
 
Page 228 - New Pump Station Case 6 
 
Page 229 - New Pump Station Case 7 
 
Page 230 - Existing Pump Station Case 1 
 
Page 231 - Existing Pump Station Case 2 
 
Page 232- - Existing Pump Station Case 3 
 
Page 233 - Existing Pump Station Case 4 
 
Page 234 - Existing Pump Station Case 5 
 
Page 235 - Existing Pump Station Case 6 
 
Page 236 - Existing Pump Station Case 7 







Pump Station Case 1 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.50 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ali U U U E 0.01 U U O E 0.01 U U U E 0.01 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.11 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U U U E 0.01 U U O E 0.01 U U U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 3.00
Rob U U U E 0.01 U U E O 0.01 U U U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ali U U U E 0.01 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U U U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U U U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01
Ali U E 0.01 U E 0.01 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.01 U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.01 U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.01 0.01
Ali U E 0.01 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
New PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 2 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03
Ali U O E 0.01 U U 0.01 U U E E 0.01 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U U U 0.01 U E 0.01 U E O E 0.01 2.00 2.00 3.00
Rob U O E 0.01 U E 0.01 U U O E 0.01 2.00 2.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ali U U U E 0.01 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U U E O 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U U U E 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.50 0.03 0.02 0.02
Ali U E O E 0.01 U U E 0.01 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U U O E 0.01 U U E 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U U O E 0.01 U E O 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.01 0.01
Ali U E 0.01 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
New PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social








Pump Station Case 3 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.65 0.65
Ali U O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob U O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.35 0.35
Ali U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.35 0.35 0.50 0.35 0.20 0.20
Ali U E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.05 U U U 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.10
Ali U U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost




Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental









Pump Station Case 4 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.35 0.35 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.80 0.80
Ali U E 0.05 O O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U E 0.05 O O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob U E 0.05 O O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.20 0.40
Ali U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.35 0.30 0.30
Ali U E E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike E O E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U E E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.20 0.20
Ali U U 0.10 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U O 0.10 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.10 3.00 3.00 2.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
New PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 5 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.90 0.90 0.50 0.90 0.90
Ali O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.45 0.45
Ali U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.65 0.60 0.60
Ali O E 0.05 O E E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 O U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob O E 0.05 O E E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.35 0.35
Ali U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
New PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 6 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.50 0.95 0.95
Ali O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 O E 0.05 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 3.00
Rob O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.75 0.75
Ali O E 0.05 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 2.00
Rob O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.80
Ali O O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike O O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 2.00
Rob O O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.60 0.60
Ali U E 0.05 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 2.00
Rob O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 2.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
New PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 7 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 5.00 1.00 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 5.00 1.00 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 5.00 1.00 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 5.00 1.00 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
New PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 1 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.50 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ali U U U E 0.01 U U O E 0.01 U U U E 0.01 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.11 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U U U E 0.01 U U O E 0.01 U U U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 3.00
Rob U U U E 0.01 U U E O 0.01 U U U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ali U U U E 0.01 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U U U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U U U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01
Ali U E 0.01 U E 0.01 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.01 U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.01 U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.01 0.01
Ali U E 0.01 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.01 1.00 2.00 2.00
Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social
Existing PS 113
Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump Off







Pump Station Case 2 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03
Ali U O E 0.01 U U 0.01 U U E E 0.01 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U U U 0.01 U E 0.01 U E O E 0.01 2.00 2.00 3.00
Rob U O E 0.01 U E 0.01 U U O E 0.01 2.00 2.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ali U U U E 0.01 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U U E O 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U U U E 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.50 0.03 0.02 0.02
Ali U E O E 0.01 U U E 0.01 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U U O E 0.01 U U E 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U U O E 0.01 U E O 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.01 0.01
Ali U E 0.01 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.01 2.00 2.00 2.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Existing PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 3 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.65 0.65
Ali O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.35 0.35
Ali U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.35 0.35 0.50 0.35 0.20 0.20
Ali U E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U E 0.05 U U U 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.10
Ali U U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 2.00 0.11
Mel
Mike U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Rob U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 2.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Existing PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 4 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Case 1 U = Under O = Over E = Even
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.90 0.90 0.50 0.90 0.90
Ali O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.05 O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.75 0.75
Ali O E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.35 0.30 0.30
Ali U E E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike E O E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob U E E 0.05 U U E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.20 0.20
Ali U U 0.10 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U O 0.10 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob U E 0.10 3.00 3.00 3.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Existing PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 5 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 3.00 3.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 3.00 3.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 3.00 3.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 3.00 3.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.50 0.65 0.65
Ali O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob O E 0.05 O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.35 0.40 0.40
Ali U E E 0.05 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike U O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Rob U O E 0.05 3.00 3.00 3.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Existing PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 6 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 4.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 4.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 4.00 4.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 4.00 4.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.80
Ali O O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike O O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 3.00
Rob O O O E 0.05 O O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 3.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.60 0.60
Ali U E 0.05 4.00 0.55 4.00 0.55 3.00 0.22
Mel
Mike O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 3.00
Rob O E 0.05 4.00 4.00 3.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Existing PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social







Pump Station Case 7 U = Under O = Over E = Even T = Trial
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 5.00 1.00 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 5.00 1.00 4.00 0.55
Mel O E
Mike 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 5.00 1.00 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Expert T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish CI T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 Finish
Start 0.50 0.99 0.99
Ali O E 0.01 4.00 0.55 5.00 1.00 4.00 0.55
Mel
Mike O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Rob O E 0.01 4.00 5.00 4.00
Cost
Pump On Insufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Pump On Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental
Environmental Cost
Pump Off Sufficient Capacity Spill Social Environmental Cost
Existing PS 113
Pump Off Insufficient Capacity Spill Social








Part 2: Event Tree Computations 
 
Page 238 - Summary of Results – Provides graphs of fragility and risk trends for a range 
of sea levels over time. 
 
Page 239 - Case 1 – 2015, 99% Flood Event at Elevation 2.56 feet, NAVD (88) 
 
Page 240 - Case 2 – 2015, 50% Flood Event at Elevation 3.74 feet, NAVD (88) 
 
Page 241 - Case 3 – 2015, 10% Flood Event at Elevation 5.53 feet, NAVD (88) 
 
Page 242 - Case 4 – 2015, 4% Flood Event at Elevation 6.49 feet, NAVD (88) 
 
Page 243 - Case 5 – 2035 Intermediate High SLR Scenario for 4% Flood Event at 
Elevation 7.10 feet, NAVD (88) 
 
Page 244 - Case 6 – 2015 Base Flood for 1% Flood Event at Elevation 8.06 feet, NAVD 
(88) 
 
Page 245 - Case 7 – 2065 Intermediate High SLR Scenario for 4% Flood Event at 
Elevation 8.35 feet, NAVD (88) 
 
Page 246 - Backup Quality Control Worksheet; Used to check consistency of estimated 























1 2015 2.56 0.99 8 23 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.001 23.000 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.001
2 2015 3.74 0.50 21 23 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.001 23.000 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.001
3 2015 5.53 0.10 50 23 0.40 0.04 0.76 0.009 23.000 0.22 0.02 0.70 0.004
4 2015 6.49 0.04 62 23 0.88 0.04 1.24 0.014 23.000 0.41 0.02 0.70 0.003
5 2035 Int High 7.10 0.04 71 34 0.99 0.04 1.24 0.016 34.000 0.74 0.03 0.70 0.006
6 2015 BFE 8.06 0.01 96 23 0.99 0.01 1.24 0.005 23.000 0.91 0.01 1.31 0.003
7 2065 Int High 8.35 0.04 100 74 0.99 0.04 1.84 0.027 74.000 0.99 0.04 2.72 0.027
1. Probability of Failure represents the chance for a spill of wastewater.
PF PL V(A) Risk PF PL V(A) Risk
2015 6.49 0.88 0.04 1.24 0.014 0.41 0.02 0.70 0.003 0.01 0.10
2035 7.10 0.99 0.04 1.24 0.016 0.74 0.03 0.70 0.006 0.01 0.10
2065 8.35 0.99 0.04 1.84 0.027 0.99 0.04 2.72 0.027 0.01 0.10
1. Lower Performance Objective for operational pump station for a 4% design event equal to less than 2% in 50 years. See Limits Calcs sheet.







New PS 113Existing PS 113



















































PF PL V(A) Risk PF PL V(A) Risk
2015-99% 2.56 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.001 0.01 0.10
2015-50% 3.74 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.001 0.01 0.10
2015-10% 5.53 0.40 0.04 0.76 0.009 0.22 0.02 0.70 0.004 0.01 0.10
2015-4% 6.49 0.88 0.04 1.24 0.014 0.41 0.02 0.70 0.003 0.01 0.10





































Probability of Spill, PF for 4-% Event 
vs Time, Cases 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 
Lower PF LImit Existing PS 113 



























Flood Stage Elevation, Ft, NAVD (88) 
Probability of Spill, PF vs Flood 
Stage in 2015, Cases 5, 6 and 7 
Existing PS 113 New PS 113 

























Relative Risk Score, R vs Time for the  
4-% Event, Cases 5, 6 & 7 
Existing PS 113 New PS 113 









ELEVATION: 2.56 Feet, NAVD (88)
Event P 0.990










Event P = Alernative Event P = Event P = Event P = 
Probability 




















V3(x3) V(A)=Σwi*Vi(x i) R=PE*PF*V(A)
Spill 0.01 4.00E-06 3.96E-06 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.15 5.97E-07
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.04
No Spill 0.99 3.96E-04 3.92E-04
Power Off 0.01
Spill 0.01 9.60E-05 9.50E-05 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.09 8.68E-06
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.96
No Spill 0.99 9.50E-03 9.41E-03
Existing Pump 
Station
Spill 0.01 9.90E-05 9.80E-05 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.09 8.95E-06
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.01
No Spill 0.99 9.80E-03 9.70E-03
Power On 0.99
Spill 0.01 9.80E-03 9.70E-03 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.09 8.86E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.99
No Spill 0.99 9.70E-01 9.61E-01






Spill 0.01 4.00E-06 3.96E-06 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.15 5.97E-07
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.04
No Spill 0.99 3.96E-04 3.92E-04
Power Off 0.01
Spill 0.01 9.60E-05 9.50E-05 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.09 8.68E-06
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.96
No Spill 0.99 9.50E-03 9.41E-03
New Pump 
Station
Spill 0.01 9.90E-05 9.80E-05 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.09 8.95E-06
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.01
No Spill 0.99 9.80E-03 9.70E-03
Power On 0.99
Spill 0.01 9.80E-03 9.70E-03 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.09 8.86E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.99
No Spill 0.99 9.70E-01 9.61E-01

























ELEVATION: 3.74 Feet, NAVD (88)
Event P 0.500































V3(x3) V(A)=Σwi*Vi(x i) R=PE*PF*V(A)
Spill 0.03 1.80E-04 9.00E-05 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.17 1.52E-05
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.10
No Spill 0.97 5.82E-03 2.91E-03
Power Off 0.06
Spill 0.01 5.40E-04 2.70E-04 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 2.97E-05
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.90
No Spill 0.99 5.35E-02 2.67E-02
Existing Pump 
Station
Spill 0.02 5.64E-04 2.82E-04 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 3.10E-05
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.03
No Spill 0.98 2.76E-02 1.38E-02
Power On 0.94
Spill 0.01 9.12E-03 4.56E-03 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 5.01E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.97
No Spill 0.99 9.03E-01 4.51E-01






Spill 0.03 1.80E-04 9.00E-05 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.17 1.52E-05
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.10
No Spill 0.97 5.82E-03 2.91E-03
Power Off 0.06
Spill 0.01 5.40E-04 2.70E-04 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 2.97E-05
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.90
No Spill 0.99 5.35E-02 2.67E-02
New Pump 
Station
Spill 0.02 5.64E-04 2.82E-04 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 3.10E-05
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.03
No Spill 0.98 2.76E-02 1.38E-02
Power On 0.94
Spill 0.01 9.12E-03 4.56E-03 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 5.01E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.97
No Spill 0.99 9.03E-01 4.51E-01













Event Tree Analysis - Fragility, PF
Total Expected Value
Spill










ELEVATION: 5.53 Feet, NAVD (88)
Event P 0.100































V3(x3) V(A)=Σwi*Vi(x i) R=PE*PF*V(A)
Spill 0.65 2.75E-01 2.75E-02 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 6.04E-03
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.65
No Spill 0.35 1.48E-01 1.48E-02
Power Off 0.65
Spill 0.35 7.96E-02 7.96E-03 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 1.75E-03
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.35
No Spill 0.65 1.48E-01 1.48E-02
Existing Pump 
Station
Spill 0.20 2.45E-02 2.45E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 3.93E-04
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.35
No Spill 0.80 9.80E-02 9.80E-03
Power On 0.35
Spill 0.10 2.28E-02 2.28E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 3.65E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.65
No Spill 0.90 2.05E-01 2.05E-02






Spill 0.65 8.45E-02 8.45E-03 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 1.86E-03
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.65
No Spill 0.35 4.55E-02 4.55E-03
Power Off 0.20
Spill 0.35 2.45E-02 2.45E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 3.93E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.35
No Spill 0.65 4.55E-02 4.55E-03
New Pump 
Station
Spill 0.20 5.60E-02 5.60E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 8.99E-04
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.35
No Spill 0.80 2.24E-01 2.24E-02
Power On 0.80
Spill 0.10 5.20E-02 5.20E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 8.35E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.65
No Spill 0.90 4.68E-01 4.68E-02














Event Tree Analysis - Fragility, PF
Spill










ELEVATION: 6.49 Feet, NAVD (88)
Event P 0.040































V3(x3) V(A)=Σwi*Vi(x i) R=PE*PF*V(A)
Spill 0.90 8.02E-01 3.21E-02 0.22 0.22 0.55 0.40 1.28E-02
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.90
No Spill 0.10 8.91E-02 3.56E-03
Power Off 0.99
Spill 0.75 7.43E-02 2.97E-03 0.22 0.22 0.55 0.40 1.18E-03
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.10
No Spill 0.25 2.48E-02 9.90E-04
Existing Pump 
Station
Spill 0.30 1.35E-03 5.40E-05 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 1.19E-05
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.45
No Spill 0.70 3.15E-03 1.26E-04
Power On 0.01
Spill 0.20 1.10E-03 4.40E-05 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 9.68E-06
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.55
No Spill 0.80 4.40E-03 1.76E-04






Spill 0.80 2.24E-01 8.96E-03 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 1.97E-03
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.80
No Spill 0.20 5.60E-02 2.24E-03
Power Off 0.35
Spill 0.40 2.80E-02 1.12E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 1.80E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.20
No Spill 0.60 4.20E-02 1.68E-03
New Pump 
Station
Spill 0.30 8.78E-02 3.51E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 5.64E-04
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.45
No Spill 0.70 2.05E-01 8.19E-03
Power On 0.65
Spill 0.20 7.15E-02 2.86E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 4.59E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.55
No Spill 0.80 2.86E-01 1.14E-02














Event Tree Analysis - Fragility, PF
Spill









ELEVATION: 7.10 Feet, NAVD (88)
Event P 0.040































V3(x3) V(A)=Σwi*Vi(x i) R=PE*PF*V(A)
Spill 0.99 9.70E-01 3.88E-02 0.22 0.22 0.55 0.40 0.0155
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.99
No Spill 0.01 9.80E-03 3.92E-04
Power Off 0.99
Spill 0.99 9.80E-03 3.92E-04 0.22 0.22 0.55 0.40 0.0002
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.01
No Spill 0.01 9.90E-05 3.96E-06
Existing Pump 
Station
Spill 0.65 4.55E-03 1.82E-04 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.0000
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.70
No Spill 0.35 2.45E-03 9.80E-05
Power On 0.01
Spill 0.40 1.20E-03 4.80E-05 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.0000
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.30
No Spill 0.60 1.80E-03 7.20E-05






Spill 0.90 5.27E-01 2.11E-02 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 4.63E-03
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.90
No Spill 0.10 5.85E-02 2.34E-03
Power Off 0.65
Spill 0.45 2.93E-02 1.17E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 1.88E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.10
No Spill 0.55 3.58E-02 1.43E-03
New Pump 
Station
Spill 0.60 1.37E-01 5.46E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 8.77E-04
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.65
No Spill 0.40 9.10E-02 3.64E-03
Power On 0.35
Spill 0.35 4.29E-02 1.72E-03 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.16 2.75E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.35
No Spill 0.65 7.96E-02 3.19E-03














Event Tree Analysis - Fragility, PF
Spill









ELEVATION: 8.06 Feet, NAVD (88)
Event P 0.010































V3(x3) V(A)=Σwi*Vi(x i) R=PE*PF*V(A)
Spill 0.99 9.70E-01 9.70E-03 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 5.34E-03
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.99
No Spill 0.01 9.80E-03 9.80E-05
Power Off 0.99
Spill 0.99 9.80E-03 9.80E-05 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 5.39E-05
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.01
No Spill 0.01 9.90E-05 9.90E-07
Existing Pump 
Station
Spill 0.80 6.80E-03 6.80E-05 0.55 0.55 0.22 0.37 2.53E-05
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.85
No Spill 0.20 1.70E-03 1.70E-05
Power On 0.01
Spill 0.60 9.00E-04 9.00E-06 0.55 0.55 0.22 0.37 3.35E-06
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.15
No Spill 0.40 6.00E-04 6.00E-06






Spill 0.95 7.22E-01 7.22E-03 0.55 0.55 0.22 0.37 2.68E-03
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.95
No Spill 0.05 3.80E-02 3.80E-04
Power Off 0.80
Spill 0.75 3.00E-02 3.00E-04 0.55 0.55 0.11 0.31 9.37E-05
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.05
No Spill 0.25 1.00E-02 1.00E-04
New Pump 
Station
Spill 0.80 1.36E-01 1.36E-03 0.55 0.55 0.11 0.31 4.25E-04
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.85
No Spill 0.20 3.40E-02 3.40E-04
Power On 0.20
Spill 0.60 1.80E-02 1.80E-04 0.55 0.55 0.11 0.31 5.62E-05
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.15
No Spill 0.40 1.20E-02 1.20E-04


























ELEVATION: 8.35 Feet, NAVD (88)
Event, PE 0.040































V3(x3) V(A)=Σwi*Vi(x i) R=PE*PF*V(A)
Spill 0.99 9.70E-01 3.88E-02 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.68 2.64E-02
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.99
No Spill 0.01 9.80E-03 3.92E-04
Power Off 0.99
Spill 0.99 9.80E-03 3.92E-04 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.68 2.67E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.01
No Spill 0.01 9.90E-05 3.96E-06
Existing Pump 
Station
Spill 0.99 9.80E-03 3.92E-04 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.68 2.67E-04
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.99
No Spill 0.01 9.90E-05 3.96E-06
Power On 0.01
Spill 0.99 9.90E-05 3.96E-06 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.68 2.69E-06
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.01
No Spill 0.01 1.00E-06 4.00E-08






Spill 0.99 9.70E-01 3.88E-02 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.68 2.64E-02
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.99
No Spill 0.01 9.80E-03 3.92E-04
Power Off 0.99
Spill 0.99 9.80E-03 3.92E-04 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.68 2.67E-04
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.01
No Spill 0.01 9.90E-05 3.96E-06
New Pump 
Station
Spill 0.99 9.80E-03 3.92E-04 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.68 2.67E-04
Insufficient 
Capacity 0.99
No Spill 0.01 9.90E-05 3.96E-06
Power On 0.01
Spill 0.99 9.90E-05 3.96E-06 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.68 2.69E-06
Sufficient 
Capacity 0.01
No Spill 0.01 1.00E-06 4.00E-08
























99% 50% 10% 4% 1% 0.2%
2015 0.00 2.56 3.74 5.53 6.49 8.06 9.89
2025 Inter High 0.28 2.84 4.02 5.81 6.77 8.34 10.17
2035 Inter High 0.61 3.17 4.35 6.14 7.10 8.67 10.50
2045 Inter High 0.98 3.54 4.72 6.51 7.47 9.04 10.87
2055 Inter High 1.40 3.96 5.14 6.93 7.89 9.46 11.29
2065 Inter High 1.86 4.42 5.60 7.39 8.35 9.92 11.75
1. Sea Level 
2. Storm Event elevations from SLR Curves with Flood Levels spreadsheet. Also, Table 12 in report.












Capacity Spill No Spill Spill No Spill Spill No Spill Spill No Spill Decimal Decimal Decimal
1 2015 BFE 2.56 0.99 8 23 0.01 0.99 0.04 0.96 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.010 0.42 0.001
2 2015 BFE 3.74 0.50 21 23 0.06 0.94 0.10 0.90 0.03 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.01 0.99 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.010 0.50 0.001
3 2015 BFE 5.53 0.10 50 23 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.35 0.65 0.65 0.35 0.35 0.65 0.20 0.80 0.10 0.90 0.402 0.76 0.009
4 2015 BFE 6.49 0.04 62 23 0.99 0.01 0.90 0.10 0.45 0.55 0.90 0.10 0.75 0.25 0.30 0.70 0.20 0.80 0.879 1.24 0.014
5 2035 Inter High 7.10 0.04 71 34 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.70 0.30 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.65 0.35 0.40 0.60 0.986 1.24 0.016
6 2015 BFE 8.06 0.01 96 23 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.85 0.15 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.80 0.20 0.60 0.40 0.988 1.84 0.005












Capacity Spill No Spill Spill No Spill Spill No Spill Spill No Spill Decimal Decimal Decimal
1 2015 BFE 2.56 0.99 8 23 0.01 0.99 0.04 0.96 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.010 0.42 0.001
2 2015 BFE 3.74 0.50 21 23 0.06 0.94 0.10 0.90 0.03 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.01 0.99 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.010 0.50 0.001
3 2015 BFE 5.53 0.10 50 23 0.20 0.80 0.65 0.35 0.35 0.65 0.65 0.35 0.35 0.65 0.20 0.80 0.10 0.90 0.217 0.70 0.004
4 2015 BFE 6.49 0.04 62 23 0.35 0.65 0.80 0.20 0.45 0.55 0.80 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.30 0.70 0.20 0.80 0.411 0.70 0.003
5 2035 Inter High 7.10 0.04 71 34 0.65 0.35 0.90 0.10 0.65 0.35 0.90 0.10 0.45 0.55 0.60 0.40 0.35 0.65 0.735 0.70 0.006
6 2015 BFE 8.06 0.01 96 23 0.80 0.20 0.95 0.05 0.85 0.15 0.95 0.05 0.75 0.25 0.80 0.20 0.60 0.40 0.906 1.31 0.003
7 2065 Inter High 8.35 0.04 100 74 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.990 2.72 0.027
Storm Event w/ Wave Set-Up, Feet, NAVD (88)2, 3Sea Level 
Stage     
E(Δt=t2-t1), 
Feet1
Event Tree Analysis for Existing PS 113
Risk 
Score   
R
Event Tree Fragility, PF
Power On














# of MH 
In-
undated









New Pump Station 113
Event Tree Fragility, PF
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